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Introduction
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies across Australia respond
to wildfires that impact the urban interface. When such an event occurs during a period
of intense fire behaviour the conditions are often incompatible with life for persons either
caught in the open or those seeking refuge in a vehicle. In order to improve firefighter
safety and operational effectiveness during landscape scale wildfires, as well as
providing sound engineering guidance to improve community resilience to wildfire
impacts, this text book forms part of the lead author’s PhD and examines critical
components of wildfire response. These components are the wildfire fighting strategies
and tactics applied during a landscape scale wildfire event; the procedures and
protective systems utilised in the event of burnover; operational risk management; and
wildfire resilient urban design. The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering (the Handbook)
provides firefighters, engineers and town planners detailed technical approaches and
analysis to enhance the resilience of communities in areas prone to wildfire impacts, and
enhance the safety and effectiveness of wildfire suppression at the urban interface
during catastrophic wildfire conditions.
Each chapter of the Handbook is designed to build upon the previous, providing a
holistic approach to understanding vegetation and wildfire basics before exploring
evidence based wildfire suppression. The critical linkage between wildfire suppression,
firefighter safety and urban design is also explored. Whilst the primary focus of the
Handbook is wildfire suppression, there are many aspects applicable to urban designers
and policy makers. These are summarized at the conclusion of each chapter.
During the preparation of this book, Australia was suffering from catastrophic wildfires
on both the west and east coasts and tragically civilians and firefighters alike were injured
or killed. The lead author was deployed as a Strike Team Leader from Western Australia
and was tasked with wildfire suppression and property defense near Walcha, NSW. In
addition to his own local experiences in Margaret River in 2011 and Yarloop 2016, during
the 2019 NSW deployment he witnessed first-hand the devastating effects of wildfire on
firefighters and the communities, survived near miss entrapments and nights spent on the
fireground cut off by fire behaviour and falling trees. This book is dedicated to all those
affected by wildfires, particularly for the firefighters of all backgrounds and jurisdictions
who put themselves in harm’s way to protect life, property and the environment. May
the guidance provided in this book help firefighters return safely to their loved ones and
provide enhanced protection of communities in wildfire prone areas.

vii
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1. Wildfire Fuels
1.1

Introduction

For frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and Incident Management Teams alike,
understanding how vegetation type and structure affects wildfire behaviour is critical to the
planning and execution of safe and successful suppression strategies. Just as important is the
understanding of how vegetation is represented in the empirical and physics based models
used to predict wildfire spread. During mega-wildfires that occur in catastrophic fire weather
conditions, wildfire behaviour through vegetation of even moderate density may be near
impossible to suppress. Conversely, over or under representing fuel structure and density when
completing wildfire behaviour predictions may result in fire behaviour being incorrectly
quantified and inappropriate suppression strategies being recommended.
For urban planners and decision makers reviewing planning applications at the Rural
Urban Interface, including those using AS3959 Construction of buildings in bushfire prone areas
(SAI Global, 2018) and the relevant bushfire planning guidelines in each jurisdiction, it is equally
as important to understand how vegetation contributes to wildfire behaviour. When
considering the benefits and costs of development in Bushfire Prone Areas, misunderstanding
the vegetation related limitations and inherent assumptions of Deemed To Satisfy (DTS) or
simplified planning / construction standards and guidelines can have significant and costly
impacts. Whilst under calculating wildfire behaviour and impacts may result in avoidable loss
of life (of both the public and the firefighters who defend them) and property, inappropriate
identification of fuel structures and resultant calculation of potential wildfire behaviour can
stifle safe and appropriate development and lead to unnecessary expenditure of potentially
hundreds of thousands of dollars in over engineering and redundant infrastructure.
This chapter explores how vegetation structure not only contributes to wildfire behaviour,
but also how it is represented in the models used to predict it on both the fireground and in the
urban planning context. It should be considered the introductory preparation for firefighters
as it represents the first step in “knowing the enemy”.
1.2

Vegetation structure

Wildfire fuel is the vegetation consumed by a fire burning in vegetation regardless of the
size of the fire itself. The term wildfire fuel applies to vegetation involved in a 10m2 fire in the
same manner as the vegetation involved in a 100,000m2 wildfire. Often referred to as fuel
load, wildfire fuel is defined by its physical structure and density. The extent to which fuel load
needs to be defined is dependent on the model used to predict wildfire behaviour. In order
to demystify the concept of wildfire fuels this chapter first discusses the concept of fuel load
and subsequently discusses how this is considered within common empirical and physics based
wildfire models. Understanding the classification of wildfire fuels and how they are represented
in wildfire modelling is the first stage of interpreting modelling outputs and their application in
assessing the suitability of wildfire suppression strategies, construction requirements and land
use planning decisions.
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Figure 1.1: Fuel load by strata

As detailed in Figure 1.1, four main fuel strata layers and the bark layer are considered
(Hines et al., 2010; Gould et al., 2007) when describing wildfire fuels. These are canopy;
elevated; near-surface; and surface fuels as well as the bark. The height of each layer is not
considered in the forest, woodland or grass fuel empirical models of Australian Standard 3959
– Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas (subsequently referred to as AS3959) 1 but is
relevant for heath or scrub fuels and the empirical model of (Gould et al., 2007). Each layer
and description are provided in the list below:
• Canopy fuel is contained in the forest crown. The crown encompasses the leaves and
fine twigs of the tallest layer of trees in a forest or woodland. Crown involvement may
lead to erratic and extreme fire behaviour and contributes to spotting distances.
• Elevated fuel includes shrubs, scrub, and juvenile understory plants up to 2–3m in
height, however, canopy of heights less than 4m can be included when there is no
identifiable separation between the canopy and lower shrubs. The individual fuel
components generally have an upright orientation and may be highly variable in
ground coverage. Elevated fuels influence the flame height and rate of spread of a
fire whilst also contributing to crown involvement by providing vertical fuel structure.
• Near-surface fuels include grasses, low shrubs, and heath, sometimes containing
suspended components of leaves, bark, and twigs. This layer can vary from a few
centimetres to up to 0.6m in height. Near-surface fuel components include a mixture
of orientations from horizontal to vertical. This layer may be continuous or have large
gaps in ground coverage and influences both the rate of spread of a fire and flame
height.

Introduced after the devastating 2009 Victorian Bushfires, AS3959 not only details the
construction enhancements to the Buliding Code of Australia in order to enhance a dwelling’s
resilience to wildfire impacts, it also details the methodology and equations for calculating
wildfire radiant heat flux across all Australian vegetation structures. Bushfire is the Australian
colloquial equivalent of the term ‘wildfire’.
1
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•

•

Surface fuel includes leaves, twigs, and bark on the forest floor. Surface fuel (or litter)
components are generally horizontally layered. Surface fuel usually contributes the
greatest to fuel quantity and includes the partly decomposed fuel (duff) on the soil
surface. This fuel layer influences the rate of spread of a fire and flame depth as well
as contributing to the establishment of a fire post initial ignition.
Bark fuel is the flammable bark on tree trunks and upper branches that contributes to
transference of surface fires into the canopy, embers and firebrands, and subsequent
spot fires.

The consideration of Vegetation Height is only considered in the empirical models of
shrubland, scrub and heath fuel structures and the dry eucalypt forest fire model (DEFFM) of
Gould et al. (2007). The effects of vegetation height on fire line intensity and flame length are
discussed in the following section of this report. For treed structures, whilst vegetation height
has some bearing on the deemed fuel loads assigned within AS3959, it is not considered in the
empirical model itself.
For grasslands structure, the effect of vegetation height is not
considered in any form in AS3959.
The “Framework for an Australian fuel classification to support wildfire management”
(Hollis et al., 2015) provides enhanced taxonomy for fuel classification with greater emphasis
on fuel attributes (composition, geometry, density and physical aspects) within each stratum.
Unfortunately the corresponding fuel load data sets and attributes for each stratum remain
the subject of potential future research. The full potential of the framework may also be limited
by empirical wildfire models which consider binominal fuel structure (understory and total) as
opposed to incorporating the detailed fuel load data presented by (Hollis et al., 2015).
Appropriate definition and consideration of wildfire fuel is essential as it directly affects
calculated wildfire outputs including head fire rate of spread, fire line intensity, flame height
and radiant heat outputs. The manner and detail with which wildfire fuel is considered is largely
dependent on the model applied. The forward Rate of Spread (RoS) and intensity of an active
front of a fire, known as the head fire, is dependent on the fuel available for consumption in
the active flaming front (Alexander, 1982; Alexander & Cruz, 2016). This is incorporated into
existing empirical wildfire models of AS3959 through the consideration of available fuels within
a 1ha assessment area, representative of the active fire area directly behind the head fire.
Typically driven by wind direction, the head fire is the main component of a wildfire
contributing to the RoS and fire behaviour intensity. Subsequently, it is the focus when
calculating radiant heat flux for the purposes of determining the appropriate standard of
bushfire resilient residential construction in AS3959. In landscape scale wildfire scenarios, being
those greater than 1ha, the 1ha area of assessment falls within the greater active fire area,
whilst in sub-landscape scale wildfire scenarios the active fire area instead falls within the 1ha
assessment area. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 1.2. (a) Landscape scale wildfire scenario; and (b) sub-landscape scale wildfire
scenario.

1.3

Consideration of wildfire fuel in empirical models

Wildfire fuels are represented in empirical models through numerical inputs in wildfire
behaviour equations including Rate of Spread (RoS), fire line intensity (I) and flame length (Lf).
AS3959 (cB3) states the appropriate surface (understory) fuel load (w) and overall fuel load
(W) must be determined and that “both the understory and the canopy should be considered
in the assessment. The rate of spread for forest fires should be determined using the understory
fuel loads. Flame heights should be determined on the basis of both the combined understory
and canopy fuels (overall fuel loads) for forest fires.” Further, AS3959 (c1.5.27) defines the
understory as “the vegetation beneath the overstory” whilst AS3959 (c1.5.20) defines the
overstory as “the canopy, being the tallest stratum of the vegetation profile.” This two layered
classification of fuel load requires the surface fuel load to also incorporate all fuel layers below
the canopy as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Mathematically this broadly assumes that despite the complex structure and geometry of
fuel below the canopy, all fuel below the canopy will contribute to fire behaviour as a single
fuel unit, resulting in the assumption of cell dimensions for treed fuel structures illustrated in
Figure 1.33. Cell dimensions for all other fuel structures are identified in Figure 1.4 and consider
understory and total fuel load as the same value.
This two layered mathematical simplification does not necessarily provide true
consideration of the influence of the fuel layers and their contribution to wildfire behaviour,
especially where fires occur in small pockets of vegetation that do not support the
development of a 100m head fire (detailed in section 2.2.3 of this report). Greater
consideration of the impact of wildfire fuels by strata on wildfire behaviour is considered in
Hines et al. (2010) and Gould et al. (2007), however when applied to the models identified in
AS3959, the two layered fuel load classification requires fuel loads to be simplified back to
understory and total fuel density only. The alternative lies in developing new empirical models
that have greater consideration of fuel strata or using physics based models discussed later in
this report.
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Figure 1.3: Cell dimensions treed fuel structures

Figure 1.4: Cell dimensions non-treed fuel structures – scrub, shrub and grassland

Case Study 1 – Models used in Australian Standard 3959
Despite significant variance in fuel structure between vegetation species throughout
Australia, only four empirical models are suggested in AS3959 to quantify wildfire behaviour.
These empirical approaches consist of a wildfire behaviour model enabling calculation of the
physical parameters of wildfire behaviour (each model unique to the classification of
vegetation structure); and separate view factor model, otherwise known as configuration
factor, which details the calculation of the receiving body’s resultant radiant heat flux (the
same view factor model is used regardless of vegetation structure and resultant fire
behaviour). Each of these models assume that all wildfire has attained a quasi-steady rate of
spread (RoS) and are of landscape proportions.
The six wildfire behaviour models detailed in AS3959 are:
• Noble et al (1980) used for all treed fuel structures subsequently classified as Group A
Forest, Group B Woodland and Group F Rainforest;
• Cruz et al (2013) shrub, scrub and heath vegetation structures subsequently classified
as Group C Shrub, D Scrub and E Mallee/Mulga;
• Purton, (1982) for grassland fuel structures subsequently classified as Group G
Grassland;
• Marsden-Smedley et al (1995) for Tussock Moorland subsequently classified as Group H
Grassland specific to Tasmania.
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Alternate models that may be also be suitable are:
• Forest & Woodlands - Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model or DEFFM (Gould et al, 2007);
• Anderson et al (2015) for scrub and heath vegetation structures; and
• Cheney et al (1998) for various vegetation within the identified Rangelands
geographical areas
The empirical models are reliant on prescribed fuel load densities measured in tonnes per
hectare which equates to large cell sizes of a minimum 1ha land area (fuel height may vary).
Further, AS3959 prescribes set fuel load densities for each vegetation structure regardless of
the actual geometry of the vegetation involved in the wildfire or the amount of vegetation
consumed during the fire scenario. This results in fires burning through small areas of vegetation
being modelled as landscape scale fires as opposed to scenario specific heat release rates
that consider the geometry and volume of the fuel consumed. Subsequently the use of
landscape scale models detailed in AS3959 for predicting sub-landscape scale fires (road
reserves, verges, landscaped gardens, vegetation adjacent to rivers etc.) or where there is
restricted fire run potential, limited fuel loads are consumed or substantial boundary walls are
present, may not be appropriate as currently applied and may significantly over estimate
radiant heat flux.
Defining fuel load and structure is perhaps the most critical input of existing empirical
models. It not only determines which mathematical model is applied, each model being
specific to a broad vegetation type (AS3959; Noble, Bary & Gill, 1980; Catchpole et al, 1998;
Marsden-Smedley & Catchpole, 1995), but when used for determining construction standards
for buildings in wildfire prone areas, it also determines which prescribed fuel load is assigned.
The vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour model are detailed in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1. Vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour model (adapted from
AS3959, Table 2.3).
Fire Behaviour
Model

Vegetation
Classification

Vegetation Type

Tall open forest
Tall woodland
Noble et al/
Note: DEFFM is also
suitable as an
alternative

A
Forest

Open forest
Low open forest

Pine plantation

Noble et al /
Note: DEFFM is also
suitable as an
alternative

B
Woodland

Woodland
Open woodland
Low woodland
Low open woodland
Open shrubland

Description
• Trees over 30m high;
• 30-70% foliage cover (may include
understory ranging from rainforest
and tree ferns to low trees and tall
shrubs);
• Found in areas of high reliable
rainfall. Typically dominated by
eucalypts.
• Trees 10-30m high;
• 30-70% foliage cover (may include
understory of sclerophyllous low
trees and tall scrubs or grass).
• Typically dominated by eucalypts.
• Trees 10-30m in height at maturity;
• Generally
comprising
Pinus
species or other softwood species,
planted as a single species for the
production of timber.
• Trees 10-30m high;
• 30-70% foliage cover (may include
understory of sclerophyllous low
trees and tall scrubs or grass).
• Typically dominated by eucalypts.
• Low trees and shrubs 2-10m high;
• Foliage cover less than 10%.

Assigned
fuel load
(t/ha)

w = 25
W = 35

w = 15
W = 25
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Catchpole et al

C
Shrubland

Catchpole et al

D
Scrub

Catchpole et al

E
Mallee /
Malga

Noble et al

F
Rainforest

Purton

G
Grassland

Marsden-Smedley
et al

H
Grassland

• Dominated by eucalypts and
Acacia. Often have a grassy
understory or low shrubs. Acacias
and Casuarina woodlands grade
to Atriplex shrublands in the arid
and semi-arid zones;
• Low open woodland is classified
on the basis of the understory
present.
• Found in wet areas and/or areas
affected by poor soil fertility or
shallow soils.
• Shrubs 1-2m high often comprising
Banksia, Acacia, Hakea and
Closed heath
Grevilea.
Open heath
• Wet heaths occur in sands
adjoining dunes of the littoral
(shore) zone. Montane heaths
occur on shallow or water logged
soils.
• Shrubs <2m high;
• greater than 30% foliage cover.
• Understory may contain grasses.
Low shrubland
Acacia and Casuarina often
dominant in the arid and semiarid zones.
• Found in wet areas and/or areas
affected by poor soil fertility or
shallow soils;
• >30% foliage cover.
Closed scrub
• Dry heaths occur in rocky areas.
• Shrubs >2m high.
• Typical of coastal wetlands and
tall heaths
• Shrubs greater than 2m high;
Open scrub
• 10-30% foliage cover with a mixed
species combination
• Vegetation dominated by shrubs
(especially
eucalypts
and
acacias) with a multi-stemmed
habit;
Tall shrubland
• usually greater than 2m in height;
• <30% foliage cover.
• Understory of widespread to
dense low shrubs (acacias) or
sparse grasses.
Tall closed forest
• >90% foliage cover;
Closed forest
• understory may contain a large
Low closed forest
number of species with a variety
of heights;
• Not dominated by eucalypts
All forms, including situations with shrubs and trees, if the
overstory foliage cover is less than 10%
Tussock Moorland
• All forms of vegetation where the
overstory is dominated by the
species Buttongrass. Only occurs
as a significant vegetation type
in Tasmania.

w = 15
W = 25

w = 25
W = 25

w=8
W=8

w = 10
W = 12
w = 4.5
W = 4.5

w = 17
W = 17
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Some of the confusion regarding wildfire fuel can be attributed to the multiple
inconsistencies between the qualitative and pictorial descriptions of the classifications of
vegetation in AS3959 and the quantified inputs such as vegetation height and foliage cover
used in the calculations (AS3959; DOP, 2016; FPA, 2016). Several of the more significant
inconsistencies that cause confusion regarding wildfire fuels are summarised in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Discrepancies of fuel classification in AS3959
Discrepancy in Fuel Classification in AS3959
Table 2.3, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 requires classification
of treed vegetation structures on the basis of
foliage cover (defined as the proportion of the
ground that would be shaded by foliage when
the sun is shining directly overhead, expressed as
a percentage for each stratum or identifiable
layer of vegetation [AS3959, c1.5.17]):
•
30-70% for Group A Forest
•
10-30% for Group B Woodland
•
10-30% for Group B Open Woodland
(subsequently classified on the basis of
the understory vegetation)
Table B2 identifies the same amount of wildfire
fuel above the surface strata (being 10t/ha) for
both Forest and Woodland vegetation structures
regardless of foliage cover.

Effect on Empirical Modelling
This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A
(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha)
vegetation structures.
In the case of confusion between Group B
Woodlands and Group B Open Woodlands, the
incorrect empirical model being applied for
Group C Shrubland, Group D Scrub or Group G
Grassland understories.
These discrepancies can ultimately result in
significantly different fire engineering outputs
including flame angle, view factor and radiant
heat flux as shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6.

Figure 2.4(B) illustrates Open Woodland as being
a single tree in a field, however the suggested
foliage cover may be interpreted as 30%, the
same as that required for Group A Forest.
Figures 2.4(A) and 2.4(B) illustrate significant
overlap between understory fuel structures as
densities with an almost total absence of
understory fuel for the Low Open Forest
classification.
Table 2.3 Note 2 states “Overstorys of open
woodland, low open woodland, tall open
shrubland and low open shrubland should be
classified to the vegetation type on the basis of
their understorys; others to be classified on the
basis of their overstorys.”
Table 2.3 “Tall woodland” has the same
qualitative description and classification as
Group A Forest resulting in wildfire modelling
reflective of Group A Forest fire behaviour as
opposed to reflecting the reduced understory
fuel structure that defines ‘woodland’ wildfire
fuels.

This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface
fuel load for Group B Woodland (15t/ha) as
opposed to the greater Group A Forest (25t/ha)
being applied.

Table 2.3, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 requires classification
of all treed vegetation greater than 10m in height
and a foliage cover in excess of 90% to be
classified as Group F Rainforest regardless of
climate or species.

This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A
(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha)
vegetation structures.

These discrepancies can ultimately result in
significantly different fire engineering outputs as
shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6.

Wildfire behaviour through dense Eucalypt forest
matching the descriptions in AS3959 Table 2.3 and
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AS3959 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 will consume significant
fuels and result in the highest magnitude of
wildfire intensity.
Empirical modelling using the Group F Rainforest
fuel loads will significantly underestimate radiant
heat flux where treed fuel structures are dense
and significant.

Table 2.3 describes Group C Shrubland as shrub
vegetation less than 2m in height potentially with
foliage cover greater than 30% whilst Group D
Scrub is identified as shrub vegetation greater
than 2m in height, potentially with foliage cover
greater than 30%
Table B2 defines the vegetation height for Group
C Shrubland as 1.5m and the vegetation height
for Group D Scrub and Group E Mallee Mulga as
3m. B2 identifies the ‘fuel type’ for all three
classifications as “Shrub and Heath.”

For modelling the effect is variable fuel load inputs
which result in significantly different engineering
outputs as shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6.
The variance in qualitative descriptions of
vegetation height from that of the empirical
inputs result in potential discrepancy between
vegetation classification and calculated wildfire
behaviour.
The discrepancy in fuel type
description between “shrub and “heath” may
introduce further confusion.
This inconsistency can result in incorrect surface
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group C
(15t/ha), Group D (25t/ha) vegetation structures.
It can also result in the incorrect vegetation height
input being used.
These inconsistencies can ultimately result in
significantly different fire engineering outputs as
shown in figures 1.7 to 1.10.

Using Figures 1.5a-1.5b as a case scenario, the ambiguity surrounding fuel classification
using the qualitative descriptions in AS3959 become apparent. The vegetation structure in the
case scenario could arguably be considered Group A - Low Open Forest or Group B – Open
Woodland as the foliage cover, defined as the “proportion of the ground that would be
shaded by foliage when the sun is directly overhead, expressed as a percentage of each
stratum or identifiable layer of vegetation” (AS3959, c1.5.17), exceeds 30%. Further, the surface
and near surface fuel layer do not clearly fit the description for either category and arguably
does not satisfy the definition of minimal fuel condition, defined as “insufficient fuel to
significantly increase the severity of wildfire attack (recognizable as short-cropped grass for
example, to a nominal height of 100mm)” (AS3959, c2.2.3.2(f)) required to be considered low
threat vegetation and excluded from consideration for calculation of wildfire impacts in
accordance with AS3959.
The effect of these variable fuel load inputs for the scenario examined results in
significantly different wildfire outputs as shown in Figures 4 to 10. The outputs detailed were
calculated using the detailed methodology detailed in AS3959; assuming flat site and
effective slopes; and standard inputs of AS3959 appropriate to each fuel classification.
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Figure 1.5. (a) Case study; and (b) Case study surface fuel.

In accordance with the vegetation descriptions provided in AS3959 the vegetative fuel in
the case study could be qualitatively classified as being Group A Forest, Group B Woodland
or Group F Rainforest (being low closed forest) depending on the individual assessor. Whilst
the same empirical model (McArthur) is applied to each of these vegetation structures, the
associated assigned fuel loads vary significantly. A result is the fire behaviour outputs and
subsequent radiation modelling outputs are vastly different as illustrated in Figures 6-12.
Subsequently, the associated construction responses required under the Building Code of
Australia (ABCB, 2015) for a typical residence could vary by over a hundred thousand dollars
(FPA, 2016) and result in significant over engineering in situations where landscape scale fire
behaviour is not possible. These inconsistencies also facilitate the opportunity for consultants
and home owners alike to underestimate potential wildfire impact in order to reduce
construction costs, leaving houses potentially vulnerable where landscape scale wildfire
impacts occur. This subsequently highlights the need for comprehensive understanding of
wildfire engineering with greater analysis of fuel loads where landscape scale fire behaviour is
not possible, typically within the urban and peri-urban area, as opposed to blind reliance on
the broad qualitative descriptions and simplified radiant heat flux tables detailed in AS3959.
Flame angle comparison between treed vegetation classifications
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Figure 1.6. Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel
structures

View factor comparison between treed vegetation classifications
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Figure 1.7. View factor as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel
structures

Radiant heat flux comparison between treed vegetation classifications
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Figure 1.8. Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel
structures
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Radiant heat flux comparison between vegetation classifications
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Figure 1.9. Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – Woodland
and open woodland structures (open woodland modelling based on the understory structure)

Flame angle comparison between vegetation classifications
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Figure 1.10. Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub, scrub
and grassland
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View factor comparison between vegetation classifications
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Figure 1.11. View factor as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub, scrub
and grassland

Radiant heat flux comparison between vegetation classifications
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Figure 1.12. Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub,
scrub and grassland
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Case Study 2 – Project Vesta and Hazard Ratings
Two of the aims of Project Vesta, perhaps the most significant research project into fire
behaviour through dry eucalypt forest of recent times, were to (Gould et al., 2007, piii):
i.
develop new algorithms describing the relationship between fire spread and
wind speed, and fire spread and fuel characteristics including load, structure
and height; and
ii.
develop a fuel hazard assessment guide that provides quantitative description
of fuel hazard and its effects on fire behaviour.
The published results have subsequently been adapted to other jurisdictions including
Victoria (Hines et al., 2007) and South Australia (DENR, 2011).
Unlike the two layered fuel structure incorporated by the models suggested in AS3959,
the dry eucalypt model of Gould et al. (2007) considers three fuel layers contributing to head
fire rate of spread being surface, near-surface and elevated fuels (illustrated in Figure 1, with
bark fuels being used to estimate potential spotting distances. Using the approach of Gould
et al. (2007) fuels in each strata are assigned hazard scores based on qualitative descriptions
and the assessor’s inspection. If the approach of Gould et al. (2007) is used, fuel loads are first
assigned hazard ratings which are then converted to the required hazard scores shown in
Table 1.3.

Table 1.3. Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al., 2007, Table 9.3, reproduced with permission
from L.McCaw on behalf of CSIRO and the Department Environment and Conservation)

Fuel Hazard Rating
Low
Moderate
High
Very High
Extreme

Surface
1
2
3
3.5
4

Vesta Fuel Hazard Score
Near-surface
1
2
3
3.5
4

Elevated
1
2
3
3.5
4

Bark
0
1
2
3
4

The assigned scores are subsequently utilised in the head fire rate of spread equation (see
Chapter 2). The approach of Gould et al. (2007) not only provides greater consideration of
wildfire fuel structure than the empirical methods detailed in AS3959, but also provides a guide
to potential spotting behaviour resulting from fire brands. Specific to dry eucalypt forest with
litter and shrub understory, Gould et al., (2007) does not allow assessment of fuel loads or fire
modelling in woodland, shrub, or grassland fuel structures. Perhaps the main benefit of Gould
et al. (2007) is the ability to vary fuel loads on the basis of ground truthing and field
interrogation, even if this is somewhat subjective and constrained by the assumptions of 100m
head fire width and sufficient vegetation geometry to sustain landscape scale wildfire
behaviour.
The calculated rates of spread and flame heights from the model can
theoretically be combined with the view factor model of AS3959 to calculate radiant heat
flux, however there is no evidence within the literature to support one approach over the other.
1.4

Consideration of sub-landscape scale vegetation geometry

Within the urban environment, wildfire growth in road reserves, urban parklands, and
similar scenarios can be restricted by the geometry of the available fuel beds. Current
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approaches of AS3959 suggest modification of the head fire width may be appropriate in
these instances. However, whilst the width of the head fire is a vital component in determining
radiant heat flux, head fire widths greater than 40m resulted in negligible differences between
the view factor and radiant heat flux within 30m of the flame front (Penney, 2017). Through
analysis of heat release rates, the same study identified that reduction of head fire width alone
without further consideration of fuel bed geometry was not suitable in scenarios where the fuel
bed geometry restricted fire growth. It was subsequently identified that:
1. Regardless of the actual geometry and coverage of fuel within the assessment area,
AS3959 assumes landscape scale wildfire behaviour with a 100% homogenous fuel loading
within the assessment area and a head fire width of 100m;
2. When fuel bed geometry prevents a 100m head fire or quasi-steady RoS being obtained,
failure to adjust wildfire fuel inputs may result in significant overestimation of wildfire
impact, particularly radiant heat flux; and
3. In order to more accurately model wildfires in fuel beds that restrict fire growth, it is
necessary to calculate available fuel loads that will contribute to fire behaviour over the
area being assessed using the vegetation availability factor equation as described below.
As previously published (Penney & Richardson, 2019), whilst the head fire flame width
should be considered as the width of the continuous fuel contributing to the active fire front,
the area covered by potential fuel load available for contribution to the RoS and intensity of
the active fire as a fraction of the total assessment area is defined as the vegetation availability
factor (VF), given by
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 =

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚2 )
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚2 )

(1.1)

where the fuel cell area is the coverage of vegetation present within a 100 m by 100 m
assessment area directly in front of the receiving body. The available surface fuel load wA
(t/ha), and the available total fuel load WA (t/ha), are then defined as

and

𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 = 𝑤𝑤 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹

(1.2)

𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 𝑊𝑊 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹

(1.3)

where 𝑤𝑤 and 𝑊𝑊 are respectively the surface fuel load and total fuel load sourced from
relevant jurisdictional data sets.
The calculated fuel loads can then be applied to the relevant fire behaviour equations of
RoS , fire line intensity, and flame length for the purposes of determining the suitability of wildfire
fighting strategies and tactics or for calculating the radiant heat flux on receiving bodies in the
path of the head fire. Where models do not consider the fuel load when calculating RoS , the
vegetation availability factor can still be applied for the purposes of calculating radiant heat
flux, fire line, and intensity.
Individual Trees and Small Garden Beds
Where individual vegetation or small vegetation beds are present that would result in an
isolated fire but would not facilitate the type of fire propagation present during wildfire events,
it is appropriate to model those instances accordingly. This is discussed in further in Chapter 2.
1.5

Consideration of wildfire fuel in physics based modelling

As opposed to empirical models derived from statistical data, physics based wildfire
modelling involve computational models that considers interaction of atmosphere, fire and
vegetative fuel using partial differential equations to solve for filtered fire spread. Physics based
models predict the wind flow through and above the fuel strata, incorporates ‘chemical
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kinetics’ to describe the drying and pyrolysis and simplified combustion equation to predict
combustion of the vegetation in defined time steps.
Significantly more complex than empirical approaches, physics based models such as
Firestar require both atmospheric quantities and vegetation inputs (Finney & McAllister, 2011;
Pimont et al., 2006) to be defined on a two or three-dimensional spatial grid. Some models
including the Wildland Fire Dynamic Simulator (WFDS) allows the resolution of the grid to be
altered to suit the specific scenario with fine grid sizes as small as 1.6m x 1.6m x 1.4m (Pimont
et al., 2006), allowing vegetation structures and fires of almost all scales to be modelled. This
enables enhanced analysis of potential wildfire behaviour compared to traditional empirical
models by accounting for each mechanism of heat transfer (conduction, convection and
radiation) (Porterie et al., 2005; Finney & McAllister, 2011; Finney et al., 2015) but subsequently
requires powerful computers and extended analysis durations (Cruz et al., 2014). Whilst the use
of physics based models is widely accepted in traditional fire engineering analysis (ABCB, 2005;
SFPE, 2008) its use in the prediction of wildfire behaviour in Australia remains in its relative
infancy in part due to the complex computational analysis required (Cruz et al., 2014).
One of the main characteristics of physics based wildfire modelling is the requirement to
input spatial and physical characteristics for each fuel type and structure within the cell to be
analysed. This permits the modelling and evaluation of heterogeneous fuels in a single
simulation (Cruz et al., 2014; Parsons, Sauer & Linn, 2010). The result of the analysis is a fire ‘map’
with outputs including fire line intensity, temperature and radiant heat flux captured at set
timed intervals in a separate spreadsheet.
Physics based models categorise wildfire fuel into two separate layers being surface and
raised fuels. Unlike empirical approaches however, the two categories of fuel are not simply
modelled as two distinct fuel layers. Fuel structures within each layer are represented as
individual fuel units within the confines of the grid resolution (Cruz et al., 2014; Parsons, Sauer &
Linn, 2010). A comparison between the two approaches is illustrated in Figure 1.13 and
enables individual trees to be considered separately as opposed to the empirical approach
of an entire forest being modelled as a single fuel unit.

Figure 1.13. Empirical (left) compared to WFDS (right) wildfire fuel cells

Input parameters for surface fuels including grasses and litter are the descriptors of the fine
fuels, which are vegetation with a diameter or thickness of approximately 6 mm or less. If the
surface vegetation is not uniform in size then the loading in each representative size class (i.e.,
surface-to-volume ratio) can be inputted. Grasses, for example, are more likely to be
sufficiently represented by one value of the surface-to-volume ratio and the fuel loading would
be for that size class. However, litter may be better represented using more than one surfaceto-volume ratio. Input parameters for raised fuels include trees and shrubs that are large
enough to be resolved on the computational grid. For example, if the grid cells are 1 m cubes
and the shrubs are 0.5 m tall, then they are not resolved. Where raised fuels are not considered
due to grid resolution they are modelled as surface vegetation.
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Similar to WFDS, FIRETEC is a three dimensional physics based model for fires through
vegetation. It relies on the formulations of physics and chemistry to model the fire behaviour
through vegetation in cells of horizontal grid resolution as small as 2m and fine fuel grid
resolution as small as 0.05m (Pimont et al., 2006).
WFDS has two distinct ways of modelling vegetative fuels, being the Fuel Element (FE)
model for vegetation that occupies a specified volume such as trees (for example, Douglas fir
trees are modelled as cones), and the Boundary Fuel (BF) model for surface fuels such as
grasslands.
In the FE model thermally thin vegetation is represented on a three-dimensional grid.
Porterie et al. (2005, p573) describes the gas phase grid as the pyrolized fuel vapour leaving
the fuel material, diffusing with the available oxidizer and forming a combustible mixture
ahead of the flaming edge that is subsequently ignited by the flame itself. The gas phase grid
requires sufficient resolution so that temperature gradients and conjugate heat transfer
between the gas and solid phases in the fuel bed can be calculated to an acceptable level.
As a result, it is regarded as providing better predictions than the BF model if adequately
resolved, however it is also both computationally intensive and time consuming.
The BF model utilises a vertical grid with sufficiently high spatial resolution to capture
vertical radiant heat transfer. A horizontal grid is also utilised similar to the FE model, typically
however with larger resolution. The underlying assumptions of the BF model are most consistent
with landscape scale fires in which the majority of heat release and radiant emission occurs
vertically above the thermally degrading surface fuel bed.
Two models may be utilised for thermal degradation of wildfire fuel, ‘Linear’ or ‘Arrhenius’,
both derived from empirical studies. The Linear model assumes a two-stage endothermic
thermal decomposition (water evaporation and then solid fuel pyrolysis). In contrast, the
Arrhenius model considers a three-stage endothermic thermal decomposition being water
evaporation, solid fuel pyrolysis and subsequent char oxidisation (Morvan & Dupuy, 2014). Solid
fuels are represented as a series of layers that are consumed from the top down until the solid
mass reaches a predetermined char fraction at which point the fuel is considered consumed
(Cruz et al., 2014). The model then continues the process throughout the fuel structures in
predetermined time intervals providing illustrative and tabularised outputs.
1.6

Use of existing data to advance physics based models

The structural framework provided by Hollis et al. (2015) includes several of the fuel
characteristic inputs required for physics based modelling. By combining datasets when
information becomes available, improvements to both empirical and physics based models
may be achieved. Table 1.4 summarises the status of fuel attributes within existing data sets
and how they correspond to physics based inputs.

Table 1.4. Fuel attributes
Fuel Attribute from Hollis
et al.
Mass

Equivalent Attribute for
physics based models
Mass

Compactness

Density

Mineral content
Heat content

Specific heat

Notes
Mass is not currently considered in empirical
models which rely on density in (t/ha).
Compactness is not currently considered in
empirical models.
Not considered in either form of model.
Considered in empirical models through
Heat of combustion, being 18600kJ/kg. This
would be altered in physics based models to
suit the individual fuel. Data sets from physics
based models could be applied to empirical
scenarios.
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Density

Density

Horizontal continuity

Fuel geometry

Particle shape and size

Fuel geometry

Surface area

Height to
canopy

Fuel geometry

base

of

Fuel geometry

-

Drag coefficient

-

Char component

-

Pyrolysis range

Empirical models utilise t/ha, however
physics based models would rely on density
in 3 dimensions.
Existing empirical models do not consider
horizontal continuity due to the 1ha grid size.
For physics based models the fuel geometry
can be manually inputted to suit the specific
scenario.
Empirical models do not consider particle
size due to the 1ha grid size. Particle size is
captured in physics based models through
enhanced definition of fuel geometry.
The shape of the fuel (cylindrical, conical or
cubic for instance) can also be considered.
Empirical models do not consider surface
area. Surface area is captured in physics
based models through enhanced definition
of fuel geometry.
Whilst empirical models use canopy height
as a guide to selecting vegetation fuel load
inputs, they do not consider height to base
of canopy in the calculation of fire
behaviour itself. Physics based models can
capture this through detailed fuel geometry
inputs.
A coefficient derived from empirical
correlation for laminar or turbulent flow
around a simplified shape.
Individually
imputed for each specific scenario and
affects physics based modelling of fire
behaviour. Not considered in empirical
approaches.
Determines the point at which the fuel is
considered completely consumed in physics
based models and value depends on
individual scenario.
Not considered in
empirical models.
When the pyrolysis starts and finishes,
assessed in set time steps in physics based
modelling. Not considered in empirical
models.

Existing data sets are limited, however combining the accepted empirical two layered
fuel loads detailed in AS3959 with analysis of fuel strata detailed in (Hines et al., 2010; Gould et
al., 2007; Hollis et al., 2015) may provide a suitable starting point for vegetation fuel inputs
required for physics based modelling. Tables 1.5 to 1.8 detail suggested bulk densities for initial
analysis and comparison against existing empirical models (Penney, 2017).
The suggested fuel loads in Tables 1.5 to 1.8 have been determined by adapting the
existing data sets identified for the associated empirical models to the three-dimensional t/m3
from the existing two-dimensional t/ha that may be suitable in the absence of other data. In
the absence of other data they may provide suitable inputs.
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Table 1.5. Suggested bulk density Forest
Fuel Strata
Surface
Near Surface
Elevated
Bark
Canopy
A
B

Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare
AS3959
(Hines et al., 2010)
2-20
1-8
0-8
0-7
n/a

25
10

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3
(Overlap will occur between strata if
height is less than 1m)
25A
4
1
1B

Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell
Assuming 100% foliage cover

Table 1.6. Suggested bulk density Woodland
Fuel Strata
Surface
Near Surface
Elevated
Bark
Canopy
A
B

Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare
AS3959
(Hines et al., 2010)
2-20
1-8
0-8
0-7
n/a

15
10

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3
(Overlap will occur between strata if
height is less than 1m)
10A
2
1
0.3B

Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell
Assuming 30% foliage cover

Table 1.7. Suggested bulk density Scrub
Fuel Strata
Surface
Near Surface
Elevated
Bark
Canopy
A
B

Bulk Density in tonnes per
hectare (AS3959)

25
0

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3

15A
0
10B

Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell
Assuming 100% foliage cover

Table 1.8. Suggested bulk density Shrub
Fuel Strata
Surface
Near Surface
Elevated
Bark
Canopy
A
B

Bulk Density in tonnes per
hectare (AS3959)

15
0

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3

10A
0
5B

Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell
Assuming 100% foliage cover
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1.7

Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s

Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and severity of wildfires.
During periods of elevated fire weather conditions, mega-wildfires in through continuous
vegetation structures (particularly in forest and woodlands), no amount of resources or water
(see Chapters 4-6) will be able to suppress the head fire. Firefighting strategies in these
situations should therefore focus on areas of opportunity where vegetation structure,
particularly surface, near surface and elevated fuels are limited and the vegetation geometry
does not support a continuous wildfire front. The removal of fuel immediately adjacent to
assets and communities through ‘dry’ firefighting strategies such as backburning (see Chapter
4) may need to be considered early in firefighting campaigns.
1.8

Implications for frontline fire behaviour specialists and urban planners

To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the accuracy of modelled
wildfire outputs the following is recommended:
i.
Classification of vegetation based solely on qualitative descriptors should not override the wildfire behaviour model applied to the scenario without due
consideration of the wildfire behaviour expected to occur through the vegetation.
Using the case study previously provided as an example, whilst the vegetation
could reasonably be classified as Class A Forest or Class B Woodlands, applying
the Noble et al wildfire behaviour model to either of these options without
modifying the deemed fuel loads would significantly result in over-estimation of
wildfire outputs. In urban areas where vegetation geometry restricts wildfire
growth, a more appropriate and accurate approach is to assess the fuel load
utilizing Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores and apply the correct vegetation availability
factor. Further guidance on this can be found in Chapters 2 and 3; and
ii.
Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning perspectives) involved
in modelling wildfire and calculating potential impacts require a sound
understanding of the respective models and their limitations. Caution should be
applied when attempting to ‘simplify’ complex equations, models or engineering
concepts in standards, guidance material or documents for use by lay persons or
in land use planning decisions. The profession of wildfire engineering is in its infancy
and job titles do not necessarily equate to the knowledge and skills required to
complete the required technical analysis or make informed and accurate
decisions. This can be in part be remedied by professionalization / accreditation
of the sector and greater recognition of the role of fire safety engineers with wildfire
backgrounds in it.
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2. Modelling Wildfire Behaviour
2.1

Introduction

Understanding how wildfire behaves and how this behaviour is modelled is the next step
for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists IMT’s and urban planners. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the relationship between wildfire inputs and the empirical wildfire behaviour models and the
radiation view factor model adopted throughout Australia. This chapter discusses each of the
empirical wildfire components, whilst the radiation model is explored in the next chapter.
Accurately modelling wildfire behaviour is important as it is used to assist determine the
suitability of wildfire suppression strategies and tactics (Chapter 4), as well as for determining
the suitability of development in bushfire prone areas.
Empirical Wildfire
model

Atmospheric conditions selected (Fire Danger
Index or Wind Speed)

Vegetation classification (fuel structure, fuel load, empirical
model)

Site parameters (slope under vegetation and
site slope)
WIldfire behaviour outputs empirically
calculated (Rate of Spread, Flame Length,
Intensity)

Inputs include:
• Empirical model
• Fuel load
• Vegetation height
• Wind speed
• Slope
Outputs include:
• Rate of Spread
• Intensity
• Flame length

Reciever inputs determined (Height of
receiver, distance to receiver)

Geometry of the radiant heat panel determined from bushfire
behaviour outputs (Flame Angle, Flame Height, Flame Width)

View factor calculated

Radiation model
Inputs include:
• Head fire width
• Separation
between receiver
and head fire

•
•
•

Outputs include:
Flame angle
View factor
Radiant heat flux

Radiant heat flux calculated
Figure 2.1. Relationship between bushfire and radiation models

2.2

Fire Weather

The influence of weather on wildfire behaviour and the potential difficulty of wildfire
suppression is considered through the use of fire danger indices (Dowdy et al., 2009). In
2-1
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Australia, the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FDI) is used to account for the effect of
weather on forest wildfires. The FDI is calculated by (Nobel et al, 1980):

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 2𝑒𝑒 (−0.45+0.987𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)−0.0345𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅+0.0338𝑇𝑇+0.0234𝑉𝑉)

(2.1)

Where:
DF is drought factor (given as a number between 0 and 10 representing the influence of
recent temperatures and rainfall events on fuel availability)
RH is relative humidity (%)
T is temperature (C)
V is wind speed at 10m (kph)
For grassfires, the Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) is calculated by (Cruz et al, 2015)

GFDI= 2exp (−23.6 + 5.01 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶) + 0.0281𝑇𝑇 − 0.266√𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.633�𝑈𝑈10

(2.2)

where:
C is degree of curing (%)
T is air temperature (°C)
RH is relative humidity (%)
U10 is average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1)

Whilst Dowdy et al. (2009, Figure 2, p10) report the 95th and 99th percentile FDI’s throughout
Australia from 2000 to 2007, future projected changes in FDI forecast widespread increases in
the severity of near-surface fire weather throughout Australia (Dowdy, 2018; Dowdy et al.,
2019) as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Alternatively, AS3959 provides alternate FDI datasets,
summarised in Table 2.1.

Figure 2.2. The 99th (upper panel) and 95th (lower panel) percentiles of the FDI. (image from Dowdy
et al. 2009, used with permission from the Bureau of Meteorology)
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Table 2.1: FDI and GFDI (excluding alpine areas)

Jurisdiction

Forest Fire Danger Index

Australian Capital Territory
New South Wales
Northern Territory
Queensland
South Australia
Tasmania
Victoria
Western Australia

100
80-100
40
40
80
50
100
80

Grassland Fire Danger
Index
130
110-130
50
50
110
70
130
110

During extreme wildfire events strong and deep convection can occur within the fire
plume (Dowdy et al., 2019). This phenomenon is termed pyroconvection. Condensation of
moisture within the fire plume can release latent heat, resulting in enhanced convection and
the formation of clouds known as pyrocumulus. In severe cases thunderstorms, (known as
pyrocumulonimbus), and pyrogenic lightning may result in multiple additional wildfire ignitions.
The feedback processes involved in such extreme weather events includes significant
variations in surface wind speed and direction that results in unpredictable and dangerous
wildfire behaviour and directional changes (Peace et al. 2017; Potter, 2012). The Continuous
Haines index (CH) is a numerical index between 0-13 which provides an indication of how dry
and unstable the atmosphere is above the surface and therefore the potential for the
formation of dangerous pyroconvective processes (Dowdy et al, 2019; Mills & McCaw, 2010;
Potter, 2012; Potter, 2018). Values of 10 or more are considered significant and require
additional vigilance to be exercised during wildfire suppression efforts.
The CH is calculated by (Dowdy et al, 2019; Mills and McCaw, 2010):
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

(2.3)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0.5(𝑇𝑇850 − 𝑇𝑇750 − 4)

(2.4)

if 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 > 5, then 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 5 + 0.5(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 5)

(2.6)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷850 − 3)
3

(2.5)

Where:
CA is the Stability Score based on the temperature difference T850 – T700, where T850 and
T700 are the temperatures at 850 hPa and 700 hPa, respectively.
CB is the Humidity Score based on the 850hPa dew point depression (DD850): equal to
T850 – DP850, where DP850 is the dew point temperature at 850 hPa.
2.3

Rate of Spread

During the initial stages of a wildfire only a few particles on the top of the surface fuels will
be involved, with flame spread influenced by the direct contact of the flames with surrounding
unburned fuel (Cheney & Gould, 1997). As the fire size grows, convective preheating of
surrounding fuels occur and flame height increases resulting in more fuel becoming available.
McAlpine (1988) suggests that, influenced by both the wind and topography, the fire continues
to grow in size and accelerate until it achieves a quasi-steady rate of spread (RoS).
In point source accelerating fire scenarios, whereby the developing fire originating from
a single ignition point is yet to grow sufficiently to reach the quasi-steady 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 required to
support the assumptions used in landscape scale wildfire behaviour, the accelerating head
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fire rate of spread 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 (km/h) in forest and woodland fuels is given by (McAlpine, 1998; Van
Wagner, 1985):
(2.7)

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(1 − 𝑒𝑒 −𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 )

where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the equilibrium/potential head fire rate of spread (km/h), t is the time since
ignition (h), and β (h−1) is a constant related to how rapidly the head fire accelerates. A
reasonable first estimate for β can be established using the assumption that the fire will
accelerate to 90% of the equilibrium rate of spread in 30 minutes (i.e., 0.5 h) for treed
vegetation structures, including forest and woodlands. The attainment of the 90% equilibrium
rate of spread 30 minutes post ignition within treed fuel structures is supported by the findings
of Gould et al (2007); Kucuk et al (2007); Van Wagner (1985); and Cheney (1981).
Richardson (Penney & Richardson, 2019) identified that applying this to Equation (1) gives
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
= 0.9 and t = 0.5, as illustrated below to solve the fire acceleration parameter (𝛽𝛽):
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

−

β

0.9 = 1 − e 2
β
−
1
⇒ e 2 =
10
β = 2 ln(10)
⇒
≈ 4.605.

It is worth noting that the value of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.0768 stated in previous work by McAlpine (1998) is
in units of (min−1). This would only be appropriate in the current setting if the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 were
considered in km/min rather than km/h.
For modelling purposes, the time since ignition may not be known, therefore the ability to
determine the rate of spread of an accelerating fire in terms of distance travelled since ignition
is required. As 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 is the rate of change of distance D (km) with respect to time, it follows that
dD
= RoS a .
dt
By integrating Equation (2.7) with respect to time, and setting D(0) = 0, the distance
travelled post ignition can be expressed as:

 e − βt 1 
− 
D = RoS  t +
β
β


(2.8)

From Equation (7) we know that
1

RoS a 

ln1 −
,
RoS 

which when inserted this into Equation (2), enables distance travelled post ignition to be
written as:
t=−

D=−

β

RoS  RoSa
 RoSa  

+ ln1 −

β  RoS
RoS  


(2.9)

or alternatively as:

βD

 RoS a
 RoS a  
= −
+ ln1 −

RoS
RoS  

 RoS

(2.10)

Equation (10) can be used to determine the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 of an accelerating head fire 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 at a
specified distance D from the point source ignition with the equilibrium rate of spread. The
problem is that it is not possible to re-arrange Equation (10) to express 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 as a function of D.
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
is numerically generated against
which can be used to
To resolve this issue a plot of

approximate the ratio
given in Figure 2.3.

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

(and hence 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 ) for a given value of the ratio

𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

. Such a plot is

2-4

A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020

Figure 2.3. Plot of the ratio

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

against

𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽

𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

.

Head fire spread distance at a given time can be calculated using the equation McAlpine
(1988, Eqn 5):
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �𝑡𝑡 +

𝑒𝑒 −0.0768𝑡𝑡
1
−
�
0.0768
0.0768

(2.11)

Where:
D is the head fire spread distance at time t
RoS is the potential head fire rate of spread
t is the elapsed time since ignition

The fire will continue to accelerate with an increasing forward RoS until it attains a quasisteady rate. Whilst Cheney and Gould (1997) report this may not occur in forest fuels until a
head fire width of approximately 150m is reached, Penney (2017) identifies the more
conservative figure of 100m, which is subsequently consistent with the calculations of Van
Wager, is adopted for modelling purposes by both AS3959-2009 Construction of buildings in
bushfire prone areas (AS3959) and NSWFRS (2016). During catastrophic bushfires, the scale
and intensity of the bushfire itself can result in air-flow and wind conditions generated by the
fire itself (Dold & Zinoviev, 2009) and subsequently ‘explosive’ bushfire behaviour similar to
flashover phenomena experienced in structural firefighting response (Chatelon,
Sauvagnargues, Dusserre, & Balbi, 2014).

RoS is calculated in treed fuel structures of forest, woodland and rainforest using (Noble et
al, 1980 cited in AS3959):
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0.0012 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 × 𝑤𝑤

(2.12)

Where:
RoS is the potential rate of spread (kph), also simply referred to as rate of spread
FDI is Fire Danger Index (dimensionless)
w is surface fuel load (t/ha)
Alternatively, for dry eucalypt forest, potential quasi-steady rate of spread (RSS) can be
calculated using the Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al, 2007) discussed in Chapter 1:
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𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏0 (𝑉𝑉10 − 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 )𝑏𝑏1 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑏𝑏2 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑏4 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ ���∅𝑀𝑀̇ 𝑓𝑓 ��∅𝑆𝑆̇ 𝑓𝑓 �

(2.13)

where:
Rss is the potential quasi-steady rate of spread (m/h)
Rt is the threshold rate of spread of 5kph at the threshold wind speed (Ut)
V10 is mean wind speed at 10m in the open (kph)
Vt is threshold wind speed 5kph
Sfhs is surface fuel hazard score
NSfhs is near surface fuel hazard score
NSh is near surface fuel height
b0 – b4 are regression constants b0 = 1.132; b1 = 0.904; b2 = 0.279; b3 = 0.611; b4 = 0.013
ØMf is fine fuel moisture function
ØSf is slope function
And (Gould et al., 2007, Eqn. 5)
∅𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 = �𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 −1.495 �⁄0.0545

(2.14)

∅𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(0.069𝜃𝜃)

(2.15)

where:
Mf is fine fuel moisture content (%)
And ∅𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 is calculated by (Gould et al., 2007, Eqn. 6)

where:
Ɵ is slope of the ground (degrees)

For shrubland and scrub, RoS is calculated by Anderson et al, (2015):

RoS = 5.67(0.67 U10)0.91 H0.22 e (-0.076MC)

(2.16)

where:
H is height of the fuel bed (m)
U10 is average wind speed at 10m out in the open
MC is moisture content

Alternatively, it may be calculated using Cruz et al (2013):

RoS = 0.023𝑉𝑉 1.21 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.54

(2.17)

where:
VH is the average height of the classified vegetation (m)
V is average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1)

For grassland, RoS is calculated by Putron (1982):

RoS = 0.13𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺

(2.18)
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Corrections for slope
When using equations 8 and 12-14, RoS can be corrected for the effects of slope by
(AS3959):
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 (0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 (−0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2.19)
(2.20)

where:
Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h)
R is the forward rate of spread determined
slope is the slope (degrees)

Cruz et al (2015) however suggest this approach will grossly over-estimate the effect of
slope and subsequently will result in an under-prediction of downslope RoS. To address this
downslope RoS should be corrected by:
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅

exp (−0.069𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒)
2 exp(−0.069𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) − 1

(2.21)

where:
Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h)
R is the forward rate of spread determined
slope is the slope (degrees)
2.4

Flame front residence time

Residence time is defined as the time the flaming zone takes to pass over a given point.
There is some variance in the literature regarding typical residence time in forest fuels. Fire
service literature (DFES, 2014) suggests in forest fuels a figure of between 45 to 60 seconds can
be expected. During the development of firefighting vehicle crew protection systems, Nichols,
Canderle, Knight and Leonard (2003, p2) identified it was reasonable to expect “residence
times of several minutes,” however the peak of the burover intensity will last between 15-30
seconds as the fine bushfire fuels are consumed. This is consistent with the findings of Linton
(2016) in her report into the burnovers experienced during the 2012 Black Cat Creek Fire.
Wotton, Gould, McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012, p270) reported longer periods as the
“average flame-front residence time for eucalypt forest fuels was 37 seconds and did not vary
significantly with fine fuel moisture, fuel quantity or bulk density.” Poon (2003) describes a
significantly longer flame residence time as lasting 1-2 minutes and mainly involving the fine
fuels of twigs, ground litter and foliage, yet in the same report he identifies a residence time of
60 seconds as being appropriate for modelling purposes. Smith (2013) identifies residence
time may be calculated using:

Where:
TR is residence time (minutes)
D is flame depth (m)
RoS is rate of spread (m/hr)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =

𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

(2.22)
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2.5

Flame length and height

Flame length (Lf) will increase as the fire develops from ignition to a bushfire of landscape
proportions. It is also affected by numerous other factors influencing the fire behaviour
including fuel structure, wind speed and topography. Flame height is the vertical height of the
flame above the ground as illustrated in Figure 2.4 and will vary depending on the inclination
of the ground, the flame length and the flame angle. Whilst Linton (2016) reports flame heights
of between 8-10m during the fatal Black Cat Creek bushfire, Cruz et al. (2012) reports flame
heights 10-20m above the crowns of trees were experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore
East fire. The flame heights experienced by crews on Black Saturday are also consistent with
reports of flames encountered by crews during the 2016 Yarloop Waroona fire in Western
Australia.

Figure 2.4. Flame length and height

Flame length (LF) in treed fuel structures including those involved in Australian bushfire
events can be calculated using the equation (AS3959, Eqn B2):
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 =

13𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 0.24𝑊𝑊
2

(2.23)

where:
Lf is flame length (m)
W is the total fuel load (t/ha)
Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h)

7):

Flame height can also be calculated using the assigned hazard scores (Gould, 2007, Eqn.
𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 = 0.0193 × 𝑅𝑅0.723 × 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�0.64𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓ℎ �

(2.24)

where:
Hf is flame height (m)
R is head fire rate of spread
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Efh is elevated fuel height (m)

2.6

Fire line intensity

Current vehicle protection systems utilised in Western Australian fire service vehicles have
been tested against fire line intensities of between 2.5-10MW/m and designed to withstand
7.5MW/m (Nichols, Gould, Knight, Leonard, & Brown, 2005). Comparatively, Cruz, et al. (2012)
report average fire line intensities experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore East Fire in
2009 of 88MW/m. Dold, Zinoviev and Leslie, (2011) describe bushfires as eruptive and unstable
combustion involving a process of dynamic interaction between RoS and fire line intensity (I).
A critical component of the fireline intensity is the heat of combustion, defined as the amount
of heat released when a unit quantity of fuel is oxidized completely to yield stable end
products (SFPE, 1-93). Common values for H are identified in Table 2.2. AS3959 details that I, in
kW/m and corrected for slope, is calculated using Byram’s fireline intensity equation.
(2.25)

𝐼𝐼 = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 /36

Where:
H is the heat of combustion (kJ/kg), shown in table 2.2
W is total fuel load (t/ha)
Table 2.2. Heat of Combustion
Fuel
Wood (European Beech)
Wood (Ponderosa Pine)
Australian vegetation

Heat of Combustion (kJ/kg)
19500
19400
18600

Source
SFPE Table 1-5.3
SFPE Table 1-5.3
AS3959
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2.7

Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s

This chapter covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and behaviour. As the
suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged against these inputs it is essential that all
firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s alike not only understand the presented models,
but are effective in accurately applying them.
Incorrect predictions may result in
inappropriate strategies being devised, leaving frontline personnel exposed to overwhelming
wildfire conditions with potentially fatal consequences (see Chapters 5 and 7). Whilst fire
behaviour specialists are required to accurately and competently predict wildfire behaviour,
all personnel from firefighters to the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby increasing
the margin for safety for both firefighters and the community.
2.8

Implications for urban planners

Perhaps the greatest implications for urban planners apply to assessments of potential
wildfire behaviour in urban areas where the landscape scale wildfire behaviour assumed in
AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines is not possible. Where vegetation fuel bed
geometry (refer back to Chapter 1) prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to
section 2.3 of this chapter), as reported in recent studies (Penney & Richardson, 2019), failure
to adequately adjust inputs may result in the significant over-calculation of potential wildfire
behaviour. This can be in part be remedied by deference in such instances to suitably
qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds that can provide quantified analysis
and an appropriate level of fire safety engineering rigor to design solutions.
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3. Wildfire radiant heat flux
3.1

Introduction

Thermal radiation is the energy emitted from a body due to the internal temperature of
the surface that is transported by photons capable of traveling through a perfect vacuum
(Massoud, 2005). The rate of transfer of radiation across a given surface is known as radiant
heat flux. Humans can only be exposed to relatively small levels of radiation before feeling
pain and suffering other debilitating effects, hence it becomes a crucial factor in determining
tenability on the fireground (see Chapter 5). Even prior to the attainment of a quasi-steady
Rate of Spread (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), radiation quickly becomes the primary mechanism of heat transfer from
a bushfire and impacts the receiving body well before direct flame impingement occurs
(Leonard, 2009; Sullivan, Ellis, & Knight, 2003; Wotton, Gould, McCaw, Cheney, & Taylor, 2012).
This chapter builds upon Chapter 2, discussing the calculation of radiant heat flux from wildfires
and other vegetation fires occuring in small fuel beds. Understanding wildfire radiant heat flux
is critical as it has impacts on firefighter and civilian tenability, as well as signficant implications
for land use planning and construction in areas prone to wildfire in Australia.
3.2

Radiant heat flux

In order to empirically calculate the radiant heat flux during a bushfire event the chaotic
flame front is geometrically represented by a uniform parallelepiped black body radiant heat
panel (Sullivan, Ellis & Knight, 2003; Tan, Midgley & Douglas, 2005; Mendham, 2013) as illustrated
in Figure 3.1. The horizontal position of the panel in relation to the flame is determined to be
directly below the middle of the extended flame panel (Sullivan, Ellis & Knight, 2003) as shown
in Figure 2. Both the flame temperature and emissivity are assumed to be consistent across
the panel, whilst AS3959 also assumes the receiving body is perpendicular to the approaching
fire front.

Figure 3.1: Geometrical representation of the flame front.
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Figure 3.2: Geometrical representation of the flame front – side view.

Radiant heat flux is calculated using the equation:
𝑞𝑞 = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏

(3.1)

where 𝑞𝑞 is the radiant heat flux in kW/m2, 𝜏𝜏 is the atmospheric transmissivity, 𝐸𝐸 is the flame
emissive power in kW/m2 and 𝜙𝜙 is the view factor.
3.3

Atmospheric transmissivity

With reference to Figure 3.3, atmospheric transmissivity (τ) is calculated using the following
steps:
Calculate path length (𝐿𝐿):

or

If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, then 𝐿𝐿 = 0

(3.2)

If 𝑑𝑑 > 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, then 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(3.3)

If 𝐿𝐿 ≠ 0, then 𝜏𝜏 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝐿𝐿2 + 𝑎𝑎3 𝐿𝐿3 + 𝑎𝑎4 𝐿𝐿4

(3.4)

𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝐶1𝑛𝑛 + 𝐶𝐶2𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 + 𝐶𝐶3𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 + 𝐶𝐶4𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

(3.5)

where 𝑑𝑑 is the distance between the fuel bed and the receiver (m), 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame length
(m) and 𝛼𝛼 is the flame angle (in degrees) that maximizes the view factor, calculated in
accordance with the algorithm shown in Figure 3.4 (AS3959).
The atmospheric transmissivity is then calculated as follows:
If 𝐿𝐿 = 0, then 𝜏𝜏 = 1
or

where 𝐿𝐿 is the path length and 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 is the coefficient calculated by

where 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 is the ambient temperature, 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 is the flame temperature, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the relative
humidity; and 𝐶𝐶1𝑛𝑛 , 𝐶𝐶2𝑛𝑛 , 𝐶𝐶3𝑛𝑛 and 𝐶𝐶4𝑛𝑛 are constants defined in Table 3.1 (AS3959, Table B3,
reproduced with the permission of SAI Global on behalf of Standards Australia).
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Table 3.1: Constants used in Equation 3.5.

n
0
1
2
3
4

C1n
1.486
1.225 × 10-2
-1.489 × 10-4
8.381 × 10-7
-1.685 × 10-9

C2n
-2.003 × 10-3
-5.900 × 10-5
6.893 × 10-7
-3.823 × 10-9
7.637 × 10-12

C3n
4.68 × 10-5
1.66 × 10-6
-1.922 × 10-8
1.0511 × 10-10
-2.085 × 10-13

C4n
-6.052 × 10-2
-1.759 × 10-3
2.092 × 10-5
-1.166 × 10-7
2.350 × 10-10

Figure 3.3: Typical building and fire front configuration.
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Figure 3.4: Flame angle algorithm (Copied by Greg Penney with the permission of SAI Global on behalf
of Standards Australia).

3.4

Flame temperature

Drysdale (2011) identifies that flames emit radiation within the visible spectrum with a dull
red glow at approximately 823K. As the flame temperature (𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 ) increases, the flame colour
changes as detailed in Table 3.2. Poon (2003) identifies that the predominantly ‘reddishorange’ colour of bushfire flames suggests a flame temperature of approximately 1273K, which
is supported by Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who report a flame
temperature of 1200K is appropriate for large wildland fires. AS3959 (2009) adopts a flame
temperature of 1080K and assumes a uniform temperature across the flame surface.
Conversley, the approximate maximum flame temperature reported in the research by
Wotton, Gould, McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012) was 1373K.
Table 3.2: Visual colour of flame.

Temperature (K)
823

Appearance
Red glow
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973
1173
1373
1673
3.5

Dull red
Cherry red
Orange
White

Emissivity

Emissivity (𝜀𝜀) is the ratio of the energy of radiated from a material’s surface to that radiated
from a blackbody (perfect emitter) at the same temperature and wavelength and under the
same conditions (NPL, 2014). It is a dimensionless number between 0 (a perfect reflector) and
1 (a perfect emitter). During small scale experiments representative of a bushfire in the early
stages of development, Boulet et. al. (2009) reported emissivity of up to 0.74 in flames lengths
of 4m. AS3959 (2009, CB10.2) adopts a flame emissivity of 0.95 across the flame surface using
the justification that “bushfire flames under design 2 fire weather scenarios are generally
optically thick (𝜀𝜀~1). " This value is consistent with the findings of Agueda, Pastor and Perez,
cited in Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who report the emissivity of large
wildland fires as being able to be considered close to the emissivity of a perfect emitter and
assigned an emissivity of 0.90. Poon (2003, p26) however, suggests the use of “an emissivity
close to 1 may not be a reasonable approximation of the emissive power from the flame front”
and subsequently assumes a flame emissivity of 0.6 justifying this figure as “equivalent to a
flame depth of about 5m” (Poon, 2003, Table 12, p38).
The flame emissive power (𝐸𝐸) is calculated by:
𝐸𝐸 = 𝜎𝜎ɛ𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 4

(3.6)

where 𝜎𝜎 is the Stefan-Boltzman constant of 5.67x10-11 kWm-2K-4, 𝜀𝜀 is the flame emissivity and 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓
is the flame temperature.
3.6

View factor

The view factor (𝜙𝜙) is a geometrical factor ranging from 0 to 1 which is related to the extent
that the fire front fills the field of view looking from the site toward the flame. A value of 𝜙𝜙 = 1
indicates that the entire field of view consists of flame (i.e. not even sky), while a value of 𝜙𝜙 = 0
indicates that the fire front is completely out of view. As such, it is the view factor that must
incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions on the radiant heat flux. To address
this issue, this section proposes an alternate view factor model to that presented in AS3959.
In the absence of shielding bodies and referring to Figure 3.5, calculation of the view
factor in the wildfire context is expressed as:
If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼) then
otherwise, if 𝑑𝑑 > 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼) then
𝜙𝜙 =

⎧
1⎪

𝜋𝜋 ⎨
⎪
⎩

𝑋𝑋1

�1 +

(3.7)

𝜙𝜙 = 1
𝑌𝑌1

𝑌𝑌1

𝑋𝑋1

⎫
�+
⎪
�1 +
�1 + 𝑌𝑌12
𝑋𝑋2
𝑌𝑌2
𝑌𝑌2
𝑋𝑋2
⎬
tan−1 �
�+
tan−1 �
�⎪
2
2
2
2
�1 + 𝑋𝑋2
�1 + 𝑋𝑋2
�1 + 𝑌𝑌2
�1 + 𝑌𝑌2 ⎭

𝑋𝑋12

tan−1 �

�1 +

𝑋𝑋12

�+

𝑌𝑌12

tan−1 �

(3.8)

A design fire scenario is a specific fire scenario on which the analysis will be conducted,
and a design fire is a quantitative description of assumed fire characteristics within the design
fire scenario.
2
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where
𝑋𝑋1 =

𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 sin(𝛼𝛼) − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos(𝛼𝛼) tan(𝜃𝜃) − 𝑑𝑑 tan(𝜃𝜃) − ℎ
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)
𝑋𝑋2 =

ℎ + �𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)�tan (𝜃𝜃)
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)

𝑌𝑌1 = 𝑌𝑌2 =

0.5𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)

(3.9)
(3.10)
(3.11)

𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame length (m), 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 is the flame width/head fire width (m), 𝛼𝛼 is the flame angle
(degrees), 𝜃𝜃 is the slope of the land between the site and vegetation fuel bed (degrees), 𝑑𝑑 is
the horizontal distance between the site and the base of the vegetation fuel bed (m), and ℎ is
the elevation of the receiver (m). Figure 3.5 provides an illustration of these variable in relation
to a typical site and fire front. In order to consider the worst case scenario, the view factor is
maximized with respect to the flame angle 𝛼𝛼. To do this, the optimization algorithm in Figure 4
(AS3959) is used.

Figure 3.5: Typical building and fire front configuration.

Within the urban environment, substantial non-combustible structures may stand between
the receiving body and the fire front. For modelling purposes, these structures include
significant walls or buildings, but not tin fencing or the like. Ignoring the impact of these
structures on view factor may result in significant over estimation of wildfire impacts (Penney &
Richardson, 2019). In order to incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions, the
total combined view factor of the obstructions must be calculated and then subtracted from
the unobstructed view factor given by Equations (3.7–3.11). This approach may be suitable for
empirical calculation of radiant heat flux when firefighters are seeking shelter behind a
substantial structure, however it is not suitable for use where firefighters are sheltering behind a
fire appliance as the fire front will be significantly wider than the shielding body. Flames may
also travel underneath and over the top of an appliance, drawn down the far side by an eddy
caused by flame and air movements (Mangan, 1997).
In describing the details of this approach, Penney and Richardson (2019) generalise
Equations (3.7–3.11) and re-write them as follows:
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1. Equations (3.8) and (3.11) impose the assumption that the site is horizontally central
with respect to the fire front. This assumption will be relaxed to allow the calculation
of view factors for obstructions and fire fronts which are not centrally aligned to
the site.
2. Equations (3.7–3.11) are formulated in terms of parameters specifically referencing
the fire front (not an obstruction). Furthermore, although convenient from a
computational perspective, they are not presented in a means that offers
significant geometrical insight. The equations will be reformulated in terms of view
angles from the site to the fire front or obstruction(s).
The first step is to generalise and amend the existing view factor model. The second step
is to consider the effect of shielding obstructions.

Figure 3.6 displays a generalised geometrical representation of the side view of a fire front
and site. Consistent with the view factor calculation assumptions of AS3959, an inclined flame
is approximated by a vertical flame with the same height as the inclined flame (height
measured vertically from the highest point of the flame to the ground directly below) and
located in the middle of the inclined flame.

1
L f cos(α ) tan (ψ 1 ) − d tan (ψ 1 ) − h
2
1
H 2 = d tan (ψ 1 ) − L f cos(α ) tan (ψ 1 ) + h
2
1
L = d − L f cos(α )
2
H 1 = L f sin (α ) −

Figure 3.6: Geometrical representation of the side view of the site and vertical approximation
of a fire front.
With reference to Figure 6, and Equations (9) and (10), it becomes evident that:
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )

�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 = sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )

for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2.

Figure 3.7 displays a generalised geometrical bird’s-eye view of the fire front and site.
Equation (8) enforces the assumption that the site is horizontally central with respect to the fire
𝑊𝑊
front by setting 𝑊𝑊1 = 𝑊𝑊2 = 𝑓𝑓, however wildfires may not be centered with respect to the
2

receiving structure. To reflect this, Figure 9 represents a generalised asymmetrical case.
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W1 = W2 =
L=d−

Wf
2

(in the case of horizontal symmetry)

1
L f cos(α )
2

Figure 3.7: Geometrical representation of the birds-eye view of the site and vertical
approximation of a fire front.
With reference to Figure 7, and Equation (11), it becomes evident that:
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2 = sec(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )

for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2.

Figure 3.8 displays a three dimensional representation of the upper-left quadrant of the
fire-front relative to the site, and the four angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2. The indexing
of quadrants is summarised in Table 3.3.

Figure 3.8: Geometrical representation of the upper-left quadrant of the fire front relative to
the site.

Table 3.3: Indexing of quadrants.
𝒊𝒊
1

𝒋𝒋
1

Quadrant
Upper-left
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1
2
2

2
2
1

Upper-right
Lower-right
Lower-left

With reference to Figure 3.8, it becomes evident that:
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗

tan�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �
= tan�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
tan(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
=
= tan�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
sec�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �
2
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗

for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2.

=

Accordingly, the generalised view factor for a rectangular approximation to a fire front or
obstruction that does not pass through the site can be expressed as:
2

2

𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
1
⎞⎞
𝜙𝜙 =
��⎛
tan−1 �
�+
tan−1 ⎛
2
2
2𝜋𝜋
�1
+
𝑋𝑋
�1
+
𝑋𝑋
2
2
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑗𝑗=1
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
⎝
⎠⎠
⎝
2
2
tan�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �
1
tan(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
=
���
tan−1 �tan�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �� +
tan−1 �tan�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ���
sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
2𝜋𝜋
sec�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �
=

𝑖𝑖=1 𝑗𝑗=1
2
2

(3.12)

1
� ��sin(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + sin�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
2𝜋𝜋
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑗𝑗=1

where the angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2 are as defined in Figures 3.8–3.10.
Consistent with Equation (3.7), if the vertical approximation to the flame front lies on or behind
the site (relative to the direction of travel of the fire front) the view factor is assigned the value
𝜙𝜙 = 1.

The method for calculating the view factor of a flame front that is at least partially
obstructed by non-combustible structures incorporates greater complexity than the existing
model of AS3959 which does not consider the impact of obstructions on radiant heat flux. To
assist with the discussion we describe the method with reference to the (𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽, 𝜈𝜈) coordinate
system illustrated in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: The (𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽, 𝜈𝜈) coordinate system.

The 𝑟𝑟 component is the distance from the site measured in the 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 plane, 𝛽𝛽 is the angle
in the 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 plane measured anticlockwise from the positive 𝑥𝑥-axis when viewed from above
(i.e. 𝑧𝑧 > 0), and 𝜈𝜈 is the vertical angle measured from the 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 plane with positive values for
𝑧𝑧 > 0, and negative values for 𝑧𝑧 < 0.
The view factor calculation method is based on a discretisation of the fire front with
respect to 𝛽𝛽 as illustrated in Figure 3.10.

Figure 3.10: The discretisation of the fire front with respect to 𝛽𝛽 using 6 uniformly distributed
values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 }6𝑖𝑖=1 looking from above. Note that 𝛽𝛽1 , 𝛽𝛽2 , 𝛽𝛽3 > 0 while 𝛽𝛽4 , 𝛽𝛽5 , 𝛽𝛽6 < 0.

The discretisation consists of a total of 𝑛𝑛 uniformly distributed values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 }𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , with minimum
value 𝛽𝛽1 corresponding to the leftmost edge of the flame front (looking from above), and
maximum value 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 corresponding to the rightmost edge.
Consider the vertical rectangle illustrated in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: Any rectangle specified by a set of angles 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , 𝜈𝜈 𝑈𝑈 , and 𝜈𝜈 𝐿𝐿 will have the same
view factor relative to the site. Note that 𝜈𝜈 𝑈𝑈 > 0 and 𝜈𝜈 𝐿𝐿 < 0, while 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 > 0 and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 > 0.

In order to calculate the view factor of the Figure 3.11 rectangle using Equation (3.12), the
angles are set as follows:

( )

 tan ν iU 
,
 cos(β i ) 

ψ 1 = tan −1 

β1 = β i ,
γ 11 = tan −1 (tan (β i )cos(ψ 1 )),
γ 12 = − tan −1 (tan (β j )cos(ψ 1 )),
ν 11 = ν iU ,
 tan (ν iU )cos(β j ) 
−1 
,
ν 12 = tan


(
)
β
cos
i



( )

 tan ν iL 

 cos(β i ) 

ψ 2 = − tan −1 

β2 = β j
γ 21 = tan −1 (tan (β i )cos(ψ 2 ))
.
γ 22 = − tan −1 (tan (β j )cos(ψ 2 ))
ν 21 = −ν iL
 tan (ν iL )cos(β j ) 
−1 

ν 22 = − tan


(
)
β
cos
i



(3.13)

A single flame front with top edge coordinates denoted {(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 )}𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 and bottom edge
coordinates denoted {(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 )}𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 is illustrated in Figure 3.12.

4

Figure 3.12: A flame front with top and bottom edge coordinates ��𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑖𝑖 ��
4

��𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑖𝑖 ��

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

respectively.

and

We now consider a collection of 𝑀𝑀 obstructions with top edge coordinates denoted
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑛𝑛2
��𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 ��𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 and
1
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
that 1 ≤ 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 ≤ 𝑛𝑛

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑛𝑛2

bottom edge coordinates denoted ��𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 ��𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀. Note
1

for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀 since the obstruction(s) may not span the full horizontal
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angular extent of the fire front when viewed from the site, and any part of an obstruction lying
beyond the angular extent of the fire front does not impact the view factor calculation. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.13.

Figure 3.13: An obstruction may only partially obstruct the fire front and will only obstruct
the fire front if it lies within the angular region.
The calculation of the view factor 𝜙𝜙 subject to shielding obstructions proceeds as follows:
If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼) (i.e. the center of the inclined flame is directly above or behind the site, so
the vertical approximation to the fire front is on top of the site) then
𝜙𝜙 = 1,
otherwise
1. Calculate the view factor 𝜙𝜙𝐹𝐹 of the unobstructed vertical approximation to the fire
front by setting 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 in Equation (3.13), and then
substituting the resulting angles into Equation (3.12).
2. In order to accommodate non-rectangular obstructions, the obstructed view
factor 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂 is calculated by approximating the obstructions using thin rectangles
defined within the angular increments from 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 to 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛 − 1. For each
angular increment, the obstructed view factor 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 is calculated by determining the
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
maximum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 and minimum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 for the obstructions that lie
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
between the flame front and the site. If 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 > 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 , then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is used to denote the
top of the obstructing rectangle, as any part of the obstruction extending above
the flame front does not actually block the view of the flame front. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.14.
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Figure 3.14. (Left) Obstruction 2 completely blocks the fire front from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 as the part of
Obstruction 2 that extends above the view line of the top of the fire front does not contribute to blocking
the fire front. (Right) Obstruction 1 partially blocks the fire front from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1𝑈𝑈 .
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

Similarly, if 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 < 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 , then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is used to denote the bottom of the obstructing
rectangle. Denoting the angle to the top and bottom of the obstructing rectangle
on increment 𝑖𝑖 as 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 respectively, it follows that
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 }
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 }

where
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = max�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 �: 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 �
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = max�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 �: 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 �
0, 𝑥𝑥 < 0
𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) = �
1, 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = �𝑗𝑗: 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 �

The obstructing view factor 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 for each angular increment 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛 − 1 is
calculated by setting 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖𝑖 + 1 in Equation (3.13), and then substituting the resulting
angles into Equation (3.12).
3. Calculate the total obstructed view factor
𝑛𝑛−1

𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂 = � 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

4.

Calculate the view factor of the partially obstructed flame front
𝜙𝜙 = 𝜙𝜙𝐹𝐹 − 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂 .

In order to consider the worst case view factor with respect to the flame angle in this
approach, four modifications need to be made to the optimisation algorithm illustrated in
Figure 4:
1. In the original algorithm the initial value (lowest value) of the flame angle
considered in is the site slope 𝜃𝜃. This is not a valid angle in the case that an
obstruction exists between the flame front and the site, as it effectively allows the
fire front to penetrate the obstruction. To avoid this situation it is necessary to set
the initial flame angle such that the fire front would clear the obstruction. This
amounts to setting
𝑗𝑗
ℎ𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
−1
𝛼𝛼0 = tan �tan(𝜃𝜃) + max �
� : 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀�
𝑗𝑗
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

when 𝑥𝑥 > min�𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ): 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀�. Note that 𝜃𝜃 denotes the site slope, and
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
ℎ𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ) denote the maximum height and 𝑥𝑥 component of obstruction 𝑗𝑗 at angle
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 relative to the site.

A further complication could arise if the center of the fire front lies in front of the
obstruction when the base of the fire front lies behind the obstruction. The issue in
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this instance is that the obstruction would not have an impact on the view factor.
To avoid this situation the minimum flame angle is required to satisfy
𝑗𝑗
2�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝜀𝜀�
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝛼𝛼0 ≥ max �cos −1 �
� : 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀�
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

when 𝑥𝑥 > min�𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ): 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀�. Note that 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame length, and 𝜀𝜀 is
a small positive number (e.g. 10-6).
2.

3.

4.

3.7

If the fire front is positioned on top of an obstruction, the flame angle 𝛼𝛼0 is set to 90
degrees to effectively consider the fire front as being behind the obstruction. In this
case, the algorithm is not required to proceed further to determine an optimal
value of 𝛼𝛼0 .
Since the algorithm does not start with the flame angle 𝛼𝛼0 equal to the site slope
𝜃𝜃, it is possible that the initial value of 𝛼𝛼0 could turn out to be the flame angle that
optimises the view factor. The standard optimisation algorithm of AS3959
terminates or refines its search increment when the view factors 𝜙𝜙0 , 𝜙𝜙1 , and 𝜙𝜙2 ,
which correspond to the flame angles 𝛼𝛼0 < 𝛼𝛼1 < 𝛼𝛼2 satisfy 𝜙𝜙1 ≥ 𝜙𝜙0 and 𝜙𝜙1 > 𝜙𝜙2 ,
however, if 𝜙𝜙0 > 𝜙𝜙1 at the first step the algorithm will not terminate. Hence the
additional termination or refinement criteria, 𝜙𝜙0 > 𝜙𝜙1 must be added to the
algorithm in addition to the existing criteria (i.e., (𝜙𝜙1 ≥ 𝜙𝜙0 and 𝜙𝜙1 > 𝜙𝜙2 ) or 𝜙𝜙0 > 𝜙𝜙1 ).
In the case that the obstruction completely obscures the line of sight from the
building site to the top of the flame front, the optimisation algorithm will never
terminate as it will not be able to identify a non-zero view factor no matter how
much the flame angle (𝛼𝛼) is increased. In order to avoid this situation, an additional
condition is added to both loops of the algorithm. Specifically, if 𝛼𝛼1 > 90𝑜𝑜 during
the iteration then the algorithm will terminate immediately, and the flame angle
will be set to 𝛼𝛼1 = 90𝑜𝑜 . This measure is only required to avoid an infinite loop, and
will not affect the outcome of the calculation.

Fire in isolated vegetation and fuel beds that restrict wildfire growth

In urban environments the failure to consider the effect of vegetation geometry on
restricting wildfire growth can lead to significant overestimation of potential radiant heat
impacts (Penney & Richardson, 2019). In turn, this may result in:
1. Firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes as a result
of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression efforts are not
suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and impacts on communities. This may
occur as firefighting suppression thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour
parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally (Penney et. al., 2019). Where
inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that does not
support the assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable
areas may be left unguarded due to inappropriate evaluation of suppression
strategies;
2. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public open
space, road reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn, land that is
actually suitable for development may be identified as being subject to
overestimated wildfire impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether.
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small unmanaged vacant
residential lot is modelled as supporting a landscape scale wildfire, in turn
restricting or prohibiting development on adjacent and near-by lots; and
3. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant construction
standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders development through
either misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels of wildfire
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impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of
wildfire resistant engineering and construction required.

As detailed by Penney and Richardson (2019), within the urban environment in road
reserves, urban parklands and similar scenarios, correction of the wildfire models can be
achieved through the application of:
1. The Vegetation Availability Factor (refer to Chapter 2);
2. Calculation of accelerating 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 from a point source (refer to Chapter 2);
3. Consideration of shielding structures when calculating view factor; and
4. Calculating the final radiant heat flux.

Methods of calculating radiant heat flux that rely of a defined 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 cannot be applied to
fires occurring in isolated vegetation structures, including individual trees, bushes or small
garden beds (Figure 3.14) or other situations where there is an absence of a sustained forward
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. AS3959 provides some provisions for the exclusion of defined ‘low threat vegetation’,
where these exclusions do not apply or modelling is required for other purposes. In such
instances the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 will be zero, a vertical flame (flame angle of 90°) should be modelled (i.e. 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 =
𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 ) and a reduction in emissivity is appropriate compared to landscape scale wildfire
environments.

Figure 3.14: Modelling of isolated trees (left) and shrub/scrub (right).

To calculate radiant heat flux in this situation, flame height (𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 ) is calculated by (Dupuy,
Marechal & Morvan, 2003)
2

𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 = 0.2𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 5

(3.14)

𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 = 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

(3.15)

where 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 is the flame height (m) and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 is the maximum heat release rate (kW). The maximum
heat release rate is given by
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where 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 is the heat of combustion and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is the Mass Loss Rate. Finally, the Mass Loss Rate
is given by

𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =

𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡

(3.16)

where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is the total fuel load consumed in the isolated vegetation structure (kg), calculated
using the Vegetation Availability Factor in the absence of other available datasets, and 𝑡𝑡 is
time (s), assumed to be 37 seconds as reported by Wotton et. al. (2012) reflective of flaming
residence times and greater than the duration of tall flames, being a maximum 22 seconds.
Once 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 is known, the view factor, flame emissive power and final radiant heat flux can
be calculated as previously described.
3.8

Case Studies

A number of case studies are presented to illustrate the application and implications of
the approaches described previously to consider radiant heat flux from a fire front while
accounting for fuel loading, non-combustible obstruction(s), or accelerating fire fronts. These
case studies, as well as the alternative view factor calculations were originally published in
Penney and Richardson (2019).
The first case study considers a semi-rural environment in which a row of single and two
story brick houses backs onto forest type bush land with a fuel bed of unrestricted geometry
and Vf=1. Suppose that the radiant heat flux of a fire in the bush land behind the houses is to
be estimated at a site or house on the opposite side of the street. The geometry of the specific
case considered here is provided in Figure 3.15.

Figure 3.15. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 1 scenario. The measurements within the house boxes
denote the height of each house.

The parameter values used in the calculation as described in AS3959 are summarised in
Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3. Parameter values used in the Case Studies.
Parameter
Effective slope

0o

Value

Parameter
Flame temperature (Tf)

1090 K

Value

Site slope (θ)
Vegetation class

0o
Forest

Ambient temperature (Ta)
Relative humidity (RH)

308 K
25%

Fire Danger Index (FDI)
Surface fuel load (w)

80
25 t/ha

Flame width (Wf)
Flame emissivity (ε)

100 m
0.95

Overall fuel load (W)
Heat of Combustion (H)

35 t/ha
18600 kJ/kg

Stefan Boltzman constant (σ)

5.67 × 10−11 kW/m2/K4

The radiant heat flux was calculated for a range of distances from the site to the
vegetation fuel bed ranging from 10 m to 100m. For the sake of comparison, the radiant heat
flux at the site was estimated using four calculation methods:
1. The method outlined in AS3959, ignoring the obstructions presented by the houses located
between the site and vegetation fuel bed.
2. The method outlined in AS3959 with the receiver height h set to 3 m (instead of the midlevel of the flame front).
3. The method outlined in this paper, where each of the four houses is considered to reduce
the view factor of the flame front.
4. A simplified method in which the four obstructions are considered as a single rectangular
obstruction with height 5 m (i.e., the height of the tallest house), and width equal to the
combined width of the four houses. The combined width is the distance from the
westernmost edge of the westernmost structure to the easternmost edge of the
easternmost structure.
Figure 3.16 provides a plot of the radiant heat flux at the site as a function of the distance
to the vegetation fuel bed using each of the methods 1–4 outlined above.

Figure 3.16. The radiant heat flux at the site as a function of the distance to the vegetation fuel bed.

As expected, the methods that did not consider the shielding effect of the houses
(magenta and red lines) provided higher estimates for the radiant heat flux compared to the
methods that did consider the shielding effect (blue and green). For small distances to the
vegetation fuel bed, the approaches that did not consider shielding significantly overestimated the radiant heat flux compared to the method presented in this paper (blue line).
As the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increases, the difference between the AS3959
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approach and shielding approach presented here becomes small. This is most likely because
the 10m gap between house 2 and 3 becomes the most significant zone for heat flux for a
more distant fire front, so the impact of the obstructions becomes less significant.
Method 4 (green line) provided the lowest estimates of radiant heat flux as expected. As
the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increased, the radiant heat flux estimated using this
approach tended to zero far more rapidly than the other methods. This was most likely due to
the significant gap between house 2 and house 3, which was not blocked in methods 1–3, but
was blocked when the four houses were approximated as a single rectangular obstruction.
This highlights the importance of considering multiple obstructions individually to ensure that
the impact of radiation through significant gaps is not diminished.
The second case study considers an accelerating fire front burning within a 20m wide
treed forest style bushland zone within the road reserve between the edge of a freeway or
highway and a 3m brick wall separating the freeway from housing. The geometry of the
vegetation fuel bed prevents the fire attaining its maximum potential rate of spread. There is a
row of houses located 10m on the other side of the brick wall, one of which will be considered
the site at which the radiant heat flux from the fire will be considered. The geometry of the
specific case considered here is provided in Figure 3.17.
The parameters used in the calculation are summarised in Table 3.3. In addition, the
vegetation factor Vf = 0.2 scales back the surface and overall fuel loads as defined in Chapter
2. The fire is assumed to ignite from a point source at the edge of the Freeway, 30 m from the
site/receiver. The fire is assumed to spread perpendicular to the Freeway at an accelerating
rate RoS a , which is related to the distance from the ignition point D. The rate parameter

β = 2 ln(10) h-1, as suggested by McAlpine (1988), is utilised. Figure 3.18 provides a plot of the

accelerating rate of spread RoS a and the equilibrium rate of spread RoS against the distance
from the ignition point D.

Figure 3.17. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 2 scenario.
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Figure 3.18. The accelerating rate of spread RoSa and the equilibrium rate of spread RoS against the
distance from the ignition point D.

From Figure 3.18 it is apparent that over 20 m (i.e., the distance from the ignition point to
the obstructing wall) the rate of spread reaches approximately half of its equilibrium value. The
rate of spread perpendicular to the forward direction is assumed to be half the forward rate
𝐷𝐷
of spread, so the flame width is given by 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 = .
2

The impact of incorporating the acceleration of a fire front and an obstruction into the
heat flux model has been highlighted by comparing the above scenario with an additional
seven modelling variants. The eight scenarios are summarised as follows:
1. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition
point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored
(the model of AS3959).
2. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition
point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored.
3. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a
vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored.
4. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a
vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored.
5. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition
point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is included.
6. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of spread from the ignition
point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is
included.
7. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a
vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is included.
8. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from the ignition point, a
vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is included (i.e., the Case Study 2
scenario).
The radiant heat flux for the above scenarios are plotted against the distance from the
site in Figures 3.19 and 3.20.
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Figure 3.19. The radiant heat flux for models ignoring the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow line
represents the Case Study 2 scenario.

Figure 3.20. The radiant heat flux for models including the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow line
represents the Case Study 2 scenario.

As expected, the heat fluxes when the wall is ignored are all greater than the
corresponding fluxes when the wall is incorporated into the model to provide shielding.
Furthermore, the fluxes with Vf = 1 exceeded those with Vf = 0.2. All of the models that include
the modelling of acceleration start from a flux of zero, which increases as the rate of spread,
length, and width increase (in addition to the increase from the larger view factor as the front
closes on the site). Significantly, in Figure 3.20 the yellow line corresponding to the Case Study
2 scenario is not visible as the heat flux at the site remains zero. This is because the fuel load
and rate of spread are not sufficient to create a front with sufficient height to be visible above
the 3m obstruction after 20m of spreading, with the flame height reaching only 2.4 m.
The progression of the flame front over the bush region between the freeway and
obstructing wall is illustrated in Figure 3.21 for scenarios 5 to 8.
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Figure 3.21. The progression of the fire front for modelling scenarios 5 through to 8. The yellow line
represents the Case Study 2 scenario.

The model of AS3959, which assumes the wildfire is established and has attained a quasisteady rate of spread, estimates the time taken for the ignited fire to travel from the freeway
to the wall (20 m) is 30 seconds, while the model incorporating the acceleration of the
spreading front and the reduced vegetation density estimates the time at 9 minutes, consistent
with the findings of McAlpine (1988) and Kucuk, Bilgili and Baysal (2007).
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3.9

Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s

The case studies presented indicate potential significant over-estimation of radiant heat
flux using the approach outlined in AS3959 in cases involving non-combustible obstructions
and point-source ignition fires for a minimum of 20m separation from the fire front. This is
significant as it is in this distance that wildfire flame radiation is considered to have its greatest
impact (Cohen & Butler, 1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such situations are common in urban
environments. The results demonstrate the importance of appropriately considering fuel
geometry, wildfire behaviour, and the effect of shielding structures when calculating radiant
heat impacts on buildings and emergency responders within urban environments where
vegetation fuel bed geometry prevents wildfires reaching landscape proportions.
Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could, in turn, result in firefighters
not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes as a result of over-estimation of
wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable
house loss and impacts on communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression thresholds
are related to wildfire behaviour parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally. Where
inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that does not support the
assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable areas may be left
unguarded due inappropriate evaluation of suppression strategies.
When considering the suitability of fire suppression strategies, there are factors other than
radiant heat flux that also require consideration. These are addressed in Chapters 4-7.
3.10

Implications for urban planners

Whilst a precautionary approach to development in areas prone to wildfire is necessary,
inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public open space, road
reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn, land that is actually suitable for
development may be identified as being subject to overestimated wildfire impact which
restricts or prohibits development altogether. Typically, this may occur in urban settings where
a small unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a landscape scale
wildfire, in turn restricting or prohibiting development on adjacent and near-by lots.
Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant construction
standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders development through either
misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels of wildfire impact, or through
making development cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering
and construction required.
In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the vegetation availability
factor previously discussed, the methodologies proposed also retain the assumption of a flame
emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a landscape scale wildfire with an active uniform
flame front depth greater than 2m, and even potentially greater than 10m (Poon, 2003;
Sullivan, 2009). In cases where the active flame front will not reach this depth, it may also be
suitable to reduce the emissivity. It is important to note that whilst the vegetation factor and
modified view factor model are applicable to all fuel types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub,
grassland, etc.), the point source acceleration model presented in this Chapter is suitable for
treed forest and woodland structures only, as fire growth in other fuel structures may be
significantly faster.
The models presented in this Chapter are not intended to address the potential radiant
heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being involved in fire. In part, this is inherently
considered within AS3959 through the requirement that associated structures on the same
parcel of land and within 6m of the dwelling subject to enhanced construction standards,
must also be constructed to that same standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the land
development should be constructed to the required standard of wildfire resistance, in theory
significantly reducing the potential for mass conflagration spreading between multiple houses.
Due to the differences in wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation models as well as
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the difference in building and structure performance once impacted by wildfire, it is suggested
that a high level of technical expertise is required to complete this process.
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4. Wildfire suppression
4.1

Introduction

Where wildfires occur yet pose no threat to life, critical infrastructure, private assets or
cultural and environmental areas of significance it is possible to simply allow the fire to selfextinguish once it runs out of available fuel or rainfall occurs. Unfortunately this is rarely possible
in populated areas common throughout developed nations and significant intervention is
required by fire and emergency services to suppress wildfires and minimise their impacts. This
chapter discusses wildfire suppression strategies and presents evidence and analysis of
available options to assist Incident Controllers to make critical incident decisions during
chaotic and large wildfire incidents.
4.2

Strategies

Whilst offensive strategies involve actively combatting the fire, defensive strategies are
employed when the fire behaviour is too intense to be safely attacked. Defensive strategies
utilise tactics that do not involve active fire suppression including building containment lines
and focusing on evacuation of people or livestock (DFES, 2012). When attempting to suppress
severe wildfire, a combination of strategies may be necessary depending on the fire
behaviour, availability of resources, accessibility and fuel structure. When incorrect strategies
are applied firefighting crews may find themselves overrun by wildfire, known as a burnover.
In such instances, unless the wildfire behaviour is particularly mild, the results can be fatal.
4.3

Offensive tactics

Direct firefighting attack involves firefighters (including personnel, firefighting appliances,
machines and aircraft) directly attacking the wildfire using the tactics of either head attack or
flank attack. A direct head attack (see figures 4.1-4.3) involves firefighting efforts directly
against the head fire before moving down either flank once the head fire is suppressed; a
direct tail attack involves attacking the bushfire from the rear and working along the flanks
towards the head fire; and a direct flank attack involves attacking the side of the fire and
working around the head and tail. The direct tail attack is the “preferred method of
suppression” (DFES, 2012, p11) as it reduces the potential for crews to be caught in a burnover
due to a wind change that turns the flank into the greater head fire. Direct head attacks
expose firefighters to the most severe wildfire behaviour, which reduces towards the tail. All
tactics require firefighters to be able to access the fire edge in order to extinguish the fire. In
dense forest fuels or in difficult terrain, this may be problematic and result in firefighters
attempting to extinguish bushfire wherever they can in a patchwork manner. Where this
occurs suppression efforts are likely to be less than optimal and result in unrestrained wildfire
propagation as well as placing firefighters in unnecessary danger. Advantages and
disadvantages of a direct attack reported in DFES (2012) are summarised in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Advantages and disadvantages of a direct attack
Advantages
Minimises the area burnt.

Disadvantages
Only possible on low intensity fires with flame
heights <1.5m to 2m.

Reduces the likelihood of fire gaining momentum
with changes in weather, fuel or topography factors.

Crews are more exposed to heat-related illnesses such
as heat stroke, heat exhaustion, heat cramps and
smoke inhalation.
If fire behaviour changes or there is a weakness in the
control line, the fire can quickly escape.

Uses any dead edge of the fire to get the fire
contained quickly.
May allow safe night work.
Usually allows retreat onto burnt ground.

It may produce an irregular, winding control line.

(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 4.1: Direct head attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c)
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 4.2: Direct tail attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c)
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 4.3: Direct flank attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c)

Parallel attacks involve construction of control lines by personnel using hand tools or
machines as close as possible to the flanks of the bushfire (Figure 4.4). The intent of the parallel
attack is to establish fuel-free containment boundaries that the fire cannot cross. Retardant
drops by firefighting aircraft may be used to reduce wildfire behaviour approaching
containment line to increase the potential for containment lines to hold. When considering
the establishment of parallel control lines or breaks, both the production rates of firefighters
with hand tools and machinery, as well as the required break width need to be considered as
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the production of control lines must exceed the bushfire’s rate of spread in order for the fire to
be contained. Whilst supporting literature regarding these factors is limited, fire line potential
rates of construction are detailed in Tables 4.3-4.5, (McCarthy, Tolhurst and Wouters ,2003 cited
in FESA, 2011). Required fire break widths in low intensity grassfire events where spotting is a
possibility are detailed in Table 4.6 (Cheney and Sullivan, 1997 cited in FESA, 2011). In more
extreme forest wildfires where flame lengths may reach 40-50m and spotting of several
hundred meters is possible (Gould et al, 2007) control lines will likely be inneffective against an
established headfire. Advantages and disadvantages of a parallel attack reported in DFES
(2012) are summarised in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Advantages and disadvantages of a parallel attack
Advantages
Control line may be shorter and straighter than in a
direct attack.
Crews may be less exposed to heat and smoke.

Disadvantages
There is an increased chance of fire escaping.
Total fire area will be greater.

Table 2.3: Rates of fireline construction using handtools (FESA, 2011)
Elevated Fuel

Construction rate (meters per
person per hour)

Construction rate when 0.5m
flames within 5m of crew

Low
High

24
19

16
13

Very high / extreme

14

10

Table 4.4: Rates of fireline construction by machines (FESA, 2011)
Machine

Flat production rate
(m/hr)

15° slope production rate
(m/hr)

D4 & Wheeled
Loader

700

420

No debris

630
470

380
200

Some debris – can handle
Some debris – can manage

300

60
10° slope production rate
(m/hr)

Substantial – D6 required

900

730

Little debris

700
450

550
375

Some debris – D4 can manage
Significant debris – D6+ required

350

270

Very significant debris – D6+ has
difficulty

D6-D9

Comments

Table 4.5: Fireline construction rates (McCarthy, Tolhurst & Wouters, 2003)

Method / Appliance

Mean production
rate (meters per
hour)

Note
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Firefighters using hand
tools

13.7 per person

A total of 34 incidents were reviewed and average
firefighter experience was high (reported as a mean
of 0.8 out of 1). Minimum crew of 5, maximum of 60
firefighters.

D4
D6

505
640

A total of 34 D4 performances were reviewed.
A total of 16 D6 performances were reviewed.

D7
D9

570
560

A total of 9 D7 performances were reviewed.
A total of 7 D9 performances were reviewed.

Notes regarding the study:
1. Maximum flame height for the 103 incidents reviewed for the study was 5m; and
2. The study does not specify the width of the fire line created.
Table 4.6: Required firebreak width for spotting vegetation (FESA, 2011)
Fire line intensity (kW/m)

Firebreak width

Anticipated success

1000

10
7.5

High
Moderate

(a)
Figure 4.4: Parallel attack - commencement
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Identified as one of the most difficult strategies to implement properly in the face of wildfire
impact at the urban interface, backburning is the only potentially successful tactic available
for combatting large, fast moving or intense and inaccessible fires (DFES, 2012). As illustrated
in Figure 4.5, it involves the deliberate burning out of vegetation fuel between established
control lines and the approaching fire front and must be undertaken with extreme care to
avoid the creation of additional uncontrollable fire fronts. Advantages and disadvantages of
backburning reported in DFES (2012) are shown in Table 4.7, however it is again noted no
supporting research or justification was provided to substantiate the statements. Due to the
nature of backburning, DFES (2014) identifies several conditions that prohibit backburns being
utilised, listed as:
1. The fire is running under extreme conditions;
2. Long distance spotting is occurring;
3. The location of the fire edge is not known;
4. There are no adequate or existing control lines;
5. There are insufficient resources to construct and hold the backburn;
6. There is not enough time to allow penetration of the backburn to a safe depth;
and
7. The forecast weather conditions will lead to extreme fire behaviour before the
backburn can be secured.

Table 4.7: Advantages and disadvantages of backburning
Advantages

Disadvantages

May stop the progress of a rapidly moving bushfire.
May be the most practicable method of bushfire
suppression for difficult terrain.

Increased total fire area.
If the backburn escapes control, the progress of the
main fire is accelerated.
It can endanger the lives of firefighters
It may produce intense fire behaviour at the junction
between the backburn and the main fire front.
It requires considerable time to effectively establish.
It requires substantial resources to light and patrol.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 4.5: Backburning – point source ignition (a) and line ignition (b)
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Although the use of fire through hazard reduction burns (HRB’s) and backburning are
utilised internationally for conservation, to reduce uncontrolled wildfire behaviour and to
enhance the potential for successful suppression (Boer et al., 2009; Grant & Wouters, 1993;
Marsden-Smedley, 2011; Stratton, 2004; VBRC, 2010; Wimberly et al., 2009; Ingalsbee, 2015), the
effectiveness of these strategies in specifically reducing wildfire impact on communities
remains uncertain (Fernandes & Herminio, 2003; Florec, 2016; McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001;
Oliveras & Bell, 2008; Penman et al., 2011). Even studies which report potential economic
benefits of prescribed burn programs from a suppression perspective (Kuzenko, 2000; Florec,
2016; Silva & Gozalez-Caban, 2010), do not provide comparison of the total economic or life
loss from wildfires where HRB’s were, or were not present. Whilst HRB’s remain an essential part
of Australian wildfire related risk mitigation (AFAC, 2016; McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001), and
backburning remains an important aspect of wildfire suppression (DFES, 2014; Ingalsbee, 2015;
Penney et al., 2019a) the effectiveness of these programs in relation to the specific objective
of protecting people and buildings from the effects of wildfire is unknown.
Illustrated in equation 4.1, the concept of effectiveness is described as a product of
efficacy and reliability (Thomas, 2002) and facilitates a numerical measure of effectiveness
allowing firefighting measures to be quantitatively compared. Efficiency of HRB’s (EffHRB) can
then be calculated to provide a numerical measure against which to evaluate HRB’s against
the set objectives.
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
(4.1)
As Thomas (2002) explains efficacy is the degree to which a system/process achieves an
objective given it operates / is executed. The efficacy the process will be different depending
on the objective. For example, if HRB’s are intended to eliminate house damage at the rural
urban interface (RUI) from wildfire impacts its efficacy is:
• One (1) if there were no houses damaged whenever prescribed burns were
present and a wildfire occurred that would have otherwise impacted the houses;
• Between zero (0) and one (1) if the rate of houses damaged whenever prescribed
burns were present and a wildfire occurred that would have otherwise impacted
the houses was reduced compared to otherwise identical situations where
prescribed burns were not present;
• Zero (0) if the rate of damaged houses remained the same whether prescribed
burns were present or not; and
• Negative if the rate of damaged houses increased when prescribed burns were
present and a wildfire occurred that would have otherwise impacted the houses.
HRB’s work to reduce the severity of wildfire behaviour by reducing the understory (and
potentially bark) fuels available for consumption during a subsequent wildfire event.
Depending on the rate of vegetation regrowth, HRB’s may reduce subsequent wildfire
behaviour in the same area for up to ten years post burn completion (McCarthy & Tolhurst,
2001; Penman et al., 2011; VBRC, 2010). However, a HRB may potentially stop a wildfire head
fire for only the first two years (VBRC, 2010) and even then only under certain conditions. Firstly,
the HRB must be suitably placed in order for the uncontrolled wildfire to impact it (in other
words they are reliable). Secondly, as reported by McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001), as fire
weather conditions worsen the probability of a HRB having any impact on an established
wildfire significantly decreases. As illustrated in Figure 4.6 (McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001, Figure 6),
even with a moderate overall fuel hazard score, once the Fire Danger Index reaches 50 the
efficacy of the HRB slowing the wildfire head fire drops to below 0.6. At increased overall
hazard scores and higher Fire Danger Indices, the efficacy of a previous HRB slowing the
wildfire head fire rapidly drops below 0.2. During a study of a different area by the same
authors involving 2425 wildfires on public land, the overall efficacy of HRB’s assisting suppression
efforts was reported to be even lower at 0.11. In some instances HRB’s have even been
reported to have negative efficacy (McCormick, 2002) where 30% of forest HRB’s studied in
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the Blue Mountains in NSW had a negative effect. This negative effect was reported to occur
due to the curing of scrub fuels greater than 0.5m above the ground, even if understorey fuels
below that height were consumed.
The efficacy of a HRB in reducing spotting and new fire behaviour is dependent on its
ability to remove bark, particularly of stringy bark fuels which contribute significantly to spotting
behaviour and the ignition of new fires (Grant & Wouters, 1993). Where spotting occurs there
is the potential for those spot fires to grow into uncontrolled wildfires having attaining a quasisteady rate of spread in their own right. Depending largely on vertical fuel understory fuel
structure and wind penetration (McRae, 1999), in forest fuels this may take in excess of 30
minutes (Finney & McAllister, 2011; Kucuk, Bilgili & Baysal, 2007; McAlpine, 1988; Penney &
Richardson, 2019) and may not occur until a head fire width of approximately 150m is reached
(Cheney & Gould, 1997). The potential result of this may be that whilst the size of the final
wildfire that impacts urban areas may be less than that of the original wildfire, this does not
necessarily mean the wildfire impacts on life or property may actually be reduced. Recent
work into the effect of fuel bed geometry on wildfire growth (Penney & Richardson, 2019),
firefighter tenability during wildfire suppression (Penney at al, 2019a) and critical flow rates for
wildfire extinguishment (Penney et al., 2019b) suggests that there will be little if any difference
in the ability for firefighters to suppress the ‘new’ headfire/s without substantial aerial
suppression once they attain a quasi-state of spread and an active head fire depth of more
than 2m. In such instances the efficacy of the HRB’s would be close to zero if the objective
was defined as reducing wildfire behaviour that would facilitate active suppression of the
head fire by firefighter direct attack using machinery.

Figure 4.6. Probability of previous prescribed burn slowing the headfire of a subsequent wildfire as a
function of Overall Fuel Hazard and Fire Danger Index. (Probability of "1.0" means "certain", probability
of "0" means "not possible".) Reproduced with permission of the Department of Environment, Land,
Water and Planning Victoria
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In this same context, reliability is the probability that prescribed burns are in the correct
place when required, in other words they are intentionally positioned so that they will be
impacted by wildfire. For example, if the area affected by prescribed burns are always
impacted by wildfires the reliability is one (1). If the area affected by prescribed burns are
impacted by wildfires only half the time then the reliability is 0.5. In a study of 114 wildfires
between 1990 to 1998, McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001) reported only 69 of all wildfires analysed
encountered a HRB, equivalent to a reliability of 0.61. This figure increased 0.92 to when only
fires within “Zone 1” were assessed. Zone 1 was identified as the most proximal to development
where the objective was to protect human life, property and assets and therefore subject to
significantly reduced overall fuel hazard scores compared to outer lying zones. The same
authors reported this figure dropped to less than 0.25 in Zone 1 areas during a study of a
different area involving 2425 wildfires on public land. This variance is not unexpected, with as
the reliability of HRB’s is highly dependent on the area being examined.

Fire services throughout Australia, America, Canada, Europe and New Zealand consider
predicted and reported wildfire behaviour including head fire RoS, fire line intensity (I) and
flame length (LF) when determining the suitability of suppression strategies and tactics. Penney
et al. (2019a) reported that out of the literature reviewed from the various jurisdictions, only
Western Australia utilised RoS as a marker for wildfire suppression strategies in forest or
woodland fuel structures. The reported thresholds were readily suppressed (<0.06kph); hand
tool attack possible (<0.14kph); direct machine attack possible (<0.4kph); direct attack not
possible / unlikely to succeed (>0.4kph); and indirect attack likely to fail (>0.8kph).
Even within fire services some variance exists between strategy thresholds as detailed in
Tables 4.8 (DFES, 2014) and 4.9 (Smith, 2013) which show values for forest fuels. DFES (2014, p79)
also identifies that for tall eucalypt forest, “aerial suppression is of limited effect with fire
intensities over 2000kW/m”. International literature revealed marked variance between
jurisdictional thresholds. Thresholds for the United States of America are identified in Tables 4.10
and 4.11 (Deeming et al., 1978 cited in Hirsch and Martell, 1996; Andrews and Rothemel, 1982
and Rothemel, 1983, also cited in Hirsch & Martell, 1996). Canadian thresholds, Alexander and
DeGroot (1988) cited in Hirsch and Martell (1996) are shown illustrated in Table 4.12. European
thresholds (EuroFire, 2012) are identified in Table 4.13 whilst thresholds adopted by New
Zealand (Alexander, 2000) are detailed in Table 4.14.
Table 4.8: Fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia
Fire Danger

Flame Height (m)

Intensity (kW/m)

Significance

Low
Moderate

0-0.5
0.5-1.5

0-50
50-500

Fires generally self-extinguish
Hand tool line should hold the fire. Direct
attack possible.

High

1.5-3.0

500-2000

Fire too intense for direct attack. Parallel
attack recommended.

Very high

3.0-10.0

2000-4000

Crown fire at upper intensities. Indirect
attack recommended.

Extreme

>10

>4000

Crowning, spotting and major runs likely.
Control efforts probably ineffective.
Defensive strategy recommended.
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Table 4.9: Head fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia
Rate of Spread
(m/hr)
<60

Intensity (kW/m)

Significance

<800

Readily suppressed.

<140
<400

<800
<2000

Hand tool attack possible.
Direct machine attack possible.

>400
>800

>2000
>4000
>5000*

Direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed.
Indirect attack likely to fail.

or

*both values are cited in the same table and category
Table 4.10: Head fire behaviour and strategies - USA (Deeming et al. 1978)
Flame Length (m)

Intensity (kW/m)

0.9
1.2

<173
346

2.4

1730

Significance
Behaviour associated with most prescribed burns.
Limit of control for manual attack methods.
The prospects for control by any means are poor above this
limit.

2.8

2422

The “heat load” on people within 30 feet of the fire is
dangerous

3.3

3460

Spotting, fire whirls and crowning should be expected.

Table 4.11: Head fire behaviour and strategies - USA (Andrews & Rothemal, 1982; Rothemel, 1983)
Flame Length (m)
<1.2

Intensity (kW/m)
<346

1.2-1.4
2.4-3.4

346-1730
1730-3460

>3.4

>3460

Significance
Manual attack on the head fire possible.
Machine attack on the head fire possible.
Control efforts at the head fire will probably be ineffective.
Crowing, spotting and major fire runs are probable. Control
efforts at the head fire are ineffective.

Table 4.12: Head fire behaviour and strategies - Canada
Flame Length (m)
<0.2

Intensity (kW/m)
<10

0.2-1.4
1.4-2.6

10-500
500-2000

2.6-3.5
>3.5

2000-4000
>4000

Significance
Readily suppressed.
Direct manual attack possible.
Direct machine attack possible.
Control efforts at head fire may fail.
Intermittent crown fire to active crown fire development (at
>10000kW/m). Suppression efforts must be restricted to fire flanks.
Violent fire behaviour at intensities >30000kW and suppression
activities should not be attempted until burning conditions
ameliorate.

Table 4.13: Head fire behaviour and strategies - Europe
Flame Length (m)

Significance

<0.5
0.5-1.5

Fires generally self extinguish.
Direct hand tool attack possible.

1.5-2.5

Direct machine attack possible. Flank / parallel attack recommended.
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2.5-3.5

Too intense for direct attack.

3.5-8
>8

Indirect attack possible.
Extreme fire behaviour. Defensive strategies recommended.

Table 4.14: Head fire behaviour and strategies - New Zealand
Intensity (kW/m)
<500

Significance
Direct hand tool attack possible.

500-2000
2000-4000

Direct machine attack possible.
Helitanks and airtankers using chemical fire retardants.

>4000

Very difficult if not impossible to control.

Applying the Noble et al (1980) forest model, as illustrated in Figure 4.7, Penney et al
(2019a) reported the operational RoS thresholds identified by Smith (2011) are exceeded in all
but the sparsest of understorey (w) fuel loads and mildest fire weather conditions associated
with an FDI less than 20. Hand tool attack is not considered possible once available understory
fuel loads exceed 5 t/ha, regardless of FDI, whilst the direct machine attack threshold is also
rapidly exceeded once the FDI exceeds 20 for understory fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha.
Indirect attack thresholds are exceeded once an FDI of 45 is reached in understory fuel loads
of 15 t/ha. At an understory of 25 t/ha, identified as the standard fuel load in AS3959 (2019),
direct machine attack is only suitable at FDIs ≤10 and the indirect attack threshold is exceeded
once the FDI exceeds approximately 23.

Rate of spread (km/h)

Tactic suitability according to rate of spread
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

FDI
w5

w10

w15

w20

w25

w30

Readily suppressed limit

Direct machine attack limit

Indirect attack limit

Figure 4.7. Tactic suitability according to RoS

When considering fire line intensity (I) thresholds, Penney et al. (2019a) found that whilst
there is general agreement across international jurisdictions regarding direct attack tactical
thresholds in forest or woodland fuel structures, discrepancy occurs between direct machine
attack thresholds as well as when the head fire is considered uncontrollable. Western
Australian, New Zealand and Canadian thresholds are the most aggressive, identifying direct
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machine attack on the headfire suitable to 2000 kWm-1 and indirect attack suitable to 30004000 kWm-1 compared to the United States which considers the headfire control limit to be
1730 kWm-1, dangerous conditions present within 30 feet (9.14m) of the head fire at 2422 kWm1 and the head fire to be undefendable at 3460 kWm-1. Only Canada identified a limit for
suppression efforts to cease, being 10,000 kWm-1 almost three times higher than the
undefendable threshold set by the United States.
Illustrated in Figure 4.8, Penney et al. (2019a) reported that once understory fuel loads
exceed 20 t/ha headfire behaviour is recognised as undefendable across all jurisdictions
regardless of the FDI. Utilising American thresholds, I is recognised as resulting in dangerous
conditions within 30 ft of the head fire at all FDIs once a surface fuel load of 15 t/ha is
exceeded. The lower Canadian intensity threshold of 10,000 kWm-1 to cease all wildfire
suppression activities can be exceeded under the right fire weather conditions once surface
fuel loads reach 10 t/ha, and can be breached at an FDI as low as 30 when surface fuels
exceed 20 t/ha. The higher Canadian I threshold of 30,000 kWm-1 is breached once surface
fuels exceed 20 t/ha and the FDI exceeds 80.

Tactic suitability according to fire line intensity
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Intensity (kW/m)
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w5
w15
w25
Direct Personnel Attack (WA, NZ & Canada)
Direct Machine (WA, NZ & Canada)
Manual Attack (US)
Dangerous within 30ft (US)
Suppression Activities Limit 2 (Canada)

60

FDI

70

80

90

100

w10
w20
w30
Parallel Attack (WA)
Indirect Attack (WA, NZ & Canada)
Direct Attack / Control Limit (US)
Suppression Activities Limit 1 (Canada)

Figure 4.8. Tactic suitability according to fire line intensity

Penney et al. (2019) reported Western Australia adopted the most aggressive LF tactical
thresholds in forest or woodland fuel structures. Whilst there is again general agreement at
lower flame length, there is increased variance as LF increases. Western Australia’s Parallel
Attack LF threshold of 3 m is greater than both the 2.5m European limit for Parallel Attack and
the 2.8m LF the United States recognises as creating dangerous conditions within 30ft of the
head fire, whilst the Western Australian indirect attack limit of 10 m is almost three times greater
than the head fire undefendable threshold of 3.4m set by the United States.
As detailed in Figure 4.9 (Penney et al, 2019a), when LF thresholds are used, offensive
suppression strategies are considered unsuitable or dangerous for all landscape scale wildfires
burning in understory fuel loads exceeding 15t/ha regardless of fire weather conditions.
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Further, fire behaviour is recognised as dangerous within 30ft of the head fire in all understory
fuel loads once an FDI of 30 is attained. There is strong agreement between direct personnel
attack thresholds between jurisdictions with direct personnel attack / manual attack on the
head fire identified as inappropriate due to LF across all scenarios regardless of understory fuel
loads and at all FDIs. Only two jurisdictions suggest a direct machine attack on the head fire
is suitable, and only in the mildest head fire behaviour arising from understory fuel loads of 5
t/ha and at an FDI of 5 (USA) and 10 (Canada).

Figure 4.9. Tactic suitability according to flame length

Penney et al (2019a) reported little agreement between the results of the Dry Eucalypt
Forest Fire Model (DEFFM) and Noble model analysis. In comparison to Noble, DEFFM analysis
under predicted RoS, I and LF across all geographic regions once fuels reached three to four
years in age and a FDI of 30 to 40 was attained. Applying DEFFM alone, direct machine attack
RoS thresholds were reached across all geographical jurisdictions when fuels reached four to
five years of age, direct machine attack I thresholds were reached at five to nine years of age
whilst direct machine attack LF thresholds were reached across all geographical jurisdictions
at fuel ages between three to nine years.
Comparative Nobel and DEFFM modelling across all fire weather conditions and utilising
typical forest fuel loads in Western Australia (a sample of these results is illustrated for RoS in
Jarrah Mosaic -Figure 4.10; I in Jarrah South - Figure 4.11; and LF in Jarrah East - Figure 4.12)
revealed DEFFM analysis typically over estimated wildfire behaviour below an FDI of 30 to 50,
above this range DEFFM analysis typically significantly underestimated wildfire behaviour
across all fuel ages and jurisdictions. . Fire line intensity suppression thresholds were typically
exceeded across all jurisdictions once fuel ages reached 3 to 4 years and an FDI of 30 was
reached, with the United States ‘dangerous within 30ft’ threshold rapidly exceeded under the
same conditions. LF suppression thresholds were typically exceeded with most jurisdictions
considering the head fire to be undefendable due to fire behaviour once fuels reached 3 to
5 years of age and an FDI of 30 attained. Only Western Australia and Europe considered head
fires to be defendable above these limits, albeit using indirect suppression tactics.
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Tactic suitability RoS - Jarrah Mosaic
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Figure 4.10. Tactic suitability – the relationship between rate of spread, fuel age and various suppression
tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah Mosaic)
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Tactic suitability Intensity - Jarrah South
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Figure 4.11. Tactic suitability – the relationship between fire line intensity, fuel age and various
suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah South)
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Tactic suitability Flame Length - Jarrah East
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Figure 4.12. Tactic suitability – the relationship between flame length, fuel age and various suppression
tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah East)

Comparing the calculated fire behaviour outputs (RoS, IFL and LF) with the associated base
inputs of FDI, w and fuel age and comparing the results to international wildfire suppression
thresholds a single strategic guidance table can be produced (Penney et al., 2019). As shown
in Table 4.15, the result is that safe offensive strategies on the head fire are identified as
appropriate in only the mildest of conditions or where fuel structure does not facilitate
significant head fire propagation (Penney & Richardson, 2019). It is important to note this
guidance is intended for established siege wildfires of significant proportion such as those
reviewed by Keelty (2011, 2012), Ferguson (2016) and the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission
(2010). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, smaller wildfires such as those experienced within
closed urban environments do not achieve the same Heat Release Rates or produce the same
behaviour outputs as established wildfires which may subsequently allow more aggressive
offensive suppression strategies and tactics. In these instances, as opposed to utilising Table
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4.15, it is necessary to apply the Vegetation Availability Factor as appropriate when predicting
potential wildfire behaviour and manually determining whether suppression and tenability
thresholds are exceeded.
Table 4.15: Wildfire head fire suppression guide
Legend

Siege Wildfire Head Fire Suppression
FDI/w (t/ha)
10
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4.4

5
DM
Fuel Age <
5yrs
IA
Fuel Age <
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs

10
IA
Fuel Age <
10yrs
IA
Fuel Age <
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs

15
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs

20
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs

25
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs

30
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs
DEF
Fuel Age ≥
10yrs

DM – Direct
machine attack
IA –
attack

Indirect

DEF – Defensive
strategy adopted
for head fire.
Consider flank
and tail attacks
where suitable.
Note:
For
DEFFM
Modelling refer
to fuel age. For
McArthur use
FDI/w

Defensive tactics

Defensive tactics are utilised when fire behaviour is too intense to be safely or effectively
attacked. As opposed to offensive tactics, defensive tactics do not attempt to suppress the
bushfire itself, but rather limit the consequences of its impacts through evacuation, community
information and the protection in place of vulnerable communities and critical infrastructure.

The protect-in-place / shelter-in-place defensive Rural Urban Interface (RUI) firefighting
tactic is typically utilised where communities and infrastructure are located within or
immediately adjacent to vegetation that will support landscape scale bushfire behaviour,
(DFES, 2013). It can be a high risk approach as not all homes are defensible (Cova, 2005) or
constructed to withstand wildfire impacts. Illustrated in Figure 4.13, RUI defense essentially
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requires firefighting crews to position themselves between an identified asset and the
approaching bushfire front (DFES, 2013). As detailed in Penney, et al. (2019a) however, it
should be noted that this type of suppression tactic may expose firefighters to untenable
conditions well in advance of the wildfire front itself and may be ineffective due to insufficient
water flow rates. These factors are explored further in Chapters 5 and 6. As an alternative RUI
defense to this high risk tactic, particularly where buildings are constructed in accordance with
AS3959 (SAI Global, 2018), protection of houses and the sheltering population may be
achieved by firefighters sheltering inside the buildings until after the passage of the head fire
and they can safely extingish spot fires and reminant flames. Where evacuations of large
vulnerable communities are not possible, as may be the case for hospitals, schools, aged care
facilities and trapped communities etc, the shelter-in-place defense remains a necessary
approach. In such instances sheltering in the safest possibly buildings distal from the fire front
should be considered. Preemptive retardent line building from fixed wing and rotary
firefighting aircraft, coupled with enhanced direct aerial suppression of the section of the head
fire impacting the protected structures should also be undertaken wherever possible.

Figure 4.13: RUI defense
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Published in Penney et al. (2020a), the Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) can be used
when considering whether there is sufficient time to set up RUI defense prior to the impact of
the head fire. Based on Australian and international RUI wildfire fighting strategies and tactics,
the RUIM represents the expansion of the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (AFAC, 2004) to the
specific context of firefighting defense at the RUI. When completed, the RUIM assists the
Incident Management Team determine whether there is sufficient time for taskforce’s assigned
to protect life, property and critical infrastructure at the RUI, subsequently known as RUI
taskforce’s, to safely mobilise, prepare for, and find shelter prior to the arrival of the wildfire and
the untenable conditions which can occur well in advance of the headfire front. deterministic
analysis of Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) versus Required Safe RUI Preparation
Time (RSRPT) can be applied:
ASRPT is calculated by:

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

(4.2)

𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
(4.3)
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
Where the distance between the headfire and RUI is the lineal separation between the
headfire and the structures under threat; and the headfire rate of spread is calculated using
appropriate equations for the vegetation type and fuel structure involved, such as those
described in (Gould et al, 2007, SAI Global 2018, Cruz et al., 2015).
Illustrated in figure 2, RSRPT is calculated by:
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

(4.4)

Where TR is the time taken for the RUI taskforce to respond; TT is travel time (to a base,
staging area and/or the RUI itself); THL is time to complete and assessment of the immediate
area and set up hose lines; TS is the time taken for crews to seek shelter within a structure prior
to the arrival of untenable conditions associated with the wildfire front. Safety factors (FS) are
included at each stage of the process. Each of these components are discussed separately
in this manuscript.
The main differences between the RUIM and FBIM are:
1. FBIM requires the firefighting strategy and associated tactics to be determined. In
RUI firefighting, the strategies are limited to either ‘backstop defense’ or sheltering
within the structures. The RUIM reflects this accordingly;
2. Wildfire suppression during large campaign wildfires such as those in California
(CAFS, 2018; USFD & CDFFP, 2003), Greece (CBS, 2018) or Victoria (BCRC, 2009)
required the mobilization of military, interstate and even international firefighting
assistance. Suppression efforts are protracted, lasting weeks and firefighting crews
will be drawn from many regions and are likely to be unfamiliar with the
operational area, particularly during the escalation phases of the incident. This
results in greater uncertainty compared to metropolitan structural fire response,
therefore some of the decision points and pathways of the FBIM are not
appropriate to the wildfire context;
3. RUI firefighting does not involve crews committing to internal structural firefighting
as structures actively on fire are identified as undefendable (DFES, 2013 & 2014).
Therefore external suppression of structures only is considered in the RUIM; and
4. The RUIM also allows for Available Safe Time to Critical Points or ASTCP to be
calculated, enabling critical components of the response including wildfire
impacts on access routes, evacuations and other aspects to be deterministically
assessed. This further enhances firefighter safety when responding to areas
involving active wildfire.
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Similarities between the RUIM and FBIM are:
1. Both models rely on the systematic completion to determine the total time to
complete the required activities;
2. Both models require the identification of the critical path, being the sequence of
activities determining the minimum time required for the firefighting intervention;
3. Whilst neither model provides a definitive answer for the duration of mobilization
and suppression efforts, both the RUIM and FBIM provide useful guidance for
Incident Controllers when making operational decisions; and
4. Both models can be improved with enhanced data.
One limitation of the RUIM is the presence of spot fires that grow into new head fires well
in advance of the original fire front are not automatically considered due to the difficulty in
accurately forecasting spot fire formation. Where spotting results in new wildfires in advance
of the original head fire result from spotting, the ASRPT must be revised appropriately. This is
not unique to the RUIM however as new fires within an urban structure require a new timeframe
to be established. As with any model, they are only one tool firefighters and Incident
Controllers can utilise to assist the decision making process. Field validation and current and
reliable intelligence will further assist to increase the accuracy of predictions.
For each of the RUIM stages in the boxes of Figure 4.14, separate flow charts and
associated tables are required to be referred to in order to calculate the total RSRPT. Whilst
firefighters will complete property protection tasks prior to seeking shelter inside the building of
refuge, the time available to complete the property protection (shaded in Figure 4.14) is
calculated after the other stages as it is not in the critical path of completing RUI defense. To
calculate RSRPT, the Incident Controller or relevant officer should commence at Box 1 in Figure
4.15 and work their way through the RUIM until all time components have been calculated.
The incorporation of safety factors and/or percentiles into the RUIM is also essential (AFAC,
2004; ICC et al., 2005; SFS, 2007) due to:
1. Fire safety engineering, especially wildfire engineering, being a discipline based
on complex science which is neither exact or complete (AFAC, 2004);
2. The potential for mass fatalities associated with firefighters’ convoys being caught
in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil & Killalea, 2010; Blanchi et al.,
2014);
3. The potential for untenable conditions occurring well in advance of the wildfire
front (Penney et al., 2019); and the complexity of significant wildfire events, the
incorporation of a safety factors and/or percentiles is also required.
As AFAC (2004, p26) reports
“Fire safety engineering is a discipline based upon a complex science which is neither
exact nor complete. For a realistic result to be achieved, informed approximations and
expert judgement must be employed. In order to ensure safety, appropriate margins are
required in the analysis.”
To account for firefighter fatigue, varying levels of firefighter proficiency and other
uncertainties that can affect fire service response, utilizing a percentile approach can also be
incorporated into the RUIM. The mean values provided in this manuscript are sourced from
AFAC (2004) and are representative of the particular activity being completed within the
stated duration, 50% of the time. Due to the severity of the consequences of burnover, it is
suitable to incorporate a greater percentile. For reference, AFAC (2004) suggests a 90th
percentile is suitable, meaning a particular activity will be completed within the stated
duration 90% of the time. Adopting a conservative approach, the relationship between X
percentile and k standard deviations can be expressed as:
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𝑘𝑘 = �

100
100 − 𝑋𝑋

(4.5)

When the distribution is unknown, for X = 90, k = 3.17 (AFAC, 2004), however where the
average time is at least several standard deviations greater than zero, it is reasonable to
assume the distribution to be normal and for X = 90, k = 1.28 (AFAC, 2004). Using the example
of an “officer size up” where the mean (μ) is 135 seconds and the standard deviation (σ) is 20
seconds, the 90th percentile can then be expressed as:
90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇 + 1.28𝜎𝜎

(4.6)

90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 135 + (1.28 × 20) = 160.6 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

Where the calculation involves speed as opposed to time, the equation becomes:
90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇 − 1.28𝜎𝜎

(4.7)

The use of safety multipliers or factors is also recommended. As AFAC (2004) describes,
where the scientific basis for a well-established discipline is sound, a relatively small safety
factor (FS) as low as 1.2 may be suitable. In keeping with the recommendations of the FBIM, a
safety factor of 2 should be considered for the RUIM. As opposed to applying a single safety
factor at the completion of the model, the correct approach to incorporating safety factors
is to apply them after each individual stage. This is demonstrated in the case study presented
later in this chapter.

Figure 4.14: Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) methodology
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This represents the time taken for firefighters to respond to the dispatch / turnout message
and respond to either the staging area, or the RUI to be defended. It considers whether the
taskforce is pre-assembled or must first mobilise to the staging area from various locations.

Figure 4.15: RUI taskforce dispatch time flow chart. Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 3, p56)
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Table 4.16: RUI taskforce dispatch flow chart explanation. Adapted from AFAC (2004, Table E, p106)
Box /
diamond
1

2
3

4
5
6

Description

Time (s)

This flowchart determines the time taken for firefighters to respond to the
dispatch / turnout message. It is the time taken from activation of the turnout
signal to the time when the taskforce proceeds to the RUI to be defended.

n/a

The RUI taskforce assembles at the staging point prior to mobilizing to the
RUI to be defended.
When assembled at the staging area and wearing PPC, firefighters receive
their briefing and crew their machines immediately prior to mobilizing to the
RUI to be defended.

n/a

If the RUI taskforce hasn’t been assembled then firefighters must first
mobilize to the RUI taskforce staging area from their home fire stations.
If firefighters are on station then they must respond to the message to
proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC and depart.
If firefighters are not on station then (as may be the case with volunteer
stations) they must first drive to the fire station prior to responding to the
dispatch/turnout message. Once on station the firefighters must respond to
the message to proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC and depart.

60*
to
1,200**
n/a
90*
480*
to 1,200**

7

Figure 4.17 details the flowchart used for calculation of fire appliance travel
times.

Fig. 4.17

8

Time for RUI taskforce to respond = sum of times in shaded boxes along
chosen paths.

n/a

*Sourced from AFAC (2004, Table E, p106)
**Suggested realistic worst case scenario

This process can be used for determining both the time it takes for individual appliances
to reach the taskforce staging area (the area all crews assemble prior to being briefed and
dispatched as one taskforce), and the time it takes for the assembled taskforce to reached
the RUI to be defended.
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Figure 4.16: RUI taskforce travel time flow chart. Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 4, p60)
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Table 4.17: Fire appliance and RUI taskforce travel flow chart explanation.
Box /
diamond

Description

Value

9

Time taken for individual appliances to reach RUI taskforce staging area (use
greatest time). Also the process used to determine the time taken for the
assembled taskforce to reach the designated RUI.

n/a

10

If the response is along a defined route then the actual road distance can be
used (Box 11). If the route or the exact distance of a route is unknown then
the radial distance multiplier (Box 12) applies.
Use the actual road distance.

n/a

11
12

AFAC (2004, p61) reports the radial distance multiplied by 1.5 provides a
reasonable approximation of actual road distance to be travelled.

13

AFAC (2004, Tables F1-F5) provide typical fire service travel times for
different Australian jurisdictions. The average of these times is provided in
Table 4.18 and may be used where other data sets are not available (AFAC,
2004, p61).

14

Total travel time = distance travelled (Box 11 or 12) divided by average
expected speed (Box 13)

Actual
route (km)
Radial
distance X
1.5 (km)
Table 4.18

n/a

Table 4.18: Mean fire appliance travel times, in kph. Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables F1-F5).
Context

Melbourne

Tasmania

South Australia

Average

Major city CBD

μ
38.8

σ
12.8

μ
45.1

σ
24.1

μ
36.6

σ
8.7

μ
40.2

σ
15.2

Major city inner suburb
Major city outer suburb

44.3
60.5

12.0
16.2

51.0
43.9

20.3
18.2

41.4
42.6

7.3
8.8

45.6
49.0

13.2
14.4

Rural town centre
Rural country

-

-

54.9
55.7

25.6
23.6

-

-

54.9
55.7

25.6
23.6

Travel through site

8

-

8

-

-

-

8

-

Note: other datasets from AFAC (2004) included firefighter response times which are
considered separately in RUIM Figure 4.15

This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to set up hose lines for the
RUI defense. It provides flexibility around the individual RUI tactics that individual fire services
utilise.
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Figure 4.17: Time to set up RUI defense hose lines flow chart. Adapted from AFAC (2004, Charts 7&10)
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Table 4.19: Time to set up RUI defense hose lines flow chart explanation.

Box /
diamond
15
16

17
18

19

20

Description

Value

Time taken for individual crews to set up hose lines in preparation for
RUI defense.
The Office in Charge must first complete a size up of the RUI and
determine which properties the taskforce will focus on. This is
considered to be equivalent to complex wayfinding in a structure fire
context (AFAC, 2004, Table K) and the time taken to gather
information in an area >10,000m2 (AFAC, 2004, Table L). Total 135
seconds.
If lay flat hoses are used proceed to Box 18. If high pressure hose
reels are to be used proceed to Box 19.
Lay flat hose must be removed, connected and charged from the
appliance. Guidance is provided in Table 4.20, amended from AFAC
(2004, Table V, p110).
Appliance hose reel must be removed from appliance and carried to
position. Guidance is provided in Table 4.20, amended from AFAC
(2004, Table Q, p109) and is considered equivalent to firefighter
horizontal speed in PPC with equipment.
Total time taken to set up RUI = sum of shaded boxes (16 + 18 or 19)
along chosen path.

n/a
135
seconds
Table 4.20

n/a
Table 4.20

Table 4.20

n/a

Table 4.20: RUI defense activities and times. Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables K, L, Q, V)

Activity

Time (s)
μ
135
15.8
39.4**

σ
23.1
17.4**

Officer in Charge size up
Remove and position high pressure hose reel*
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 65mm
diameter hose
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 38mm 33.3**
15.4**
diameter hose
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 65mm diameter 20.3**
13.2**
hose
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 38mm diameter 18.4**
10.2**
hose
*Movement speed of firefighter in turnout uniform carrying equipment (AFAC, 2004, Table
Q)
**Per 30m length of hose

This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to seek shelter in an
appropriate refuge prior to the arrival of the wildfire front.
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Figure 4.18: Time for firefighters to seek shelter flow chart.

Assuming firefighters are only required to travel horizontally (i.e. no stairs are involved) and
firefighters move at μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3 (AFAC, 2004, Table Q ‘dressed in turnout uniform with
equipment’) the time taken for firefighters to reach the building of refuge can be estimated
by:
𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 (𝑚𝑚)
(4.8)
𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −1 )
Where Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge; SF is the speed of
the firefighters. In the absence of available data it is suggested that as a worse case credible
scenario it is appropriate to consider this distance to be 90m, being three lengths of 30m hose
consistent with the tactics of RUI defense (DFES, 2013 & 2014).
The time taken for a group of people (including firefighters) to pass a point in a path of
travel (corridor, aisle, ramp, doorway) is expressed as (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno,
2008, Eqn 11):
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃 ⁄[(1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 ]

(4.9)
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Where tp is the time for passage in seconds, P is the population size in persons, D is the
population density in persons per m2, k is 1.40, a is 0.266ms-1, and We is the effective width in
metres of the component being transferred (door, corridor, ramp etc.). In the absence of
alternate data, We of a door can be assumed to be 0.6m and D assumed to be 1.9 persons
per m2 (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno et al., 2008).
Whilst the time available to complete property protection tasks (TF) is not on the critical
path for RUI defense, removal of proximal fuel from houses can increase their resilience to
wildfire impacts (Leonard, 2009; Blanchi et al., 2006). TF is calculated by:
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

(4.10)

If ASRPT<RSRPT then Incident Controllers need to consider the high potential for the
responding taskforce to be caught by the approaching headfire in the open, either on route
or during RUI preparation.

In order to provide the pathway between firefighting theory and practice, and
demonstrate the practical application of the RUIM to a realistic wildfire scenario, the following
case study based on recent and potential wildfire events in Western Australia (illustrated in
figures 4.19-4.21) is presented:
A wildfire ignition is reported in the Blackwood State Forest in the south west of Western
Australia. Aurora wildfire simulation completed by the IMT predicts the wildfire will impact
Nannup, a town approximately 47km to the east in 30-34 hours post ignition. The fire will also
impact the road between the taskforce staging point and Nannup in 26-30 hours post ignition.
For the first 11 hours suppression is unsuccessfully attempted through aerial firefighting and the
construction of containment lines. Community warnings are issued and residents are advised
to evacuate north towards the regional city of Bunbury, however a large aged care facility of
80 high dependency residents cannot be evacuated and a critical radio communications
tower is also located in Nannup townsite. At the 12 hour mark the IMT determine a defend-inplace strategy is required to protect the aged care facility. A request for a taskforce is issued
however it is not known whether the taskforce will arrive too late to protect the town. The
taskforce of 30 personnel (including the Officer in Charge) will be coming from the regional
city of Bunbury and the state capital city of Perth. Bunbury is approximately 70km to the north,
whilst Perth is approximately 220km to the north (both distances measured lineally). Whilst the
Bunbury Taskforce is already assembled and ready to depart to the RUI staging area, the Perth
Taskforce is to be made up of fire appliances from various metropolitan and regional volunteer
fire stations, including Lancelin (114km northwest of Perth) and Northam (90km northeast of
Perth). The crew of Northam have advised there will be a four hour delay due to appliance
technical issues before they can depart to the Perth staging area where the convoy will
depart. The IMT are situation in the town of Busselton, 50km northwest of Nannup. This is also
the location of the RUI Taskforce Staging point. To provide the IMT guidance, the RUIM is
applied. An overview map is provided in figure 7.
Step One – Determining ASRPT and safety factors
From the Aurora modelling, the town of Nannup wll be impacted by the headfire in 30-34
hours post ignition. It is critical however to acknowledge the request for the taskforce is issued
12 hours post ignition, reducing the Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) to 18-22 hours.
The Incident Controller takes a precautionary approach and requires the lower 24 hour period
to be used.
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 22 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
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However, another critical point is also identified for the scenario, being the available time
before access road is impacted by fire, being 28-30 hours post ignition. It is equally as critical
to acknowledge this event is forecast to occur 16-18 hours after the request for the taskforce
is issued. This is termed the Available Safe Time to Critical Point 1 or ASTCP1 = 16 hours = 960
minutes.
The Incident Controller also requires 90th percentile margins and safety factors to be
applied where possible, except for the initial travel to the taskforce staging area located well
away from the fireground or any smoke impacts etc, and requires a Safety Factor (FS) of 2 to
be applied in all instances.
Step Two – Calculating time taken for RUI taskforce to respond (TR)
Separate TR must be calculated for each section of the taskforce, subsequently denoted
Bunbury TF and Perth TF. With reference to figures 4.15-4.16, the process for determining TR for
each section is detailed in tables 4.21-4.22 from initial dispatch to arrival at the Busselton
staging point to receive their briefing and then table 8 from Busselton to the RUI staging point.
The process results in TR for the Bunbury TF calculated as 58.5 minutes and the TR for the Perth
TF as 637 minutes. When considering the two separate taskforces are to join into a single
taskforce to respond to the RUI, the greater value of 637 minutes is applied.

Figure 4.19: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com
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Figure 4.20: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com

Figure 4.21: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com
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Table 4.21: TR Bunbury TF

Step
1
2
4
5
7
9
10
11
13
14
End

Comment
Start of RUIM. Proceed to step 2.
Task force is ready to depart Bunbury but is not at the RUI staging area.
Proceed to step 4.
Firefighters are at their station. Proceed to step 5.
Firefighters dress, assemble, assimilate information and leave station.
Duration 90 seconds. Proceed to Step 7.
Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step
9.
No action required. Proceed to step 10.
Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.
Actual distance of 52km is used, 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’
and 42km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.
Travel time to taskforce staging area = (10/49.0) + (42/55.7) = (0.2 + 0.75) =
0.95 hours
Total Bunbury TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals
time to respond plus travel time, being 1.5 + 57 min. Equal to 58.5 minutes.

Time
n/a
n/a
n/a
1.5 min
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
57 min
58.5
minutes

Table 4.22: TR Perth TF

Step
1
2
4
6

7
9
10

12

13
14

Comment
Start of RUIM. Proceed to step 2.
Task force is not assembled. Proceed to step 4.
Firefighters are not at their station. Proceed to step 6.
For all stations except for Northam, time to travel to fire station, dress,
assemble, assimilate information and leave station is 1,200 seconds = 20
minutes.
For Northam station, the stated delay is 4 hours = 240 minutes.
The highest value is used for the purposes of calculation.
Proceed to step 7.
Calculation of travel time to Perth base for Perth TF to form starting at step
9.
No action required. Proceed to step 10.
Exact distance by road is not known, travel times calculated for the two
stations required to travel the greatest distance, being Lancelin (114km)
and Northam (90km). Assumption made that as all other metropolitan
appliances are within 20km of the Perth base they will arrive prior to either
Lancelin or Northam.
Proceed to step 12.
Maximum radial distance from staging area calculated as:
Lancelin = 1.5 x 114 = 171km; and
Northam = 1.5 x 90 = 135km
Both distances assumed to include 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’
and the remaining distance through ‘rural country’.
Proceed to step 13.
Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.
Travel time to taskforce staging area is calculated as:
Lanceline = (10/49.0) + (161/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.9) = 3.1 hours = 186 minutes
Northam = (10/49.0) + (135/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.4) = 2.6 hours = 156 minutes.

Time
n/a
n/a
n/a
240 min

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a

n/a
156 min
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1
2
4
5
7
9
10
11
13
14
End

As the Lancelin crew will arrive at the Perth base prior to the Northam crew
leaving their station, the Northam value of 156 minutes is the critical value
used for the purposes of calculation.
Proceed to step 1 to determine time required for Perth TF to respond to TF
staging area in Busselton.
No action required. Proceed to step 2.
Perth TF is assembled at the Perth base and ready to depart to the staging
area in Busselton. Proceed to step 4.
Crews are at the Perth base. Proceed to step 5.
Crews receive their briefing and depart. Duration 60 seconds. Proceed to
step 7.
Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step
9.
No action required. Proceed to step 10.
Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.
Actual distance of 222km is used, 20km through ‘major city outer suburb’
and 202km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.
Travel time to taskforce staging area = (20/49.0) + (202/55.7) = (0.4 + 3.6) =
4 hours
Total Perth TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals time
to respond plus travel time, being 240 + 156 + 1 + 240 min. Equal to 637
minutes. This is greater than the Bunbury TF travel time and is used for
subsequent calculations.

n/a

1 min
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
240 min
637 min

Step Three – Calculating time taken for joint taskforce to travel to RUI (TT)
Now the taskforce is united, subsequently referred to as the Joint TF, at the Busselton
staging area, a single travel time (TT) to the RUI staging area can be calculated. With reference
to figure 4.15, the process for determining TT is detailed in table 4.23. Noting that the Joint TF is
now proceeding to the fireground, the IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety
factor of 2 to be applied will be in effect. Importantly, the calculations demonstrate ASTCP1
of 960 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the taskforce can be safely deployed to the RUI
with reasonable confidence that they will not be impacted by the headfire during the journey.
The total TT is calculated as 288 minutes.
Table 4.23: TT Joint TF

Step
9
10
11
13

14

FS
ASTCP1

Comment
No action required. Proceed to step 10.
Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.
Actual distance of 60km is used, 5km through ‘major city outer suburb’
and 55km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
Table 3 ‘Average’ values used and 90th percentile applied.
90th percentile= μ-1.28σ, therefore major city outer suburb speed = (49.0
– (1.28x14.4) = 30.7kph and ‘rural country’ speed = (55.7 – (1.28 x 23.6) =
25.5kph. Proceed to step 14.
Travel time to RUI staging area = (5/30.7) + (55/25.5) = (0.2 + 2.2) = 2.4
hours.

Time
n/a
n/a
n/a

Safety factor of 2 applied.
For the taskforce to travel to the RUI without being impacted by the fire
front, ASTCP1 > (TR+TT). Using the forecast time of impact of the access
road and the calculated TR and TT:

288 min

n/a

144 min
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ASTCP1 = 960 minutes
TR = 288 minutes and TT = 637 minutes, therefore TR+TT = 925 minutes

Step Four – Calculating time taken to set up hose lines (THL)
Once the taskforce arrives at the Nannup RUI the time taken to set up hose lines and
establish the urban defense must be calculated. With reference to figure 5, the process for
determining THL is detailed in table 4.24. The IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety
factor of 2 to be applied is incorporated into the calculation. The total THL is calculated as 10
minutes.
Table 4.24: THL Joint TF

Step
15
16
17
18

Comment
No action required. Proceed to step 16.
Time taken for Officer in Charge (OIC) to complete size up is 135 seconds
= 2.3 minutes. Proceed to step 17.
The OIC determines that hose lines will consist of 1 length of 65mm hose
and 2 lengths of 38mm hose. Proceed to step 18.
Table 5 values used and 90th percentile applied.
90th percentile= μ+1.28σ, therefore time to remove and connect 65mm
hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (39.4 + (1.28
x17.4)) = 61.7 seconds and time to remove and connect 38mm hose from
appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (33.3 + (1.28 x 15.4) = 53.0
seconds.

Time
n/a
2.3 min
n/a
1.7 min

20

Time to charge hose is the time to charge the 65mm length and both 38mm
lengths of hose. This is calculated by (20.3+(1.28 x 13.2)) + 2(18.4+(1.28 x
10.2) = (37.2+62.9) = 100.1 seconds = 1.7 minutes
Proceed to step 14.
THL = 2.3 + 1.7 min = 5 minutes

5 min

FS

Safety factor of 2 applied.

10 min

Step Five – Calculating Time taken for firefighters to seek shelter (TS)
With reference to figure 4.18, the process for determining TS is detailed in table 4.25. The
required time for firefighters to seek shelter prior to the arrival of untenable conditions
associated with the head fire are calculated in accordance with equations 4.8 and 4.9, where
Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge = 90m; SF is the speed of the
firefighters μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3, therefore SF = 2.3 – (1.28 x 1.3) = 0.6 ms-1; P is 30, We is 0.6m; and
D is 1.9 persons per m2. The FS of 2 is again applied. The total TS is calculated as 12.6 minutes.

Table 4.25: TS Joint TF

Step
21
16

FS

Comment
No action required. Proceed to step 22.
Time taken for firefighters to reach shelter, applying equation 6.
90 (𝑚𝑚)
∴ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
= 150 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 2.5𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
0.6 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −1 )
Apply Safety factor.
Safety factor of 2 applied.

Time
n/a
2.5 min

5 min
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18

FS
24

Proceed to step 23.
Time taken for firefighters to enter shelter, applying equation 7.
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 = 30�[(1
= 38 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.
− 0.266 × 1.9)1.4 × 1.9 × 0.6]
Apply Safety factor
Safety factor of 2 applied.
Proceed to step 24.
TS = 5 + 1.3 min = 6.3 minutes

0.65 min

1.3 min
6.3 min

Step Six – Deterministic analysis and calculating TF
Equation 4.4 is now applied to determine whether there is sufficient RSRPT for the taskforce
to be deployed. ASRPT was previously determined to be 22 hours.
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (637 + 288 + 10 + 6.3)

∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 941.3 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 15.7 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

In this scenario, the deterministic analysis provides guidance to the IMT that there is
sufficient time for the taskforce to safely reach the Nannup RUI and ready the defense of the
nursing home. The calculation of RSRPT also enables evidence based trigger points to be set
by the IMT. For instance, should spotting result in a new headfire that will impact the access
road into Nannup 20 hours post ignition (8 hours after the taskforce request is submitted) and
impacting the Nannup RUI 26 hours post ignition (15 hours after the taskforce request is
submitted), then the revised ASTCP1 of 480 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the revised
ASRPT of 900 minutes < RSRPT of 941.3 minutes. Having completed the RUIM process, the IMT
are aware that without waiting for the Perth TF, the Bunbury TF RSRPT is 369.1 minutes (6.2 hours);
and only 310 minutes (5.2 hours) if they are already assembled at the Busselton staging area.
This analysis supports the IMT to enact the contingency plan of deploying a smaller taskforce
to the Nannup RUI as opposed to no taskforce at all. It also supports the establishment of
operational ‘go/no-go’ trigger points to reduce the potential for responding firefighters to be
caught in burnover.

Evacuations of communities in the path of large wildfires is a growing problem for both
land use planners and Incident Management Teams alike (Cova, 2005; Taylor & Freeman,
2010). If left too late or incorrect routes are taken during evacuations, fatalities may result,
particularly in the wake of significant wildfires (Haynes et al, 2008; Blanchi et al, 2014; Handmer
et al, 2010; Ronchi et al, 2019). When considering whether community evacuations are
possible, a hydraulic model which simplifies egress behaviour and enables evacuation to be
described by a set of equations can be used (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008; ICC
et al, 2005). This subsequently enables deterministic analysis of Available Safe Evacuation Time
(ASET) versus Required Safe Evacuation Time (RSET) as described in the wildfire context by
Ronchi et al, (2017 & 2019):
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 + 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣ℎ + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

(4.11)

where td is the time for the incident to be detected after ignition, tFDA is the time spent by
the fire department assessing the situation on site, tFDI is the time spent by the fire department
intervening and attempting to control the incident, tN is the time for the population to be
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notified once intervention has been deemed unsuccessful, tprep is the time for a resident to
complete preparations after they have initially been notified, tfoot is the time for the population
to move on foot (e.g. walk to a place of safety or to a vehicle), tveh is the time for the population
to move into a vehicle, and finally tref is the time for the individual to be on-boarded at a place
of safety. An additional consideration not inherently contained within the model is the
requirement for assisted evacuations from schools, aged care facilities, hospitals etc. When
considering evacuations from such places it may be more suitable to adopt a shelter-in-place
strategy with dedicated urban firefighting appliances. As illustrated in Figure 4.22, the timing
and adequacy of decisions made by Incident Controllers can have significant impact on the
ability of the community to safely evacuate. Whilst td, and tprep are often beyond the control
of responding fire services, rapid and accurate assessment of the incident and subsequent
selection of appropriate strategies and tactics (tFDI), including evacuation as a tactic, coupled
with detailed and timely community warnings tN can increase the available time for evacuees
to find safe refuge. It is important to note that this approach implies various assumptions about
human behaviour and has several limitations including (Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno,
2008, p3-376):
1. Behaviours that detract from movement are not explicitly considered;
2. People are considered as a group as opposed to their own personal identity and
attributes;
3. Movement between egress components is considered, rather than within them;
and
4. The results are deterministic and will therefore remain the same unless changes are
made to the scenario or the assumptions employed.
As a result it is important to include a safety factor when considering the suitability of an
evacuation strategy. For example, depending on the size of the population to be evacuated,
the complexity of the situation and the Incident Controller’s own risk tolerance they may
require ASET ˃ 2.7RSET prior to approving and evacuation plan. As a point of reference, whilst
AFAC (2004) identifies that the safety factor for a well-established discipline supported by
robust evidence may be quite small and as low as 1.2, for structural firefighting efforts a factor
of 2 is appropriate. Given the relative infancy of wildfire engineering as a discipline, the lack
of robust data and the potential for mass fatalities associated with evacuating people being
caught in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil & Killalea, 2010; Blanchi et al., 2014)
the authors suggest a minimum safety factor of 2.5 is utilised for community evacuation
purposes in the landscape wildfire context. In sub-landscape scale wildfire scenarios within
the urban environment, where head fire suppression is possible and smaller community
movements need to be considered, a safety factor of 1.5 may be suitable.

Figure 4.22: (a) ASET; (b) RSET with delayed community notification; (c) RSET with rapid community
notification and early evacuation decision.
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tfoot and tref include movement and queuing times for all evacuees and can become
complicated where large numbers of evacuees are moving to different refuges. In such
instances guidance can be found in Gwynne & Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008), however in
simple cases flow of persons through a certain point (such as the doors of buildings) can be
calculated by:
𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒

(4.12)

𝑆𝑆 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(4.13)

where Fc is calculated flow (m/s), S is speed of movement(m/s), D is population density
(persons/m2), and We is effective width of component being traversed such as a door or
stairwell (m).

where k and a are both constants, obtained from sources including Gwynne &
Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008, Table 3-13.2) or Vaughan and Bain (2001).
The complexity of mass evacuations during natural disasters and emergencies requires
dynamic modelling software to be used (Shiwakoti et al., 2013). Dynamic traffic simulation
enables the comparison of different evacuation plans under a variety of situations (Yuan et
al., 2006), however there is often a trade-off between accuracy, cost, data requirements and
the time required for simulations to be completed (Shiwakoti et al., 2013). In addition to
recommending minimum traffic means of egress standards for urban design in wildfire prone
areas, Cova (2005) also identifies the major factors that can impede community evacuation.
Whilst accurately calculating tveh remains problematic (Cova et al, 2011; Intini et al, 2019;
Ronchi et al, 2017), in an urban design and planning assessment context when a shelter in
place strategy is adopted, calculation of tveh is not required as occupants are not leaving the
site. To improve the design of wildfire prone communities (including visiting tourists) in regards
to large scale evacuation and egress, Cova (2005) recommends a number of safety aspects.
These recommendations are summarized in Tables 4.26-4.29.
Table 4.26: Wildfire prone road design safety aspects. Adapted from Cova (2005)
Component
Occupant load factor (density)

Number of exits

Standard
The density of homes along the roads in any fire-prone community or
portion thereof should not exceed: that specified in Table 4.16 (reproduced
with permission from ASCE)
The number of means-of-egress from any fire-prone community or portion
thereof shall meet the minimum specified in Table 4.28 (reproduced with
permission from ASCE)

Exit capacity

The total egress capacity from a fire-prone community or portion thereof
shall meet the factors specified in Table 4.29 (reproduced with permission
from ASCE)

Exit arrangement

The closest distance between any two points along any of the n exits from
a fire-prone community must be at least 1/n the maximum diagonal
distance across the community. The maximum diagonal of a community
is defined as the greatest Euclidean distance between any two households
that rely on the same exit set, and the minimum distance between exits is
defined as the shortest Euclidean distance between any two points along
two exiting roads.
No household in a fire-prone community shall be further than 3 km by
road from its closest exit. The maximum exit distance for a community is

Maximum exist distance
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Exit vulnerability (distance to fuel)

defined as the household with the greatest shortest-path distance on the
road network to an exit discharge in the most constraining bottleneck set
i.e., the end of one of the exiting roads from the community.
Exits in a fire-prone community shall have a 10m buffer on each side that
is clear of fuel.

Table 4.27: Occupant load factor (density). Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE
Use

Hazard

Road length per household (m)

Road length per vehicle (m)

Residential

Low

12.5

6.3

Moderate

16.7

8.3

High

20.0

10.0

Low

12.5

4.2

Moderate

16.7

5.6

High

20.0

6.7

Residential
& Tourism

Table 4.28: Minimum exits. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE
Number of households

Minimum number of
exiting roads

Maximum households per
exit.

1-50

1

50

51-300

2

150

301-600

3

200

600+

4

200
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Table 4.29: Exit capacity. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE
Use

Hazard

Minimum total exit capacity
(vehicles
per
hour
per
household)

Minimum evacuation time
(hours)

Residential

Low

1

2

Moderate

2

1

High

4

0.5

Low

1.5

2

Moderate

3

1

High

6

0.5

Residential
& Tourism
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4.5 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s
Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in late 2019 and early 2020
throughout Australia are dynamic and complex disasters that require significant interstate and
international resourcing over prolonged durations. When such events occur they will inevitably
impact life and property as well as overwhelming firefighting efforts. This chapter discussed
the strategies available to firefighters, their limitations, and where the evidence suggests they
may be successful. Detailed and accurate planning is required to be completed by IMT’s and
fire behaviour specialists to ensure firefighting operations are suitable and to minimise the
potential for firefighter injury. When applied correctly and in the right context, the findings of
new research including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist IMT’s to achieve this.
As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega wildfires, detailed
predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in itself is insufficient. Care must be taken to
bridge the theory – practice gap and ensure planning is operationally relevant. The research
presented in this chapter demonstrates that even in mild conditions, the head fire will often be
unstoppable where it occurs in continuous vegetation fuel bed geometry. This is further
supported by the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The use of existing wildfire scars and
prescribed burns for wildfire suppression can only be considered opportunistic and with
marginal chance of success unless the burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and significant
in area. As climate change continues to result in worsening fire conditions, frontline firefighters,
IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists need to apply increased scrutiny to fuel bed structure and
geometry, focusing suppression efforts where fuels are discontinuous and broken.

4.6 Implications for urban planners
By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression strategies, urban planners
can significantly influence the defendability and resilience of communities to wildfire impacts
through appropriate design of development at the RUI. The research and increased analysis
presented in this chapter enables wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered
at the design stage of RUI development. Evidence based design that incorporates minimum
measures for evacuations and eliminates the unrealistic expectation that firefighters will be
able to defend every property will lead to more appropriate passive 3 wildfire resilient design
The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire Engineering Reports,
similar to the standard fire engineering processes within the urban fire engineering profession
will only further increase the standard of safety in bushfire prone areas. These are detailed and
complex technical documents however that required a high degree of technical knowledge
and proficiency from both the engineer and the agencies involved.

Passive systems do not require action or maintenance. For instance, ensuring road
design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without additional control measures is a
passive measure that can be supported by appropriate and timely community evacuation
messages. Firefighters being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.
3
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5. Firefighter tenability in the wildfire context
5.1

Introduction

Whilst the wildfire suppression thresholds discussed in Chapter 4 are utilised internationally
by fire services, they fail to sufficiently consider firefighter tenability. The International Fire
Engineering Guidelines (ICC, 2005) defines untenable conditions as “environmental conditions
associated with fire in which human life is not sustainable.” This should not be confused with
the conditions required to facilitate effective firefighting suppression which are significantly
milder than those able to be withstood for short periods of time. Therefore, improving firefighter
safety during wildfire suppression by clearly defining fire ground environmental conditions that
are considered tenable, or safe for firefighters is paramount. Both the Society of Fire Safety
(2014) and Poh (2010) identify four primary hazards associated with fires within the built
environment that affect tenability being convected heat, radiant heat, toxic gases and smoke
obscuration. However, as Poh (2010) reports, there is no single set of related values for
tenability criteria which is universally accepted. This chapter defines and discusses firefighter
tenability in the wildfire context to assist Incident Controllers to make critical incident decisions
during chaotic and large wildfire incidents.
5.2

Defining Tenability

Smoke obscuration is excluded as a factor affecting firefighter tenability in the wildfire
context due to the lack of injuries and incidents associated with visual obscurity during wildfire
events (Hayes et al, 2008; Penney, 2019 – risk). Knight, Brown and Leonard (2001) identify the
toxic gases produced during the thermal degradation of vehicle componentry, particularly
the interior vehicle componentry, will be subsequent to the loss of tenability due to radiant
heat and other factors. The same authors do note that hydrogen chloride (HCl), a severe
irritant released when vinyl interiors thermally degrade even without combustion,
formaldehyde (HCHO), hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and carbon monoxide (CO) may cause
significant irritation to occupants in the vehicle cabin, however not to the extent of affecting
tenability. The concentration for each of these gases that are immediately dangerous to life
or health (IDLH) are detailed in Table 5.1. Brown et al. (2003) reports fire truck cabins will
generally remain tenable in regards to toxic gases unless there is catastrophic window failure
with glass falling from the frame.
Table 5.1: IDLH concentrations
Material
CO
HCHO

IDLH (ppm)
1000-8000
20-100

HCl

50-1000

HCN

50-280

Source & Comments
(Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2014)
(Brown et al., 2003; Kent, 1998; NIOSH, 2014a)
@20ppm – severe respiratory irritation
@50ppm – pulmonary oedema
@100ppm – immediate death
(Brown et al., 2003; Hull et al., 2008; NIOSH, 2014b)
@50ppm – barely tolerable
@1000ppm pulmonary oedema
(Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2016)
@ 100 death after 1 hour
@181 fatal after 10 minutes
@280 immediately fatal

Radiant heat transfer is primarily responsible for the propagation of landscape scale
bushfire and subsequent impacts on firefighters (Penney & Richardson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018;
Butler, 2014; Frankman et al., 2012; Leonard, 2010) therefore it is proposed any impacts of
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convective heat transfer, or noxious gases on firefighters would first occur from radiant heat
transfer. Direct flame contact from the passing fire front or adjacent involved fuels (including
burning fuels underneath the vehicle) have the potential to result in rapid vehicle fire
involvement and untenable conditions in as little as 90 seconds (DFES, 2012a & 2016; Pearce
et al, 2004). Post burnover investigations support the conclusion radiant heat remains the
greatest threat to firefighters (Sullivan et al., 2003) and conditions within the vehicle cabin may
become untenable in a much shorter timeframe than this (Linton, 2016; Johnstone, 2002;
Pearce et al., 2004; WFA, 2013). Calculated potential peak radiant heat flux from large
wildfires can exceed 76 kWm-2, even at greater than 10 m separation from the head fire under
mild fuel loads and weather conditions (Penney et al., 2019a). By comparison experiential
forest fire field data reported by Frankman et al. (2013) identified peak heat fluxes of 179 kWm2 and 263 kWm-2, whilst an analysis of 216 homes post the Springwood wildfire in New South
Wales, Australia in 2013 by Newnham et al. (2014) estimated peak radiant heat fluxes
experienced by houses to be as much as 52.5kWm-2.
Purser (2008) cites three methods of incapacitation from exposure to fire are possible,
being heat stroke, body surface burns and respiratory tract burns. The sensation of pain occurs
prior to burns, incapacitation and ultimately death, however in the case of significant bushfire
such events may be almost simultaneous as opposed to the more prolonged onset of
hyperthermia.
In considering pain and burns two assumptions detailed in both Poe (2010) and Purser
(2008) are retained:
1. Thermal burns to the respiratory tract will not occur unless the air temperature / or
humidity are sufficient to cause (unprotected) facial skin burns; and
2. Heat flux and temperature tenability limits designed to protect victims from
incapacitation by skin burns should be adequate to protect them from burns to the
respiratory tract.
Whilst the protective effects of Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) and Equipment (PPE)
are acknowledged, this report includes a third assumption that unprotected skin thresholds are
suitable for modelling purposes (and as a result incorporate an inherent safety factor where
structural firefighting PPC and PPE are worn). Limited experimental data involving human test
subjects is available to support tenability thresholds and variance between the literature exists.
Although Raj (2008) suggests exposure to as much as 5 kWm-2 may occur without pain or injury
in clothed subjects, Poe (2010) identifies 2.5 kWm-2 is sufficient to result in both skin and
respiratory burns. The Australasian Fire Authorities Council (2004) provides further guidance for
firefighters in structural firefighting PPC (including Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) as
detailed in Table 5.2, however the Society of Fire Safety (2014) suggest the ‘Routine’ exposure
threshold may be inappropriate considering radiant heat flux received whilst sunbaking may
be as high as 1.1 kWm-2. For firefighters sheltering inside a fire appliance cabin Knight et al.
(2001) utilise a 60 second radiation limit of 2 kWm-2 and air blast temperature limit of 200°C
however the lower temperature of 150°C for exposed personnel is adopted in Europe (2010).
Further guidance regarding human tolerance to thermal radiation is provided by Purser (2008,
Table 2-6.19] as summarised in Table 5.3.
Table 5.2: Firefighter exposure limits
Routine
Condition
Maximum Time
Maximum Air Temperature
Maximum Radiation

25 minutes
100°C
1kWm-2

Hazardous
Condition
10 minutes
120°C
3kWm-2

Extreme
Condition
1 minute
160°C
4-4.5kWm-2

Critical
Condition
< 1 minute
>235°C
>10kWm-2
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Table 5.3: Radiant heat flux effects
Heat Flux kWm-2
2.5
4.2
10.5
23.5
30
35
40
50
100
150

Pain
40
5
1.6
6
5
4.5
4
2
1

Time to Effect (seconds)
Burn
30 (blisters)
10
9.5
9
7
4
2.5

Full Burn
>15
>15
>15
>15
6
4

The time taken for various effects as a result of exposure to thermal radiation can also be
calculated by Purser’s (2008) equation:
4
𝑟𝑟 �3
(5.1)
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 4
𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟 �3
where trad is the time to reach end effect for the identified thermal radiation (minutes), qr
is the given radiant heat flux, and r is the radiant heat exposure [(kWm-2)min-1] for the identified
endpoint detailed in Table 5.4:
Table 5.4: Radiant heat exposures
Thermal radiation [(kWm-2)min-1]

Endpoint

1.33
10

tolerance limit / pain / first-degree burns
severe incapacitation and second-degree burns

16.7

fatal exposure with third-degree burns

Applying Purser’s equation, Penney et al. (2019a) provided comparison of the various
times to reach the identified endpoint as a function of radiant heat flux. This is shown in Figure
5.1 and illustrates that incapacitating burns can occur within relatively small timeframes at the
lower end of possible wildfire induced radiant heat flux. The results demonstrate fatal exposure
occurs within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2, whilst incapacitating injuries
occur within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2.
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Time to effect as a function of radiant heat flux
6

Time (minutes)

5
4
3
2
1
0
5kW/m2
45kW/m2

10kW/m2
50kW/m2

15kW/m2
55kW/m2

20kW/m2
60kW/m2

25kW/m2
65kW/m2

30kW/m2
70kW/m2

35kW/m2
75kW/m2

40kW/m2
80kW/m2

Figure 5.1: Time to effect as a function of thermal radiation

5.3

Radiant heat flux suppression and tenability thresholds

Penney et al. (2019) reported that when setting firefighter tenability thresholds, the worse
cast credible scenario should be adopted. This is defined as firefighters in personal protective
clothing (PPC) suitable for wildland fire suppression are exposed to radiant heat effects of a
rapidly advancing flame edge that is part of a continuous landscape scale wildfire flank or
head. This is a deliberate measure to account for burnover situations in appliances are
disabled and firefighters attempt to flee by foot. In these situations sheltering behind
appliances and other small structures will provide little if any shielding from radiant heat flux
(Penney & Richardson, 2019). Whilst the literature identifies several potential tenable limits as
previously discussed, it is recommended the AFAC (2004) “Hazardous Condition” limit of 3
kWm-2 is adopted as the threshold for suppression operations involving personnel (the
“Suppression Threshold”). This is less than both the “Extreme” limit of 4 kWm-2 (AFAC, 2004) and
the acceptable 5 kWm-2 exposure in normal clothing reported by Raj (2008) which were
considered to provide an insufficient margin for error to firefighters to retreat to a safe area as
incapacitating injury may occur within 30 seconds depending on the individual, but greater
than the limit adopted by Knight et al. (2001). As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the “Critical” limit of
10 kWm-2 [58] can result in incapacitating burns in less than one minute and is subsequently
identified as the “Tenability Threshold”. The “Suppression Threshold”, being the radiant heat
flux the firefighters in PPC can withstand whilst being able to undertake suppression activities is
inherently lower than the “Tenability Threshold”, being the radiant heat flux those same
firefighters could physically survive. Whilst different PPC affords firefighters various levels of
protection however exposed skin and respiratory tracts (in the absence of closed circuit
breathing apparatus) remain vulnerable. As a result the thresholds reported by Penney et al.
(2019) incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPE is worn.
Illustrated in Table 5.5, even in the mildest of fuel loads and fire weather conditions, when
attempting to suppress a fully developed forest head fire in continuous fuel structures,
firefighters will need to remain at least 20 m from the head fire (Penney et al., 2019). At
understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and assuming no shielding, the Suppression Threshold is
exceeded even at an FDI of 10 until 20 m separation from the head fire is achieved, whilst
tenability limits are exceeded for the first 6 m from the head fire. The required separation for
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the Suppression Threshold increases with FDI, with 28 m separation necessary to reach suitable
conditions once an FDI of 40 is reached. Conditions supportive of suppression efforts are not
experienced within 30 m of the head fire at or above an FDI of 50. As illustrated in Figures 5.2
and 5.3, representative of typical Woodland and Forest fuel loads [28], conditions worsen as
fuel load increases. For typical Woodlands fuel loads, depending on FDI, radiant heat flux falls
below the Tenability Threshold at 15 m-35 m whilst 35 m-80 m separation is required for
conditions to be conducive to safe suppression efforts. These distances increase to 20 m to 50
m and 45 m to >100 m respectively for typical Forest fuel loads. None of the scenarios analysed
resulted in conditions that would facilitate suppression efforts on the head fire within 10 m of
the flame edge, being the typical maximum separation from the flaming zone for firefighters
to effectively apply suppressants from hand held attack lines or machine monitors.

Table 5.5: Separation (distance between firefighters and flaming zone) required for suppression and
tenability thresholds
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (based on 5 m increment data)
Surface
Fuel
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
(t/ha)
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
w5
w10
w15
w20
w25
w30

Tenability

10

10

10

10

15

15

15

15

15

20

Suppression

20

25

25

30

35

35

35

40

40

45

Tenability

10

15

15

15

20

20

25

25

25

30

Suppression

30

35

40

45

45

50

55

60

60

65

Tenability

15

15

20

20

25

30

30

30

35

35

Suppression

35

40

50

55

60

65

70

70

75

80

Tenability

15

20

25

25

30

35

35

40

40

45

Suppression

40

50

55

65

70

75

80

85

90

90

Tenability

20

25

30

30

35

40

45

45

50

50

Suppression

45

55

65

70

75

85

90

95

100

>100

Tenability

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

50

55

60

Suppression

50

60

70

80

85

90

95

>100

>100

>100
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Figure 5.2: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between radiant heat
flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Woodlands fuel structures

Figure 5.3: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between radiant heat
flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Forest fuel structures
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Applying Purser’ equation [56] and assuming 10 m separation from the head fire, the
reality of the environmental conditions faced by firefighters becomes evident across
understory fuel loads and FDI (Table 5.6). In the mildest of conditions, the time taken for pain
tolerance thresholds to be reached and for first degree burns to occur is 8 seconds. In
foreseeable circumstances, such as an FDI of 60 and understory fuel loads of 25 t/ha, this time
is reduced to less than a second. In comparison, the time taken for severe incapacitation to
occur in the mildest conditions at 10 m separation from the head fire is approximately 120
seconds, whilst at an FDI of 60 and understory fuel load of 25 t/ha this drops to approximately
10 seconds. At 10 m separation and at the lowest FDI and fuel load, fatal exposure limits are
also rapidly reached, occurring in under 233 seconds. At understory fuel loads of 25t/ha and
an FDI 60 fatal exposure will occur in less than 17 seconds (Table 5.6).
The time frame for incapacitating burns to occur is a critical factor when identifying safe
zones for firefighter retreat and for assessing the appropriate wildfire suppression strategies and
tactics. When interpreting the results of this study, it is suggested that once incapacitation
occurs a firefighter will likely be imminently exposed to fatal levels of radiant heat and the
shorter time frame should be applied. It is also important to consider the shielding effects of
intervening unburnt vegetation may provide firefighters a false sense of fire intensity until the
flames engulf the vegetation in front of them. Firefighters surprised by the rapid emergence of
landscape scale wildfire from behind thick vegetation could be rapidly incapacitated and
may have insufficient time to retreat to vehicles and activate protective systems such as
sprinklers and radiation shields fitted to the vehicles. Even if protective systems are activated,
the flow rates required to extinguish or substantially lessen fire impact is likely to exceed the
capacity of the protective systems (Penney et al., 2019b; Penney et al. 2020b) which suggests
fatal burnovers may still occur.

Table 5.6: Time to pain, incapacitation and fatal exposure from radiation at 10m separation from the
head fire
Time (seconds) taken to tolerance limit / pain / first degree burn at 10m separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

w5

8.0

6.4

5.3

4.5

3.9

3.4

3.0

2.7

2.4

2.2

w10

4.8

3.6

2.8

2.3

1.9

1.7

1.4

1.3

1.1

1.0

w15

3.4

2.4

1.9

1.5

1.2

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

w20

2.5

1.8

1.3

1.1

0.9

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

w25

2.0

1.4

1.0

0.8

0.7

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

w30

1.6

1.1

0.8

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

Time (seconds) taken to severe incapacitation and second degree burns at 10m separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

w5

117.5

94.4

78.2

66.3

57.3

50.2

44.5

39.8

35.9

32.7

w10

71.4

53.2

41.8

34.1

28.5

24.4

21.2

18.6

16.6

14.9

w15

49.7

35.7

27.3

21.9

18.0

15.2

13.1

11.4

10.1

9.0

w20

37.3

26.2

19.7

15.6

12.8

10.7

9.1

7.9

6.9

6.1

w25

29.5

20.3

15.2

11.9

9.6

8.0

6.8

5.9

5.0

5.0

w30

24.1

16.4

12.1

9.4

7.6

6.3

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

Time (seconds) taken to fatal exposure with third degree burns at 10m separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

w5

232.8

187.0

155.0

131.4

113.4

99.4

88.1

78.9

71.2

64.7

w10

141.4

105.5

82.9

67.6

56.6

48.3

42.0

36.9

32.8

29.4

w15

98.4

70.6

54.1

43.3

35.7

30.2

25.9

22.6

19.9

17.8

w20

74.0

51.8

39.1

30.9

25.3

21.2

18.1

15.6

13.7

12.1
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w25

58.4

40.3

30.0

23.5

19.1

15.9

13.5

11.6

10.0

10.0

w30

47.8

32.5

24.0

18.7

15.1

12.5

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

As discussed in Chapter 3, emissivity will vary depending on the depth of the active fire
front. Table 5.7 illustrates the effect of emissivity on the Tenability and Suppression thresholds.
For Woodlands fuels, the Tenability Threshold is not achieved until a minimum 25 m separation
from the head fire flames is reached whilst the Suppression Threshold is not achieved until a
minimum 60 m separation is reached. For Forest structures, these distances increase to 40 m
and 80 m respectively. These results suggest suppression efforts will be ineffective against siege
head fires where the flame emissivity exceeds 0.6, representative of optically thick flames in
head fires with an active flame depth of more than 1 m to 1.5 m (Boulet et al., 2009; SAI Global,
2019; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011).
Table 5.7: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds – sensitivity
to emissivity
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data)
Surface
Fuel
(t/ha)
w15
w25

Ԑ 0.6

Ԑ 0.65

Ԑ 0.7

Ԑ 0.75

Ԑ 0.8

Ԑ 0.85

Ԑ 0.9

Ԑ 0.95

Tenability

25

30

30

30

35

35

35

35

Suppression

60

65

65

70

70

75

75

80

Tenability

40

40

40

45

45

50

50

50

Suppression

80

85

85

90

95

95

100

>100

As illustrated in Table 5.8, as the FDI and understory fuel loads increase, slope has a greater
effect on the separation distance required to achieve tenable and operational conditions. In
all scenarios presented, increased positive slope and associated increase in fire behaviour
decreases tenability and suppression potential compared to equivalent siege wildfire burning
over flat terrain.

Table 5.8: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds – sensitivity
to slope
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data)
FDI
10
20
30
40
50
60
70

0° Slope

5° Slope

10° Slope

15° Slope

20° Slope

Tenability

20

20

25

25

30

Suppression

45

50

55

60

65

Tenability

25

25

30

35

45

Suppression

55

60

70

80

85

Tenability

30

30

40

45

55

Suppression

65

70

80

95

>100

Tenability

35

40

50

Suppression

75

80

90

60
>100

70
>100

Tenability

35

40

50

60

70

Suppression

75

90

100

>100

>100

Tenability

40

45

55

65

80

Suppression

85

95

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

45

50

60

70

85

Suppression

90

100

>100

>100

>100
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80
90

Tenability

45

55

65

75

90

Suppression

95

>100

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

50

60

70

80

100

100

>100

>100

>100

>100

50

60

75

85

>100

>100

>100

>100

>100

>100

Suppression
Tenability

100

Suppression

5.4

Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s

It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do not
systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, I and LF) combined with
the associated potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters attempting suppression
activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario. Current fire behaviour-linked suppression
guidelines do not specifically address the tenability of environmental conditions in the
proximity of the flaming zone where firefighters are often working to suppress the fire. Once
tenability thresholds are considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack on the head of
large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all but the mildest of conditions.
Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous defensive rural urban
interface firefighting is. Firefighters exposed to head fire fronts will potentially be subjected to
levels of radiant heat that are capable of causing severe incapacitating burns in as little as
five seconds in elevated fire weather conditions and higher fuel loads. Incident Controllers
and fire crew leaders must therefore carefully consider whether properties and the occupants
that shelter insider them are defendable or whether the credible risk to their own crews is too
high. As discussed in Chapter 7, firefighters have a personal risk tolerance higher than that of
their commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more likely than their
ranking officers to commit themselves to defending occupants from insuppressible wildfire
fronts. This is potentially due to firefighters’ own personal expectations that they should put
themselves in personal danger to protect and rescue civilians, whist officers also consider the
responsibility of keeping their crews safe and potential greater reaching consequences on the
firefighter’s family should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire suppression operations
(Penney, 2019).
As opposed to being part of a RUI strategy, sheltering inside or behind firefighting
appliances during the passage of a wildfire front should be considered an absolute last resort
only. Instead, firefighters should seek refuge in suitable structures well before the expected
impact of the wildfire front and emerge to salvage property where they are able to do so.
Committing to a RUI defense by positioning firefighters in between a landscape scale forest
wildfire front and private property or critical infrastructure with the expectation that suppression
efforts will be either safe or successful is at best, reckless. Even the intervention of aerial
firefighting suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this approach safe or effective.
Given the extreme danger associated with RUI firefighting, it should be considered only as a
contingency plan except in extreme circumstances where large populations of vulnerable
communities including school, nursing homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior
to the arrival of the wildfire front.
5.5

Implications for urban planners

Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia typically set deemed to satisfy
‘acceptable’ 4 threshold for development at 10kW-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for

4

Planning approval will typically be provided.
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vulnerable, critical or hazardous land use 5 and between 19kWm-2 to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019;
WAPC, 2015, 2017) for standard development such as subdivision. As detailed in this chapter,
10kWm-2 is considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural PPC and breathing
apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60 seconds. At the same level, for a healthy person
without protective equipment, incapacitating burns are predicted in approximately 60
seconds, with severe pain and first degree burns expected to occur after substantially less
exposure. By adopting these thresholds, communities are effectively being designed to be
undefendable by firefighters. At 29kWm-2, firefighters in structural PPC and breathing
apparatus are likely to face incapacitating burns in less than 30 seconds. This realisation is also
significant for firefighters and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of threatened
communities who must consider whether they are expected to, or are indeed themselves
expecting to do the impossible and un-survivable.
The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several approaches that
require consideration on a case by case basis:
1. If development is required to be actively defendable by firefighters during the passage
of a wildfire front, the maximum radiant heat impact at any point within the
development needs to be within the window of safe and effective wildfire suppression.
In turn, this arguably either requires extensive and permanent vegetation modification
and fuel reduction around the development, or appropriate landscaping that forms
part of a passive wildfire engineered design;
2. If development does not require active firefighter defense then the actual level of
wildfire radiant heat impact can, in theory, be addressed by the application of
enhanced wildfire resilient engineering construction such as that detailed in AS3959. In
turn, this may also allow the fire truck related road access standards to such as those
described in existing guidelines (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA, 2012) to be
revisited;
3. Development of an evidence based performance based wildfire urban planning
code, similar to that of the Building Code of Australia and that adopted by Tasmania
(2017). This would need to go beyond the existing and largely subjective planning
guidelines and carry throughout the planning and building legislation and process, as
is the case in Victoria (VSG, 2019);
4. Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering industry. Whilst the existing
Bushfire Planning and Design (BPAD) accreditation scheme is the first step in this
process, the technical knowledge and expertise required of wildfire engineers
arguably requires greater accreditation and regulation.

5

Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.
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6. Critical water flow rates
6.1

Introduction

Globally various retardants are applied during wildfire suppression efforts, yet water
remains the primary extinguishing agent (Hansen, 2012). Whilst prediction of water suppression
requirements and its impacts on firefighting strategies and logistics within the urban
environment has been the subject of many previous publications (Grimwood, 2017; Barnett,
2004), the same level of research has yet to be applied in the field of wildfire suppression
(Hansen, 2012; Simpson et al., 2019). With fire services around the globe advocating offensive
wildfire fighting strategies (DFES, 2012, 2014a; DBCA, 2014; Hirsch et al., 1996; Eurofire, 2012)
heavily reliant the application of both water and other suppressants, it is suggested this
knowledge gap and a lack of suitable data may be impeding firefighting efforts of significant
wildfires, known as siege or campaign wildfires amongst fire services internationally.
Existing water extinguishment models reported by Hansen (2012) have been validated
against field data from low intensity experimental burns with fire line intensities of less than 1
MWm−1 and flame lengths of less than 2.5 m. These experimental conditions are far from the
conditions faced during siege wildfire events which can include fire line intensities of 88 MWm−1
and flame heights extending 10–20 m above the crowns of trees (Cruz et al, 2012). Further
limiting the application of existing research to dynamic emergency conditions is the lack of
consideration for the capabilities of firefighting vehicles and aircraft that have limited water
capacities and may be away from the active fire front for considerable durations whilst they
refill.
To work towards addressing the identified knowledge gap, this chapter applies a fire
engineering analysis of water flow rates required for head fire suppression during wildfires.
Guidance is provided in relation to critical water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire
across a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. The impacts
of the results on current suppression strategies and logistics are discussed in order to facilitate
enhanced effectiveness and safety of operational response to siege wildfire incidents.
6.2

Calculating critical flow rates

The prevention or extinguishment of fire through the application of water occurs by three
methods (Hansen, 2012; Grimwood, 2017):
1.
2.
3.

Water is applied to fuel surfaces not yet involved in fire, preventing pyrolysis and the
production of combustion gases;
Water is applied directly into the flames, cooling the flame below the critical temperature;
or
Water is applied directly to the burning fuel surface, cooling the fuel and resulting in a
reduced pyrolysis rate and quenching of the flames.

When considering active suppression efforts during high intensity bushfires only surface
cooling should be considered as evaporating water vapour is rapidly dispersed and will not
noticeably affect the flame temperature (Hansen, 2012). As a result, by applying Fire Point
Theory and accounting for external radiant and convective heat flux, the critical flow rate (CF)
in Lm−2s−1 can be calculated for the wildfire scenarios using Equation (6.1). CF is the flow rate
of water required to extinguish a burning surface, with an infinite period of time available
(Särdqvist, 2002). As the wildfire length and depth of the active flame front changes over time
and is influenced by many factors including but not limited to terrain, wind, fuel structure and
fuel geometry (Cruz et al., 2015, Penney & Richardson, 2019), the CF can only be calculated
at a specific point in time. The limitations of fire ground suppression, including appliance or
aircraft capacity and available must be considered and are addressed later in the chapter.
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 +

𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 × 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

(6.1)

where:
𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 is the critical water application rate assuming no external heat flux, identified
as ≈0.0129 Lm−2s−1 (Hansen, 2012), 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is the efficiency of water application, representing the
portion of water leaving the firefighting branch which actually contributes to fire
extinguishment, conservatively assumed to be 0.7 (Hansen, 2012), 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is the enthalpy
change of water, identified as 2640 kJkg−1, 𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸 is external heat flux, calculated using Equation
(6.2),
𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸 = �

0.27 × 𝐼𝐼

× 𝜏𝜏𝜙𝜙� + �ℎ × �𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 − 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ��
(6.2)
�2 × 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 + 𝐷𝐷�
Where 𝐼𝐼 is fire line intensity in kWm−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is flame length in m, 𝐷𝐷 is depth of the active flame in m,
𝜏𝜏 is atmospheric transmissivity, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the unburned fuel in
respect to the flames, 𝜙𝜙 is view factor, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the unburned
fuel in respect to the flames, h is the convective heat transfer coefficient set at 0.077 kW/m2K
assuming a forced convection and air velocity at 10 ms−1 (Hansen, 2012), Tg is gas temperature
of the flame, assumed to be 1090 K, representative of siege wildfire conditions (Penney &
Richardson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011; Wotton et al., 2011), Tfuel is the
fuel temperature of the fuel, assumed to be 588 K, being the ignition surface temperature for
pine-needle fuel beds (Hansen, 2012).
Penney et al., (2019b) completed analysis of CF using Equation (6.1) across variations of
fuel load, FDI and active flame depth to simulate a large range of wildfire conditions and
scenarios. Six variations of forest understory fuel loads at 5 tha−1 increments between 5–30 tha−1
with corresponding total fuel loads between 15–40 tha−1 (Note: the assumption that the
canopy contributes 10 tha−1 reported in SAI Global (2018) is retained) were simulated,
representing a broad spectrum of forest fuel loads (Penney et al., 2019a). Ten variations of FDI
at increments of 10 between 10–100, identified as the 99.9th percentile of fire weather
conditions across Australia (Dowdy et al., 2012) were incorporated into the simulations. Nine
variants of active flame depth (D) were also modelled at 1m increments between 2–10 m,
representative of the optically thick head fire flame experienced during severe wildfire events
(Penney & Richardson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011). In total, 540 wildfire
scenarios were analysed. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities were derived
from technical literature (DFES 2013, 2014c, 2014d, 2016c, 2017) and discussions with technical
experts (Parks, 2018). These capabilities are summarized in Table 6.1, with maximum potential
flow rates, representing best case scenario, selected for the study. Deterministic analysis of
calculated required CF to available flow rates was completed. For the purposes of
deterministic analysis, it was assumed that appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern
of water to a 10 m length of active head fire front. These values can be easily converted should
different active head fire lengths be required.
Table 6.1. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities.
Type
Aircraft-Rotary 1
Aircraft-Rotary 2
Aircraft-Fixed wing 3
Appliance 4WD 4
Appliance 4WD 4,5

Name
Dauphin Type 2
Erikson S64E Aircrane
AirTractor AT802F
Light Tanker
Heavy Tanker

Water Capacity (L)
1000–1200
7560
3150
~500
~3000

Flow Rate (Ls−1)
~333–400
~1512
~1050
2.5
3.8–7.9

Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~15 m, full deployment in 3 s; 2 Drop width >8 m, drop length
~30 m, full deployment in 5 s; 3 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~30 m, full deployment in 3 s; 4
Branch jet spray width ~1 m; 5 700 L water required for appliance sprinkler protection which
activates at 3 Ls−1 from each head.
1
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6.3

Implications for wildfire suppression

As reported in Penney et al. (2019b), figure 6.1a–f illustrate critical flow (CF) rates per 10 m
section of active head fire range from 0.94 Ls−1 in a 2 m deep active flame front through
understorey fuels of 5 tha−1 at a FDI of 10 through to 21.10 Ls−1 in a 10 m deep active flame
front through understorey fuels of 30 tha−1 at an FDI of 100. As previously described, this study
assumes appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m length of
active head fire front and the results are presented on this basis.
Deterministic analysis of required CF to available CF identifies that a single Light Tanker
cannot apply the required flow rate to 10 m section of wildfire front once an active flame
depth of 6 m is attained, irrespective of fuel loads and FDI. Prior to the active head fire attaining
a 6 m depth, in limited Light Tankers can engage in head fire suppression for a duration of 200
s in limited circumstances. Larger appliances such as the Heavy Tanker have a maximum flow
rate of 7.9 Ls−1 and can supply enough water to extinguish at 10 m section of active wildfire
front at all FDI’s in understorey fuel loads of 5 tha−1. As conditions worsen, the capacity of a
single Heavy Tanker to extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire rapidly diminishes. With
significantly higher capabilities, all aircraft assessed are found to provide enough flow rates to
extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire, regardless of flame depth, FDI or understorey fuel
load.
The results demonstrate small firefighting appliances such as light tankers cannot deliver
sufficient water flow rates to extinguish wildfire, regardless of FDI, once the active flame depth
reaches 2.5 m in typical Woodland fuels of w = 15 tha−1 or 3 m in typical Forest fuels of w = 25
tha−1 [22,26]. In larger appliances with higher delivery capacities, the required CF cannot be
achieved once the active flame depth reaches approximately 5 m with an FDI of 40. All aircraft
reviewed are capable of achieving the required CF. However, they remain restricted by the
inherent limitations of availability, turn around, restricted ability to operate at night where they
may be most effective due to reduced fire behaviour, and the increasing presence of privately
operated drones over fire grounds which requires the cessation of aerial suppression on safety
grounds (Parks, 2018).
In translating the theory to practical application during a wildfire emergency, Figure 6.1a–
f may assist Incident Controllers quickly determine the suitability of appliance-based
suppression strategies where fuel load, FDI and active flame depth are known. In jurisdictions
that do not rely on FDI or surface fuel loads, it is suggested Table 6.2 (with an appropriate safety
factor) may be suitable to provide a deterministic assessment required CF to available CF, and
therefore determine whether ground suppression efforts are potentially suitable. Used in
conjunction with existing suppression thresholds and newer thresholds that consider radiant
heat flux and firefighter tenability (Penney et al. 2019 – tenability), these results will assist provide
greater justification for the selection of appropriate wildfire suppression strategies.
The results also demonstrate the importance of active flame depth when analyzing
wildfire severity and the suitability of suppression strategies. In addition to having a significant
impact on CF as shown in this study, the depth of the active flame front has significant effects
on emissivity and subsequently, radiant heat flux. It is therefore proposed that active flame
depth may be a better measure of wildfire intensity than the traditional measures of RoS,
intensity or Lf utilized internationally. Where active flame depths remain less than 3 m, traditional
suppression strategies may remain suitable as long as firefighter tenability is considered and
due care is exercised.
In order to meet the required CF to extinguish a wildfire in accordance with the
assumptions applied in this research, firefighters must be able to have appliances consistently
attacking each 10m section of wildfire. Whilst it is not in any way suggested incident logistics is
as simplistic as providing a single suitable ground appliance for every 10 m section of fire front,
it may be applied for determining initial resourcing turnout to developing wildfires that have
the potential to grow into siege wildfire dimensions.
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Figure 6.1. Critical flow, (CF) per 10 m length of head fire across the selected range of FDI’s for Forest
with surface fuel loads (w) of: (a) 5 tha−1; (b) 10 tha−1; (c) 15 tha−1; (d) 20 tha−1; (e) 25 tha−1; (f) 30 tha−1.

CF as functions of (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) are illustrated in Figures 6.2–6.4.
This also enabled CF as a function of active flame depth (CFD) to be expressed as equations
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of the corresponding the fire behaviour, summarized in Table 6.2. The advantages of this
approach are:
(1) The analysis incorporates the full spectrum of fire weather conditions and understorey fuel
loads. Therefore the CF can be rapidly estimated by Incident Controllers without requiring
current or predicted fire weather conditions (an essential component for calculating FDI)
or understorey fuel loads (w) which may vary across the landscape.; and
(2) It provides Incident Controllers both visual and mathematical tools to assess the potential
suitability of suppression strategies.
The limitation of this approach is that as wildfire behaviour intensifies the power functions
appeared to under-predict CF at active flame depths greater than 6m compared to using Fire
Point Theory and Equation (6.1) directly. This may be explained however as the equations are
trend lines of the data, which are influenced by the somewhat clustered data at lower levels
of wildfire behaviour.
Table 6.2. CFd as functions of Rate of Spread, intensity and flame length.
Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1)
Active Flame Depth (m)
Function
2
CF2 = 2.72 RoS0.42
3
CF3 = 3.97 RoS0.43
4
CF4 = 5.12 RoS0.44
5
CF5 = 6.24 RoS0.44
6
CF6 = 7.23 RoS0.45
7
CF7 = 8.30 RoS0.45
8
CF8 = 9.23 RoS0.45
9
CF9 = 10.20 RoS0.45
10
CF10 = 11.11 RoS0.46
Intensity, I (kWm−1)
Active Flame Depth (m)
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Figure 6.2. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of head fire Rate
of Spread, RoS (kmh−1).
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Figure 6.3. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of intensity, I
(kWm−1).
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Figure 6.4. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of flame length, Lf
(m)

Sensitivity to variations in the base inputs was conducted to evaluate how they influence
CF. To complete the sensitivity analysis the following inputs were assumed: FDI = 80, w = 25
tha−1, W = 35 tha−1, D = 4 m, Lf = 19.8 m, I = 43,000 kWm−1, h = 0.077 kW/m2K, Tg = 1090 K, Tfuel =
588 K, 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 = 0.7, 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 = 2640 kJkg−1, 𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 ≈ 0.0129 Lgm−2s−1, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8, 𝜙𝜙 = 0.8. As the
effects of FDI, fuel load (and thereby Lf and I due to the mathematical relationships identified
in Chapter 2) and flame depth are investigated throughout the study, sensitivity to the
remaining inputs was assessed by decreasing and increasing the subject base input by 20%,
all other inputs as assumed. The results are summarized in Table 6.3. With the exception of 𝜏𝜏
and 𝜙𝜙, there was little if any change to CF as a result of a 20% to the base input. It is worth
noting that in the context of wildfire where the fuel and the flame are in close proximity, both
𝜏𝜏 and 𝜙𝜙 should be set at 1 (Hansen, 2012).
Table 6.3. Sensitivity analysis.

Input
h
Tg
Tfuel
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0
𝜏𝜏
𝜙𝜙

% Change to Base Input
±20%
±20%
±20%
±20%
±20%
±20%
±20%
±20%

% Change to Critical Flow (CF)
±1%
±2%
±1%
±1%
±1%
±0%
±24%
±24%
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6.4

Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s

Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to landscape scale forest
and woodlands fires drops significantly as the active flame depth of the head fire increases.
By understanding this concept, as well as how vegetation structure influences fire behaviour
and fire front geometry, IMT’s and firefighters can more realistically assess the potential for
suppression success. At the same time, if fire behaviour specialists understand these
relationships, they are better prepared to describe the fire behaviour in terms that are
meaningful for the IMT and frontline firefighters. The use of guiding analysis such as that
presented in this and other chapters may assist IMT’s determine that suppression strategies are
unlikely to succeed and resources would be better spent in evacuations or allowing crews
more time to prepare to defend vulnerable assets.
This chapter provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to CF required to
extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire
front depths. Perhaps the greatest ramification of the results is the need to reexamine the use
of aerial and appliance suppression in high fire intensity conditions. The use of ground based
appliances remains vital in suppression of wildfires. However, in both forest and woodland fuel
structures, and when faced with siege wildfire behavior with active flame depths across the
head fire greater than 3 m, increased reliance on aerial suppression may be required to deliver
the CF necessary to impact the head fire and have any effect on the forward Rate of Spread.
In reality this will require greater investment to ensure that fuel loads adjacent or near
congregations of high value assets are prevented from reaching the thresholds that support
this level of fire intensity. Fire services investment in improved technologies that supports night
time aerial suppression operations during periods of reduced fire behaviour is also suggested.
Where aerial resourcing is limited, strategies such as guiding head fire direction and preemptive line building adjacent to existing fuel breaks such as major roads, supported by
appliance based suppression may provide enhanced outcomes compared to reliance on
head fire suppression alone.
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7. Vehicle protection systems during entrapment and burnover
7.1

Introduction

During wildfire operations the use of inappropriate suppression tactics [Penney et al,
2019a] or sudden changes in wind direction (Lahaye et al., 2018) can result in firefighters being
directly caught by wildfire smoke and fire, a situation known as entrapment. The occurrence
of wildfire flame directly impacting firefighters is known as burnover. The threat posed from
entrapment and burnover is significant and has resulted in 411 firefighter deaths in the USA
from 1910 to 2006 (Mangan, 2007), 92 Australian firefighter deaths from 1901 to 2011 (Blanchi
et al., 2014) and 165 Canadian firefighter deaths between 1941 and 2010 (Alexander & BuxtonCarr, 2011). In many cases multiple fatalities resulted from a single entrapment and burnover.
The causes entrapment and burnover are well known (Wilson,1977), although more recent
studies have increased this understanding by defining human factors and fire behaviour
leading up to these events (Blanchi et al. 2012; Butler et al. 1998; Diakakis et al. 2016; Page &
Butler, 2017; Lahaye et al., 2016, 2018; Viegas et al. 2009).
7.2

Vehicle Protection Systems

In an effort to improve firefighter safety and aiming to protect the integrity of firefighting
vehicles, enabling escape and improving the tenability for entrapped occupants, Australian
fire services have invested in vehicle protection systems (VPS).
Vehicle protection systems include (DFES, 2016a; IDES, 2014) (figure 2):
1. Installation of deluge sprinklers, drop down thermal shielding blankets and personal
fire blankets;
2. Protect components essential to vehicle mobility against thermal damage, through
shielding, relocation and lagging;
3. Protect components critical to firefighting against thermal damage, through
shielding, relocation and lagging;
4. Ensuring the cabin is a suitable refuge and provides a continuous enclosure of noncombustible materials through:
i.
removal of wheel arches, mudguards, step shrouds, cabin body aesthetic
panels, side mirror mounts, door handles, backing plates and underbody
panels; or
ii.
Where this is not possible, making these products fire resistant;
5. Protection of windows that are not essential for vision including the replacement of
rear and side rear windows with solid panels;
6. Adding infill panels between the cabin and the vehicle tray; and
7. Modifying the air-conditioning system to prevent smoke and heated gases entering
the cabin.

(a)

(b)
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(c)
Figure 7.1. Burnover protection systems (a) Drop down shielding blanket deployed (DFES, 2013c); (b)
Firefighter under a personal fire blanket (DFES, 2013f); (c) Typical wildfire fighting appliance showing
position of side deluge sprays (DFES, 2013a).

The vehicle protection system deluge sprays designed to (DFES, 2016b):
1. Prevent glass failure, i.e. to ensure integrity of the cabin;
2. Cool the cabin to reduce occupant heat exposure; and
3. Cool the tyres to reduce risk of ignition.
The deluge system is required to be activated from the cabin, operate for a minimum of
5 minutes from the time the ‘crew protection water alert’ sounds which occurs once water
tank reserves reach 600L, and to have a nominal flow rate of 120Lmin-1 with a flow pressure of
3 bar (DFES, 2016a). An audible and visual warning device alerts crews once they have
reached the deluge system reserve capacity, however the crew can continue to utilise this
reserve without restriction. Not all appliances can be fitted with deluge systems. For instance
Light Tankers, a small four wheel drive appliance with a 500L water tank, cannot be fitted with
deluge systems due to insufficient water capacity to generate the required protection
duration and existing vehicle weight restrictions (IDES, 2014; Knight et al, 2003). Note that
existing design specifications do not consider water droplet size or their effect on thermal
attenuation.
Limited field experimentation has been completed (Cruz et al., 2016) and the inherent
danger of wildfire suppression during elevated fire weather conditions has prevented the
potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems being suitably quantified in full scale field
experimentation. Addressing this gap is vital and forms a critical component of thorough fire
engineering safety analysis [ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007]. Current external vehicle protection
systems utilised in Australian fire service vehicles incorporate drop down thermal shielding
blankets and sprinkler deluge systems have been tested against fire line intensities of between
2500-10000kWm-1 and designed to withstand 7500kWm-1 (Nichols, Gould, Knight, Leonard, &
Brown, 2005). In similar tests, Nichols et al. (2003) reported that cabin tenability was maintained
when simulated fire line intensities of up to 12000kWm-1 were maintained for up to 14 seconds
when water spray protection systems were used in conjunction with window radiation shields,
whilst Sargeant et al. (2003, p7) reported that
“In general vehicle orientated front on remained tenable at radiation levels up to 30kWm2. while side on and rear facing vehicles lost integrity at around 10 to 15 kWm-2”
By comparison forensic wildfire analysis(Cruz et al., 2012) and field experimentation (Cruz
et al., 2011; Frankman et al., 2012) identified fire line intensities of up to 88MWm-1 and radiant
heat fluxes in excess of 100kWm-2 can be experienced for longer durations during landscape
scale wildfires, far exceeding the limits of crew protection systems (Nicholas et al., 2003).
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The potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems in providing an adequate level
of fireifghter protection during burnover remains unquantified. Without validation firefighters
may overestimate their personal safety during wildfire suppression based on the belief they will
be adequately protected. To address this knowledge gap and provide further guidance the
potential effectiveness of VPS in improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and
burnover, Penney et al. (2020b) completed:
1. Systematic analysis of historical entrapments and burnover; and
2. Simulated wildfires encompassing the 99th percentile of weather conditions and fuel
structures.
In order to verify the effectiveness of fire safety systems clear objectives and performance
criteria must be defined (ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007; Yung, 2008). Effectiveness is defined as
the product of fire safety system efficacy and reliability (Thomas, 2002). The objective of
vehicle protection systems is to increase the tenability of firefighters during vehicle entrapment
and burnover. For the purposes of the study the performance criteria (PC) required to meet
this objective were subsequently defined as:
PC1. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less
than 7500kWm-1 (the current rating of VPS);
PC2. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less
than 10000kWm-1 (the maximum intensity VPS have been tested to);
PC3. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less
than 12000kWm-1 (maximum short duration intensity VPS can withstand);
PC4. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line intensity (I) is less
than the mean historical upper reported / calculated intensity for all
entrapments resulting in fatality or injury;
PC5. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant heat flux (RHF) is
less than 15kWm-2, assuming vehicles are orientated side on or with the rear to
the advancing headfire; and
PC6. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant heat flux (RHF) is
less than 30kWm-2, assuming vehicles orientated front on to the advancing
headfire.
7.3

Historical entrapment analysis

Of the 4856 reports initially reviewed in the study (Penney et al., 2020b), 4336 were
excluded as they did not meet the initial inclusion criteria. Of the remaining 520 reports, 56
reports were excluded because they did not involve a fatality or injury; two reports were
excluded because they detailed accidents unrelated to entrapment (one structure fire
propane tank explosion and one ATV rollover); eight reports were excluded as they related to
controlled burns; and 392 reports were excluded because they contained insufficient
information to extract or calculate fire line intensity. A total of 62 reports were included in the
final study, 42% (n=26) containing firefighter fatalities and 58% (n=36) reports containing
firefighter injuries only.
By vegetation, forest fuel structures accounted for approximately 62% (n=16) of fatal
entrapments, scrub 23% (n=6), shrub 7.5% (n=2) and grassland 7.5% (n=2). For entrapments
involving injury only, forest accounted for approximately 25% (n=9) of incidents, woodlands
14% (n=5), scrub 11% (n=4), shrub 17% (n=6) and grassland 33% (n=12).
For all entrapments resulting in either fatality or injury, forest accounted for approximately
40% (n=25) of incidents, woodlands 9% (n=5), scrub 16% (n=10), shrub 13% (n=8) and grassland
22% (n=14). Wildfire behaviour (lower and upper reported / calculated values) during
entrapments and burnover at the time of fatality, injury and all incidents is detailed in Table
7.1, with distribution across all incidents illustrated in Figure 7.2. The highest RoS by vegetation
type was Forest 8.3ms-1, Woodland 4.53ms-1, Scrub 7.23ms-1, Shrub 6.73ms-1, and Grass 5.63ms1.
The highest intensity and flame length occurred in planation Forest fires during fatal
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entrapments, with the highest reported intensity being 249226kWm-1, the highest calculated
intensity being 318990kWm-1 and the largest flame length being reported as between 45.7 to
61m. The mean (μ) upper reported / calculated intensity across all entrapments was
64453kWm-1 and was subsequently adopted as the intensity threshold for Performance Criteria
4. Acknowledging the limitations and assumptions of the wildfire models used in the study,
these figures are consistent with explosive wildfire behaviour over short runs (Alexander & Cruz,
2016; Tedim et al., 2018; Penney et al., 2019a).
Table 7.1. Wildfire behaviour at point of impact during entrapments resulting in injury or fatality,
showing minimum and maximum reported or calculated values, mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ)
Fatality only incidents
Wildfire behaviour

min

max

μ

σ

RoS lower reported value (ms )

0.1

7.2

2.0

2.1

RoS upper reported value (ms )

0.1

8.3

2.3

2.4

I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1)

1012

318990

68523

87142

I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1)

3113

318990

83545

85912

LF lower reported value (m)

1.8

45.7

13.7

13.0

3.0

61

19.8

18.5

min

max

μ

σ

RoS lower reported value (ms )

0.2

4.5

1.5

1.4

RoS upper reported value (ms )

0.2

6.7

2.2

1.8

I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1)

253

209250

32937

7481

I upper reported / calculated value (kWm )

850

227850

50664

60349

LF lower reported value (m)

0.6

45.7

8.5

10.9

LF upper reported value (m)

1.2

76.2

11.8

15.5

μ

σ

-1

-1

LF upper reported value (m)

Injury only incidents
Wildfire behaviour
-1

-1

-1

All incidents considered
Wildfire behaviour

min

max

RoS lower reported value (ms )

0.1

7.2

1.8

1.8

RoS upper reported value (ms-1)

0.1

8.3

2.2

2.1

I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1)

253

318990

47860

67687

I upper reported / calculated value (kWm )

850

318990

64453

73373

LF lower reported value (m)

0.6

45.7

10.6

11.9

LF upper reported value (m)

1.2

76.2

15.0

17.1

-1

-1
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(a) RoS all incidents by vegetation

(b) Intensity all incidents by vegetation
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(c) LF all incidents by vegetation
Figure 7.2. Wildfire behaviour all incidents by vegetation type (a) RoS; (b) Intensity; (c) LF

Efficacy is the ability of a fire safety system to successfully achieve its required objective,
assuming it functions as intended (SFPE, 2008; Thomas, 2002, Yung, 2008). Table 7.2 details the
efficacy of vehicle protection systems against Performance Criteria 1 to 4 using the results from
the historical entrapments analysed. Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to
an intensity 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) have an efficacy between 0.12 to a
maximum of 0.36. An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 is observed when vehicle protection
systems performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10000kWm-1, are considered. Vehicle
protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance
Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47. Applying Performance Criteria 4 (i.e.
performance threshold equal to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of
64453kWm-1), efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81. By
comparison, Yung (2008) reports the efficacy of sprinklers in suppressing a ‘large’ fire in
buildings as between 0.89 to 1.00, with an overall effectiveness (efficacy multiplied by
reliability) of 0.77 to 0.96. In conjunction with the analysis of historical entrapments, this suggests
that existing vehicle protection systems may be unreliable in protecting vehicle occupants
from entrapment and burnover. Improvements in vehicle protection system efficacy could be
achieved by increasing the performance standard they are required to meet, whilst further
research into the reliability of vehicle protection systems will facilitate greater understanding
of overall effectiveness.
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Table 7.2. Vehicle protection system efficacy based on historical entrapments considering lower and
upper recorded / calculated intensity

Fatality only incidents (n=26)
Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)

lower intensity
0.19 (n=5)
0.31 (n=8)
0.31 (n=8)
0.69 (n=18)
Injury only incidents (n=36)

upper intensity
0.12 (n=3)
0.12 (n=3)
0.12 (n=3)
0.62 (n=16)

Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)

lower intensity
0.36 (n=13)
0.42 (n=15)
0.47 (n=17)
0.81 (n=29)
All incidents (n=62)

upper intensity
0.22 (n=8)
0.28 (n=10)
0.33 (n=12)
0.67 (n=24)

Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)

7.4

lower intensity
0.29 (n=18)
0.37 (n=23)
0.42 (n=26)
0.76 (n=47)

upper intensity
0.18 (n=11)
0.21 (n=13)
0.24 (n=15)
0.66 (n=41)

Design wildfire analysis

Where full scale systems testing is prohibitive, fire safety systems analysis using simulations
and modelling (International Code Council et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007, 2008) is required. Assessing
the effectiveness of existing VPS against the full scale of wildfires experienced in Australia using
field testing is not achievable due to the inherent dangers associated with catastrophic wildfire
events and the costs associated with the burnover of firefighting appliances. To in part address
this and provide some guidance to firefighters, Incident Management Teams and fire safety
engineers, simulated design fires are used for the study. Yung (2008, p80) defines define fires
as “prescribed fires that can be used by fire protection engineers for performance-based fire
safety designs”.
The approach adopted by Penney et al. (2020b) enabled vehicle protection systems
designed to Performance Criteria 1 to 6 (intensities of 7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1, 12000kWm-1,
64453kWm-1; and radiant heat flux of 15kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) to be assessed across Forest,
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland fuel structures, fuel loads, forest and grassland fire
danger indices, windspeeds, slope and fuel age.
A total of 90 simulations were completed during the first phase of the study. As expected
wildfire intensity increased with slope, windspeed (V) and Forest / Grassland Fire Danger
Indices (Figure 7.3a-j), which is consistent with the principles of established wildfire behaviour.
Forest simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1
(7500kWm-1) and Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 10 to
20, and Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire Danger Index
of 20 to 30. Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance threshold equal to the mean historical
upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1) was not exceeded regardless of the Fire
Danger Index. By comparison Woodland simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity
exceeding Performance Criteria 1 (7500kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 30 to 40,
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intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1) between a FDI of 40 to 50, and
Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire Danger Index of 50 to
60. Echoing the results of Forest simulations, Performance Criteria 4 (64453kWm-1) was not
exceeded in Woodland regardless of the Fire Danger Index. In Grassland under equivalent
conditions, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 1-3 prior to a Grassland Fire Danger Index
of 50 while Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded at any Fire Danger Index.
To put these figures into context, Blanchi et al. (2010) report virtually all house loss from
wildfire in Australia occurs on days when the FDI exceeds the 99.5th percentile in the
distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions considered, with the majority of
house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger Index greater than 100. Further, they report there
is little house loss on days where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50. This indicates that
vehicle protection systems designed to current performance criteria are unlikely to be
effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in the protection of
houses during significant wildfire events.
The influence of windspeed on fire line intensity in Scrub and Shrub wildfires is illustrated
in Figures 7.3g and 7.3i. Scrub simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding
Performance Criteria 1 to 3 between windspeeds (V) of 5 to 15kmh-1. Unlike all other
simulations, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 4 in simulated Scrub wildfire, but only
once windspeed exceeded approximately 55kmh-1. By comparison, Shrub simulations in
equivalent conditions resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 and 2 between
windspeeds of 5 to 15kmh-1, and Performance Criteria 3 being exceeded between
windspeeds of 25 to 35kmh-1. Intensity did not exceed Performance Criteria 4 regardless of
windspeed in Shrub simulations.
Sensitivity analysis was completed to determine the effect of changing slope across all
vegetation structures. Simulations in each fuel structure were completed at 0° to 20°. When
simulating the effect of increase in slope (Figures 7.3b,d,f,h,j), a positive relationship was
confirmed between slope and wildfire intensity (Table 7.3). This subsequently resulted in
Performance Criteria 1-3 thresholds being exceeded more rapidly as slope increased.
Increased slope may also result in Performance Criteria 4 being exceeded where it previously
provided adequate protection. These outcomes were expected given the mathematical
relationship between slope, rate of spread and intensity detailed in Penney et al (2020b).
Sensitivity analysis of intensity to fuel load in Forest and Woodland also confirmed
consistent increase of intensity as understory (w) and total fuel (W) load increased (Figure 7.4).
At a Fire Danger Index of 80 and assuming flat ground, fire line intensities exceeded
Performance Criteria 1 and 2 when Forest fuels reached 40-50% of their default design wildfire
values (w= 10-12.5tha-1 and W= 14-17.5tha-1) and Performance Criteria 3 was exceeded once
Forest fuels reached 50-60% (w= 15-17.5tha-1 and W= 21-24.5tha-1) of default design wildfire
values. Under the same conditions, Performance Criteria 1 was exceeded when Woodland
fuels reached 60-70% (w= 7.4-9tha-1 and W= 12.5-15tha-1) of default design wildfire values and
both Performance Criteria 2 and 3 were exceeded once Woodland fuels reached 70-80% (w=
10.5-12tha-1 and W= 17.5-20tha-1) of their default design wildfire values (the fuel loads assigned
in AS3959). Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded in Forest or Woodland simulations at any
fuel load up to 100% of default values detailed in AS3959. These results indicate that whilst
sparser fuels result in reduced intensity, vehicle protection systems designed to existing
performance criteria may still be exceeded, however vehicle protection systems designed to
Performance Criteria 4 would provide a significantly higher level of firefighter protection.
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(e) Grass headfire FDI sensitivity

(f) Grass headfire intensity slope sensitivity
(GFDI 110)
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(h) Scrub headfire intensity slope sensitivity
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Figure 7.3. Wildfire intensity by vegetation type
Table 7.3. Relationship between slope and intensity, all vegetation types

Slope
Flat
5°
10°
15°
20°

Intensity factor
compared to flat ground
1
1.4
2.0
2.8
4
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Figure 7.4. Sensitivity to fuel load - Forest & Woodland

Wildfire simulations (n=45) enabled radiant heat flux (RHF) to be calculated at 5m
increments for 0 to 100m of separation from the headfire for Forest, Woodland, Scrub, Shrub
and Grassland vegetation structures (Figure 7.5). As expected, radiant heat flux at each unit
of separation increases with slope, Fire Danger Index (FDI), Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI)
and windspeed (V).
In all simulations, regardless of FDI, GFDI, V, slope or fuel load, Performance Criteria 5
(15kWm-2) and Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) were exceeded for 0 to 5m separation from
the wildfire front. Historical analysis (Table 3) identifies the mean flame length during
entrapments and burnover resulting in either injury or fatality is 10.6 to 15m, with a maximum
flame length of 45.7 to 76.2m. This indicates vehicle protection systems would likely fail in the
event of protracted flame immersion associated with engulfment and burnover during the
passage of the headfire.
In Forest simulations (Figure 7.5a), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5
(15kWm-2) for approximately 14m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10,
increasing to approximately 44m at a Fire Danger Index of 100. Radiant heat flux exceeded
Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 8m separation from the headfire at a Fire
Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 25m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.
As expected, the efficacy of vehicle suppression systems in Woodlands fuels was slightly
higher by comparison, Woodlands having less understory fuel (15tha-1) compared to Forest
(25tha-1). Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately
10m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately
30m at a Fire Danger Index of 100 (Figure 7.5b). Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance
Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index
of 10, increasing to approximately 17m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.
In Scrub simulations (Figure 7.5c), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5
(15kWm-2) for approximately 8m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to
approximately 35m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1. Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance
Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1,
increasing to approximately 20m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1. By comparison, in Shrub
simulations (Figure 7.5d), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for
approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately
25m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1. Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-
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approximately 4m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to
approximately 13m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.
In Grassland simulations (Figure 7.5e) radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5
(15kWm-2) for approximately 10m from the headfire at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50,
increasing to approximately 17m at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130. Radiant heat flux
exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at a
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 10m at a Grassland Fire Danger
Index of 130.
These results again demonstrate that the operating parameters of existing vehicle
protection systems are likely to be exceeded well below the conditions Blanchi et al (2006)
report are most likely to be involved in the defense of life and property.
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Figure 7.5. Radiant heat flux (RHF) as a function of separation from headfire: (a) Forest; (b) Woodland;
(c) Scrub; (d) Shrub; (e) Grassland

Sensitivity analysis (table 7.4) demonstrates the separation required from the headfire (all
vegetation structures) in order for radiant heat flux to fall below Performance Criteria 5 and 6
increases with slope.
Similarly, sensitivity analysis of understory fuel loads (w) in
Forest/Woodland design wildfires (Figure 7.6a-f) demonstrates a positive relationship between
the separation required from the headfire in order for radiant heat flux to fall below
Performance Criteria 5 and 6, and understory fuel loads (w). At surface fuel loads (w) of 30tha1, and a Fire Danger Index of 100, radiant heat flux exceeds Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2)
until approximately 45m separation from the forest head fire is achieved. Under the same
conditions radiant heat flux exceeds Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) until separation of
approximately 25m is achieved. The required separation from the head fire for RHF decreases
with FDI and w, with only approximately 6m separation required for RHF to fall below 30kWm-2
at a FDI of 100 when w is 5tha-1; and 10m separation required for RHF to fall below 15kWm-2
under the same conditions.
Table 7.4. Effect of slope on reparation from headfire required before Performance Criteria 5 & 6 are
achieved.

Slope
Vegetation
0°
5°
10°
-2
Performance Criteria 5 (Radiant heat flux of 15kWm ) exceeded
Forest (FDI=80)
35-40m
45m
55m
Woodland (FDI=80)
25m
30m
35-40m
-1
Scrub (V=45kmh )
20-25m
25-30m
30m

15°

20°

65m
45-50m
30-35m

75-80m
55-60m
35-40m

Shrub (V=45kmh-1)
15-20m
15-20m
20-25m
Grassland (GFDI=110)
15m
15-20m
20m
-2
Performance Criteria 6 (Radiant heat flux of 30kWm ) exceeded
Forest (FDI=80)
20-25m
25-30m
30-35m
Woodland (FDI=80)
10-15m
15-20m
20-25m
-1
Scrub (V=45kmh )
10-15m
10-15m
15-20m

20-25m
15-20m

25-30m
25-30m

40-45m
25-30m
15-20m

50-55m
30-35m
20-25m

Shrub (V=45kmh-1)
Grassland (GFDI=110)

10-15m
10-15m

10-15m
10-15m

5-10m
5-10m

5-10m
5-10m

10-15m
10m
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Figure 7.6. Effect of understory fuel load on RHF as a function of separation from the headfire: (a) w =
5tha-1; (b) w = 10tha-1; (c) w = 15tha-1; (d) w = 20tha-1; (e) w = 25tha-1; (f) w = 30tha-1
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7.5

Discussion

The results identify that vehicle protection systems designed to operate in fire line intensities
of 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) could reasonably expected to have been successful
in 0.12 to 0.36 of historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate without fault
100% of the time (i.e. a reliability factor of 1.00). An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 was
observed when vehicle protection systems performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e.
10000kWm-1, were considered. Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an
intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to
0.47. This is well below the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety systems (Yung, 2008;
SFPE, 2008). Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle protection systems
to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance
Criteria 4) would result in an increase in efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to
between 0.62 to 0.81. To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is
recommended that significantly higher fire line intensity performance criteria are adopted
across fire services for vehicle protection systems. Further research into the reliability of vehicle
protection systems is also recommended to enable the effectiveness of each system to be
determined as part of a detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering analysis.
Until this is completed the potential of unrealistic expectations of the safety afforded to
firefighters during entrapment and burnover may contribute to increased injuries or fatalities
during wildfire suppression.
Radiant heat flux analysis further highlights the performance limitations of existing vehicle
protection systems. Whilst the 95th and 99th percentiles of Fire Danger Indices across Australia
from 2000 to 2007 as reported by Dowdy et al. (2009) are illustrated in figure 2.2 (refer to
Chapter 2), fire weather in Australia is increasingly worsening as a result of climate change
Lucas et al. (2007). As Blanchi et al. (2010) report, virtually all house loss from wildfire in Australia
occurs on days when the Fire Danger Index exceeds the 99.5th percentile in the distribution of
daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions considered, with the majority of house loss
occurring on days of Fire Danger Index greater than 100. Further, they report there is little house
loss on days where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50. Fire line intensity simulations
identified Performance Criteria 1-3 (i.e. intensity of 7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1 and 12000kWm-1
respectively) were exceeded on flat terrain in Forest below a Fire Danger Index of 30; in
Woodlands at Fire Danger Indices between 30 to 60; in Grassland at a Grassland Fire Danger
Index of less than 50 (equivalent to a Fire Danger Index of 40); and in Scrub and Scrub at
windspeeds of less than 15kmh-1. By comparison, the mean historical upper recorded /
calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) was not exceeded in any
simulation, regardless of Fire Danger Index or windspeed except for Scrub fuels once
windspeed reached approximately 55kmh-1.
Radiant heat flux modelling completed in Penney et al. (2020b) demonstrated vehicle
protection system Performance Criteria 5 and 6 (i.e. 15 kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) are likely to be
exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct
possibility for significant distances of separation from the headfire. To increase firefighter safety
it is recommended further research and development into vehicle protection systems satisfying
Australian Standard 1530.8.2 Methods for fire tests on building materials, components and
structures – Part 8.2 Tests on elements of construction for buildings exposed to simulated
bushfire attack – large flaming sources, which specifically identifies performance criteria for
prolonged radiant heat flux exceeding 40kWm-2.
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7.6

Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists, IMT’s and
fire services

This chapter identifies that vehicle protection systems designed to the existing intensity
standard of 7500kWm-1 may have been successful in 0.12 to 0.36 of historical entrapments and
burnovers, assuming they operate without fault. An efficacy this low is highly unlikely to be
tolerated in any traditional fire safety system. In conjunction with research into wildfire weather
in Australia, the results of design wildfire analysis indicate existing vehicle protection systems
are unlikely to be effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in
the protection of houses during significant wildfire events. In order to maximise firefighter safety
during wildfire suppression, and to avoid providing firefighters unrealistic expectations
regarding vehicle protection systems and other fire safety systems which may contribute to
firefighters taking unacceptable risks, it is recommended fire services should include training
on the limitations of their respective systems.
Significant improvements in firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover may be
made by increasing the required intensity threshold of VPS. Increasing the operational
performance standard of vehicle protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded /
calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an increase in
efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81. Adopting this intensity
threshold would also result in vehicle protection systems being theoretically effective in all
design wildfires modelled, with the exception of Scrub where VPS may potentially remain
effective until windspeeds reach 45 to 55kmh-1.
When considering radiant heat flux, this chapter identifies that both 15 and 30kWm-2 is
likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame immersion occurs, and, remains
a distinct possibility for significant distances of separation from the headfire. To increase
firefighter safety it is recommended fire services not only ensure wildfire suppression training
includes analysis of the magnitude and effects of wildfire radiant heat flux, but include credible
worse case radiant heat flux thresholds of 30kWm-2 as one of the mandatory performance
criteria of VPS and any other wildfire vehicle fire safety system.
The results of this study should not be considered in isolation, but rather alongside the
findings of other recent research (Penney et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b) into wildfire
suppression strategies and the limitations of firefighters and the equipment they rely on. A
recurring theme within the conclusions of this research is that when attempting to suppress
landscape scale wildfire, it may be more appropriate for fire services to consider early
instigation of indirect attack or defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and
clear communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at the head
fire are not defendable. It is suggested offensive strategies involving personnel and appliances
should be employed with caution after detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity,
secondary to the increased use of aerial firefighting suppression. Early adoption of this
approach will assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous ‘dead
man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little if any impact on the fire.
Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the approaching head fire and will assist to
prevent unrealistic community expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic
wildfire events.
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8. Risk management during dynamic firefighting contexts
8.1

Introduction

Succinctly described by (Kunadharaju et al., 2011), “there is little protective redundancy
in firefighting.” Accordingly, effective risk management is an essential component of dynamic
firefighting operations throughout the world. International Standard 31000 Risk management
guidelines (ISO, 2018) subsequently referred to as ISO31000, is the standard of risk management
within the Australian emergency services context.
Previous studies (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al. 2007) reported decisions made on
the incident ground to be reactionary rather than considered, or to be adapted from previous
experience at similar situations or incidents potentially without thorough analysis (Tissington &
Flin, 2007). Dynamic risk management in the emergency rescue context is often restricted to a
qualitative selection of tactics guided by tacit professional craft knowledge as opposed to
quantified risk assessment and evidence based practice as part of the entire risk management
process (Jacobs, 2010; Loflin & Kipp, 1997). Buoyed by disasters of significant scale including,
the devastating Grenfell Tower fire of June 14, 2017 (GTI, 2018) and more frequent siege and
mega wildfires such as those experienced in California (CA Gov, 2018; USFS & CDFFP, 2004),
Greece (CBS, 2018) and Australia (Bushfire CRC, 2009), fire services are facing increased public
scrutiny and both firefighters Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) are being held to a higher
standard of performance than ever before.
In response to the changing external environment, fire services throughout the world are
embracing new technologies and turning to research to support evidence based practice.
At the same time, fire services are collecting significant amounts of specific and information
rich data. Probabilistic analysis of this data can subsequently facilitate improvements in
operational risk management during emergencies and in pre-incident planning (Penney, 2017,
2019) ultimately resulting in a safer workplace and providing Incident Commanders evidence
that can be used to support operational decisions. This chapter not only defines risk
management within the dynamic emergency fire service context, but explores firefighters risk
attitudes and how these may influence Incident Controllers (IC’s).
8.2

Defining risk in dynamic fire and emergency situations

Whilst the term ‘risk’ is often used incorrectly instead of, or interchangeably with the term
‘hazard’ within the majority of fire services literature (Penney, 2017, 2019), risk is specifically
defined as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 2018). Risk is not an event (SAI Global,
2013a) such as an explosion, fire or other emergency. Instead, risk is expressed as the likelihood
of a consequence, positive or negative, occurring. When applied to emergency response it is
essential to appreciate that incidents are dynamic, occurring within an environment subject
to constant change and therefore the level of uncertainty and therefore risk, must be
constantly reassessed. Often inappropriately described, three elements must be defined in
order to articulate risk:
1. The objective(s) being referred to;
2. The particular source of uncertainty; and
3. How the source of uncertainty may lead to consequences.
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may include:
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved in a high speed
vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the firefighters from mechanical, thermal
and chemical hazards preventing all firefighters completing the rescue unharmed. In this
statement:
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed;
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and
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3.

Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead to the
consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured.
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may include:
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved in a high speed
vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the firefighters from mechanical, thermal
and chemical hazards preventing all firefighters completing the rescue unharmed.
In this statement:
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed;
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead to the
consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured.

8.3

Risk management in the dynamic emergency context

The term ‘risk management’ refers to the structure (principles, framework and process) for
managing risk effectively whilst ‘managing risk’ refers to the application of that structure to the
decision making process (SAI Global, 2013a). The risk management process provides the
architecture for decision making and must be applied in every situation, including emergency
response, for risk to be deemed to have been considered sufficiently (Penney, 2016). Further,
SAI Global (2013a,p45) provides the following example of how the process must be applied in
even the most dynamic emergency situations:
“A military special forces section leader might have a split second in which to make a
tactical decision on which personal wellbeing and that of subordinates as well as the success
of the mission, might depend. In that time the leader must recall the objectives, appreciate
the external and internal environment, assess the risks, consider the options, review those
against the objectives and take the appropriate action. Despite the very short decision making
window, the quality of each of these steps must be of the highest standard.”
Failure to comprehend risk or to apply the entire risk management structure to dynamic
decision making in the emergency environment can result in decisions that exacerbate rather
than mitigate adverse consequences. Should adverse outcomes eventuate it may also lead
to post incident scrutiny of the decisions made by ICs. Existing studies suggest risk assessment
in accordance with (ISO, 2018) may not occur during frontline emergency response in most
jurisdictions (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al., 2007; Penney, 2019). In contrast to these
findings however, the risk management methodology for dynamic emergency incidents
adopted by United Kingdom Fire Services as published by the Department for Communities
and Local Government is comprehensive and requires specific attention.
The first of these publications, the Fire and Rescue Authorities “Health, safety and welfare
framework for the operational environment” (DCLG, 2013), details a comprehensive
architecture for management of dynamic incident risk that commences with the brigade’s
senior officers and ends with the individual emergency responder on the incident ground. This
publication is unique amongst the literature reviewed in that it not only acknowledges Health
and Safety legislation, often viewed as encumbrance to emergency response, but embraces
it as a pillar of dynamic emergency risk management. In doing so the United Kingdom Fire
Services succinctly define both internal and external organisational risk contexts as they apply
to frontline operations. Further, DCLG (2013) not only articulates the dynamic incident risk
assessment process through the hierarchy of command but also provides multiple fire service
specific examples for ICs and front line personnel of all ranks and operational roles to
reference. Perhaps most importantly from an organisational context is the recognition that
“standard operational procedures need to be sufficiently flexible to allow the Incident
Commander to exercise discretion on the resources and the procedures required to resolve
the emergency” (DCLG, 2013, p23). The flexibility for ICs and personnel to use ‘operational
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discretion’ is carefully articulated and “should be based on a balance in terms of risk versus
benefit, and the Incident Commander knowing the action which they are normally required
by the relevant standard operational procedure” (DCLG, 2013 ,p23). In these statements the
term Incident Commander and IC are interchangeable.
The second publication is the Fire and Rescue Manual 2nd Volume “Fire Service
Operations – Incident Command” (DCLG, 2008). It is the doctrine of fire service dynamic
incident management at all levels and embraces incident risk management as one of the
three key elements required for effective incident command. Most significantly DCLG (2008,
p64) recognises “in order to provide an acceptable level of protection at operational
incidents, the organisations health and safety management must operate at three different
levels – Strategic, Systematic and Dynamic.” At a strategic level, the doctrine defines the fire
service’s risk attitudes and establishes internal context whilst complying with relevant external
contexts. This is achieved through appropriate policy and doctrine that embrace the risk
philosophy of the fire service. Systematic risk management is completed by operational
subject matter experts in each discipline. The results subsequently guide the development and
implementation of operations including but not limited to safe work systems, procedures,
equipment, training and supervision. Dynamic risk management occurs during an operational
incident and encompasses all risk management carried out by all personnel involved in the
incident whilst an emergency situation is present.
In considering the application of ‘dynamic risk management’ it is essential to distinguish
between time critical emergency situations, for instance where lives are endangered and
rescue is required, and non-emergency situations such as body recovery. The distinction is
critical as risk thresholds will vary accordingly as demonstrated in the “Safe Person Concept”
(NZFS, 2008) and the philosophy of the DCLG [2008,p65],
“In a highly calculated way, firefighters:
• Will take some risk to save saveable lives.
• May take some risk to save saveable property.
• Will not take any risk at all to try and save lives or property that are already lost.”
Whilst NZFS (2008) considers dynamic incident risk management in isolation, DCLG (2008,
2013) acknowledge it as only a part of the greater risk management process applicable to the
fire service as a workplace. Through this approach the United Kingdom integrates the internal
and external risk contexts into the dynamic incident risk management process. This holistic
approach empowers ICs to manage risk in accordance with ISO31000 regardless of the nature
of the emergency encountered.

Klein’s (1989) Recognition-Primed Decision and Rasmussen’s Decision Ladder (1976, cited
in Naikar, 2010) represent two accepted models representing the decision process of
experienced personnel in dynamic situations. Both models are dependent on a high level of
expertise from the decision maker and the ability to process information in a structured
sequence that characterises rational, knowledge-based behaviour (Naikar, 2010). Neither
model references the application of risk management into the decision making process or
how prior exposure may influence risk tolerance and the cognitive process. Recognition
Primed Decision Making (RPDM) requires a level of operational maturity bordering on mastery
that can only be achieved through significant and repeated exposures that result in both
positive and negative consequences. Basing training solely on RPDM can be problematic as
it relies on teaching rookie ICs the “experience” of veterans and expecting them to respond
as the veteran would, despite not having the personal library of experience to draw upon.
Alternatively, the cognitive processes explained by Kahneman (2012) explain how complex
cognitive processes such as risk analysis during dynamic emergency situations can be
expedited by the development of advanced and efficient cognitive processes that can be
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taught, practiced and mastered. Unlike RPDM, Kahneman’s approach supports the
implementation of ISO31000 risk analysis during dynamic emergencies. This is not to say that
RPDM does not have a place in risk management during emergency operations, however to
introduce it to inexperienced ICs as the sole means of risk analysis is not appropriate.
Risk analysis (also known as risk assessment) is the process to comprehend the nature of
risk and to determine the level of risk (SAI Global, 2013a). The process of comprehension
requires the risk manager to be able to adequately interpret risk sources in a structured manner
and to subsequently understand the probability and consequences of an event occurring.
During even the most rapidly changing emergency situations the risk management framework
and structure remains the same. Each risk analysis must be considered a new separate
process, even if it builds upon a previously and recently completed analysis of the same
emergency situation at an earlier point in time. This realisation is significant as it supports the
understanding that dynamic risk management does not involve a changing architecture or
process of analysis, but rather the same risk management architecture and analysis process
applied multiple times during a rapidly changing (dynamic) emergency situation.
Risk analysis may either be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of both. Qualitative
analysis involves descriptive and often subjective appraisal of risk as described by the assessor.
It is often useful when risk treatment strategies involve multiple risks at different levels that
cannot be accurately measured on the same quantitative scale and may be suitable during
preliminary or scoping assessments. Importantly, when qualitative analysis is applied “there
should be a clear explanation of all the terms employed and the basis for all criteria should be
recorded” (SAI Global, 2013a, p18). Review of fire services literature (ACT, unknown; NZFS, 2008;
DFES, 2012; SACFS, 2014) identified that whilst prioritised objectives of the protection of life,
property and the environment were common across jurisdictions, explanations of terminology
were largely absent from operational material. Yung (2008) asserts that reliance on qualitative
assessment alone must be considered fundamentally flawed because subjective judgements
cannot be verified and may often differ between operators. Further, the same operator may
make different decisions given the same situation at various points in time.
Quantitative assessment requires the analysis of numerical data to calculate probabilities,
frequencies and distributions. Considered the epitome of fire risk analysis probabilistic risk
analysis requires detailed and time consuming consideration of all possible outcomes as either
a function of incidence, Bayesean probability or life/dollar loss per unit time (Yung, 2008). Such
analysis requires availability of substantial high quality data as well as the ability to numerically
represent variability within defined confidence levels, therefore it cannot be undertaken within
the parameters and constraints of a single emergency incident. This is supported in (ACTESA,
date unknown, p2] by the Dynamic Risk assessment overview statement that “often, rescues
have to be performed, exposures protected and hose lines placed before a complete
appreciation of all material facts have been obtained”. Whilst typical quantitative analysis,
including fault tree or event tree diagrams, may be particularly useful for pre-incident planning
and as a supporting assurance process, their complexity and time required for completion
render them impractical for incident ground completion. Review of available literature
identified that whilst significant international statistical analysis of fire related fatality and injury
data were available (DCLG, 2015; FEMA, 2011 & 2012) a total absence of statistical analysis of
Australian firefighting injuries and risk management during dynamic operations was noted in
both published and internal brigade documentation.
For risk analysis during dynamic incidents to align to ISO31000, both qualitative and
quantitative components are arguably required. Reviews of historical injury data may provide
quantitative probabilities pertaining to the effectiveness of certain personal protective
equipment in reducing firefighter injuries. At the same time, experience may provide an IC with
valuable insight into qualitatively assessing the effectiveness of specific tactics in certain
situations.
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Risk treatment involves the application of mitigating processes, systems or other inhibitors
to reduce the likelihood or consequence of an event occurring (ISO, 2018; SAI Global, 2013a
& 2013b). Consequences of inaccurate identification of risk and subsequent treatment can
be catastrophic with Ash & Smallman (2012) identifying 19% of all firefighter deaths in the
United States between 2000 and 2005 being a direct result of human error. In the context of
firefighting operations, risk treatments (also known as controls) are subsequently presented in
the contextualisation of the traditional hierarchy of controls.
At the top of the hierarchy is “elimination” which refers to the removal of the risk source.
In the firefighting context this may be viewed as pre-operational actions such as arson
prevention or road safety campaigns. During an emergency incident “elimination” may
include the decision not to commit crews, but rather to isolate a fuel source and permit it to
‘burn out’ so that lives are not endangered.
Next in the hierarchy is “substitution” which is difficult to translate to the firefighting context
because firefighters often respond to emergency situations where time and resourcing
restrictions are encountered. It may be considered that a decision to use defensive firefighting
strategies, as opposed to offensive internal firefighting strategies, may meet the definition for
substitution because even though the risk source is not eliminated, the approach to resolving the
incident is specifically varied in a manner that reduces the potential for an adverse event to
occur.
“Engineering” controls are those that isolate assets from the risk source. In the firefighting
context this may only be partially achieved because there is likely to be a requirement for at
least several firefighters to be present within the ‘hot’ zone (DFES 2012, 2015a, 2015b) and this
remains essential to resolving many dynamic emergency situations. Isolation occurs through the
implementation of controlled access to areas within an emergency incident that are the
greatest risk source through Entry Control Officers and physical demarcation (DFES, 2015a,
2015b). Despite the use of isolation controls at emergency incidents, which may reduce the
potential for greater numbers of adverse outcomes, ICs are still required to commit sufficient
firefighters into hazardous situations in order to resolve the emergency.
“Administrative” controls are the policies, procedures and ‘doctrine’ that provide
organisational guidance as to the appropriate manner in which to resolve a dynamic
emergency situation. Extensive fire services literature in this area was found, however, an
absence of established risk criterion or documented risk thresholds was also noted. No reason for
this absence was found.
“Personnel attitudes” are an addition to the traditional hierarchy of controls and may be
considered a critical component to the contextualised hierarchy of controls within the
firefighting environment. It may be considered that personnel attitudes are significantly
influenced by the internal context in which they evolve (Lloyd, 2005, 2008) and the internal
context of firefighters is particularly influential. It is therefore surmised that the attitude of individual
firefighters under the command of an IC must be considered in the contextualised hierarchy of
controls. Whilst good attitudes will afford some benefit for the reduction of the likelihood of an
adverse outcome, poor attitudes will inevitably increase the potential for failure to implement or
abide by other controls and therefore increase both the probability and severity of adverse
outcomes on the incident ground.
“Personal protective equipment” colloquially known as PPE within fire services represents the
final line of defence between personnel and an adverse outcome. Whilst some PPE may in fact
reduce the potential for realisation of an adverse effect, for instance breathing apparatus
theoretically preventing a firefighter inhaling toxic smoke and products of combustion, it must
also be considered that the presence of PPE may result in firefighters undertaking greater risk
taking behaviour due to a perception that the PPE affords them complete or excessive levels of
protection (Penney, 2013).
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8.4

Risk attitudes amongst firefighters

Differences in the identification of objectives and the willingness to accept and retain risk
(risk tolerance) between strategic and tactical levels within an emergency services
organisation, as reported by Ash and Smallman (2012) and Jacobs (2010), may result in risk
management decisions being made by ICs that could be later considered to be inappropriate
or unjustified. Further, Ash and Smallman (2012) identified the perception by emergency
services personnel that strategic (organisational) decisions and guidance may hinder
achievement of goals at a tactical level and actually contribute to inappropriate risk
management during emergency response. Further, inappropriate or insufficient understanding
and consideration of risk may leave emergency services personnel with potentially dangerous
familiarity with the hazards they face (Sadler et al., 2007).
Also worth consideration is the intimate culture amongst firefighting crews that can affect
management of risk during dynamic emergencies. Firefighters spend a significant amount of
time together during both emergency incidents and routine station life (Childs et al., 2004). In
this environment, indoctrinated traits established by organisational culture invariably flourish
and form a unique environment that has the capacity to directly influence an IC’s
management of risk during dynamic emergency operations. Reports including NIFC (1996)
and Moore-Merrell et al. (2008) identify an established culture of risk taking amongst firefighters
in order ‘to get the job done’ regardless of operational guidelines. This is supported by the
findings of Kunadharaju et al. (2011) who reported, in contrast to most high hazard work,
firefighting operations are actively based on hazard engagement, typically compounded by
acute time pressures. In addition to these findings, Fender (2003) reported multiple firefighter
specific traits that directly affected personal risk tolerance. These included:
•
The age of a victim - the younger the victim the higher the threshold to personal injury
or death;
•
Respect for the officer in charge – firefighters were willing to undertake more
dangerous tasks if they respected the officer giving a command;
•
A sense of pride in taking risks; and
•
Expectations of the community.
A previous study into the decontamination practices of firefighters exposed to hazardous
and toxic materials (Penney, 2013) found a tendency amongst firefighters to perceive
potentially life threatening incidents as routine if they were regularly encountered without
acute health effects becoming evident. It is suggested the cultural acceptance of personal
risk taking amongst firefighting crews needs to be carefully understood by ICs who are
ultimately responsible for crew safety and may well have less risk tolerance during incidents.
Recent research (Penney, 2016, 2019) provides insight into the risk attitudes and
perceptions of operational Australian firefighters. The research was conducted in two phases:
(1) Semistructured interviews and (2) subsequent in-depth structured surveys. This enabled
exploration and documentation of the beliefs, understanding, and attitudes of fire and
emergency service ICs. Phase one involved ethnographic qualitative interactive observation
of 20 current serving professional fire and emergency service ICs over a three-month period.
All participants were experienced ICs with a minimum of seven years operational experience
across all fire service hazards, including but not limited to structure fire, bushfire, hazardous
materials, road crash, and other rescue response. Semistructured interviews and subsequent
in-depth structured surveys designed to identify the individual’s risk attitudes and beliefs were
completed by all participants. The participation of one candidate was interrupted by an
incident call out, resulting in 19 interviews and surveys being available for analysis. These
represented 7% of the overall officer population from a Western Australian career fire service
background.
The first question asked of participants in the semistructured interview was “How do you
define risk?” Whilst all participant responses acknowledged that risk is a consideration of
consequences and likelihood, only one participant provided the answer “it is the effect of
uncertainty on objectives” as defined in ISO31000. Approximately a quarter of participants
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(26%) provided answers that were specific to emergency response without consideration of
the greater application of risk, and only one participant provided the restrictive definition “risk
is the potential to injure me”. Consistent with the findings of Tissington and Flin (2004) and
Reinhardt-Klein (2010), these answers suggest fire and emergency service ICs generally have
a perception of risk as the practical consideration of consequence and likelihood as it applies
to a reactive emergency environment, rather than as a considered and managed process
consistent with ISO31000.
The second question asked of participants was “How do you manage risk in a dynamic
emergency environment compared to other situations and contexts?” In response, nearly all
participants identified that risk management in dynamic contexts was based on a similar
process to risk management in other situations, but with limited information available and with
restricted time frames in which to make decisions. Ten percent of participants expressed the
opinion that dynamic risk management required more “forward thinking” than risk
management in other situations. These responses again suggest the study group has adopted
a definition of risk that is reasonably consistent throughout their population and contextualised
to their perception of reality but does not consider all elements detailed in ISO31000; especially
when consideration is given to the example of the special forces soldier in a hostage situation
provided in SAHB436 (SAI Global, 2013a).
More than half of participants (58%) also expressed that they managed risk in dynamic
emergency environments according to how they believed their organisation expected them
to do so, or that they managed risk in accordance with organisational procedures and
protocols. This suggests the majority of fire and emergency service ICs believed they managed
risk using the same risk attitudes as their organisation. This was despite a review of the literature
identifying an absence of organisational risk thresholds and attitudes specific to dynamic
emergency response environments.
Responses from the study group to the third question “How do you decide whether risks
are acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment?” were varied. A quarter of
participants (26%) reported they relied on organisational procedures and protocols; almost
half of participants (47%) reported they relied on personal prior experience to determine
whether risks were acceptable; 16% of participants stated they simply relied on whether they
believed the risk was acceptable to themselves personally; and 10% of participants responded
that in the case of “life involvement” (being the fire services terminology for when potential
consequences include the loss of occupant life), all risks are acceptable. The variation in
answers provided by fire and emergency service ICs represents significant variance in the risk
thresholds between ICs within the same organisation. Conflicts between risk attitudes will
foreseeably lead to increased risk at an emergency incident because additional uncertainty
is introduced when individuals work together to form incident management teams or when
they are responsible for different sectors within the same emergency incident. When the
answers provided by participants to question three are considered in conjunction with the
answers provided by participants to question two, the variance in risk thresholds between
participants suggests an absence of a defined organisational internal risk context that may
otherwise guide participants towards similar answers. This notion is consistent with Fender (2003)
and reinforces the conclusion that, for risk management to be compliant with ISO31000, it must
be ingrained as part of the core culture of the fire service inclusive of explicitly defined risk
tolerances.
The final question posed to fire and emergency service ICs was “Does the risk
management process differ in the dynamic emergency environment compared to other
situations? If yes, then how?” Responses provided by participants were far less varied than the
responses to question three. Forty-two percent of participants stated there was no difference
in the process; however, half of these participants also stated the time frame available for
completing the risk assessment was significantly reduced during dynamic emergency
environments. Interestingly, one participant also stated that risk tolerance is significantly higher
during dynamic emergency operations compared to other situations, which suggests
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fluctuating risk thresholds depending on the participant’s evolving perception of the severity
of an incident. In addition, only one participant identified that the risk management process
had to be repeated multiple times throughout an emergency incident, suggesting the
remaining participants did not consider repeated risk application of the risk management
process necessary.
More than half of participants (53%) stated that the risk management process did differ in
the dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations. These participants all
identified that the process changed due to a significant reduction in both the available
information on which to make decisions, and the available time to gather further information.
One participant clarified their response by adding they felt “pushed to do things you wouldn’t
normally do due to expectations and pressure”. This indicated they operated at risk thresholds
they personally felt were unacceptable. Only one participant stated the dynamic risk
management process was reactive as opposed to being a thought out process.
These findings appear to contradict the previous findings of Ash and Smallman (2012),
Fender (2003), and Naikar (2010), all of whom identified decision making during dynamic
emergency incidents to be reactive and based on recognition of specific cues. Whilst the
finding from the study reported may be interpreted with some caution, due to the moderate
sample size, the finding is supported by the answers provided by the fire and emergency
service ICs to the second question posed in the interview. One participant stated they were
unsure whether the risk management process differed in the dynamic emergency
environment compared to other situations.
The first question in the structured survey relating to risk perceptions required participants
to identify the severity of potential consequence for 20 outcomes that may occur during fire
and emergency incidents. From the answers provided, probability analysis was completed
across the entire sample population. Conditional probability was then calculated on the basis
that participants had, or had not, been previously injured at an incident. Nine participant fire
and emergency service ICs had been injured at an incident and 10 had not been injured at
an incident, and these results were compared to the severity assigned to the consequence in
fire and emergency services risk literature. Full results are provided in Table 8.1. Analysis of the
results revealed there was a conditional probability of 0.00 (zero) for all fire and emergency
service ICs assigning the same severity to a consequence given the event being realised. Only
in a single instance did a subgroup completely agree on the severity of a consequence. This
was the non-injured group agreeing that the death of a rescuer was of catastrophic severity
(represented by a conditional probability of 1.00).
Further analysis revealed there was an equal probability between the group that had
never been injured, with a conditional probability of 0.2 that the survey groups’ perception of
consequence severity would align with the severity adopted by fire and emergency services.
Whilst some variance may be expected due to potential differences in individuals’ perception
of the consequence realised, a conditional probability of 0.2 signifies agreement between
participants and fire and emergency services in the perception of consequence severity of
only a single occurrence each year. It is therefore concluded that the internal context of risk
attitudes is not harmonious amongst fire and emergency service ICs and may lead to
conflicting risk management during dynamic emergency situations or post-incident analysis.
Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of 0.612 (standard deviation of
0.142) that the entire survey group would agree on the severity of any given consequence.
This further supports the findings of the potential for conflicting risk attitudes between ICs and
parties conducting post-incident analysis.
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Table 8.1. Consequence severity across the entire sample and the injured/never been injured subgroups.
Rating
Group
Consequence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Insignificant

Minor

Moderate

Major

Catastrophic

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

0.42
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.26
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.44
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.40
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.30
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.53
0.21
0.00
0.05
0.05
0.68
0.83
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.79
0.42
0.68
0.05
0.00
0.00

0.44
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.67
0.88
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.89
0.44
0.44
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.60
0.20
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.70
0.80
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.70
0.40
0.90
0.10
0.00
0.00

0.05
0.58
0.11
0.11
0.26
0.05
0.06
0.68
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.06
0.26
0.17
0.16
0.42
0.26
0.42
0.37
0.00

0.11
0.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.13
0.67
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.56
0.56
0.33
0.22
0.00

0.00
0.60
0.20
0.20
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.70
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.10
0.40
0.22
0.20
0.30
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.00

0.00
0.16
0.42
0.63
0.47
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.05
0.63
0.42
0.61
0.63
0.72
0.00
0.16
0.00
0.37
0.58
0.53

0.00
0.22
0.44
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.00
0.33
0.11
0.56
0.44
0.67
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.44
0.78
0.44

0.00
0.10
0.40
0.50
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.70
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.67
0.00
0.30
0.00
0.30
0.40
0.60

0.00
0.00
0.47
0.21
0.21
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.95
0.37
0.47
0.33
0.11
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
0.05
0.47

0.00
0.00
0.56
0.22
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.89
0.44
0.56
0.33
0.11
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.56

0.00
0.00
0.40
0.20
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.30
0.40
0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.40

Consequences:
1. Near miss—cut finger
2. Near miss—broken arm
3. Near miss—death of rescuer
4. Near miss—exposure to acutely toxic material
5. Near miss—exposure to hazardous material with health effects that may take 20 years
to occur
6. Scratch or dent to a vehicle
7. Cut finger requiring first aid treatment
8. Broken arm requiring hospitalization
9. Death of a rescuer
10. Exposure to acutely toxic hazardous material requiring hospital admission
11. Exposure to hazardous material that results in lung damage only evident 20 years postexposure
12. Inhaling asbestos particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities
13. Exposure to silica particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities
14. Exposure to glass particulates and dusts as a result of rescue activities
15. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $1000 damage
16. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $20,000 damage
17. Damage to the environment that does not result in long term impact
18. Damage to the environment resulting in long term impact
19. Lung tissue damage without respiratory impairment
20. Lung tissue damage that limits physical activity
Group:
A. Total study population
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response whilst
working under a different IC
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency response
whilst working under a different IC
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An individual’s beliefs and expectations can significantly affect the internal context of the
risk management process (SAI Global, 2013a). To investigate how this may be a factor in risk
management during dynamic emergency operations, the second question of the survey
required participants to state their agreement to four statements regarding external and
personal risk attitudes and expectations using a Likert scale. The statements were:
1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to
save others.
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to
save property.
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to
save the environment.
4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put themselves at a higher
level of risk than the general public in the course of their duties.
Full results are provided in Table 8.2. Analysis of these results reveals that the overwhelming
majority of the entire study group (74%), as well as the both subgroups (injured 77% and never
injured 70%), believed there were external expectations that emergency services personnel
would risk their own lives to save others. By comparison, only 52% of the entire study group, 78%
of the injured subgroup, and 30% of the never injured subgroup believed there were external
expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own lives to save property.
This difference in attitudes between the injured and never injured populations appears to
suggest personnel who had a higher personal risk threshold may be more likely to be injured
during emergency operations; however, further research is required to confirm this hypothesis.
Analysis of the responses to the statement “There is an expectation that emergency
services personnel will risk their own lives to save the environment” was less conclusive but
appeared to suggest a less strongly held belief amongst the study group of fire and emergency
service ICs that this was the case (37% of the total study group stating they either disagreed or
strongly disagreed with the statement).
Table 8.2. Incident controller perceptions and expectations across the entire sample and the
injured/never been injured subgroups.
Response

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

Disagree
Group
Belief

A

B

1

0.11

2

0.16

3
4

Agree
C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

0.11

0.1

0.11

0.11

0.20

0.11

0.00

0.2

0.05

0.11

0.00

0.53

0.44

0.60

0.21

0.33

0.10

0.00

0.20

0.21

0.11

0.30

0.47

0.67

0.30

0.05

0.11

0.21

0.11

0.30

0.00

0.16

0.11

0.20

0.37

0.56

0.20

0.26

0.22

0.30

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.10

0.16

0.11

0.20

0.05

0.11

0.00

0.68

0.67

0.70

0.05

0.11

0.00

Beliefs:
1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to
save others.
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to
save property.
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to
save the environment.
4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put themselves at a higher
level of risk than the general public in the course of their duties.
Group:
A. Total study population
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response whilst
working under a different IC
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency response
whilst working under a different IC
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To further define the risk attitudes and tolerance of the study group, participants were
required to identify whether potential scenarios were either acceptable or unacceptable
when the probability of realisation of the consequence was low, moderate, and high.
Participants were required to answer the question in two contexts: First, that they were
personally exposed to the risk source and, second, that they were responsible for other
responders and it was these other responders who were exposed to the risk source. The
scenarios presented were:
1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where the consequence is being
severely injured or killed.
2. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being exposed to dust
that may cause immediate lung damage.
3. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where the consequence is
developing cancer.
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being exposed to dust
that may cause long term lung damage.
5. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where the consequence is being severely
injured or killed.
6. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where the consequence is being
severely injured or killed.
7. Entering a burning building to save the property where the consequence is being
severely injured or killed.
Full results are provided in Table 8.3. Analysis of results revealed a probability of certainty
(where probability equals 1.00) amongst the study group of only 0.143. This means there was a
probability of 0.857 that participants did not collectively agree on risk tolerance attitudes or
thresholds. Further analysis revealed a probability of only 0.286 that all participants shared the
same risk tolerance across the presented scenarios. This probability increased to 0.381 amongst
the “injured” population, whilst there was no change in the probability of agreeance amongst
the “never injured” population compared to all participants. One potential explanation for the
increased consensus of risk acceptance amongst the “injured” population may be that those
participants who had been previously injured held a higher risk tolerance and therefore were
more likely to undertake hazardous tasks that may result in injury compared to the “never
injured” group.
Risk acceptance with limited certainty was also higher for the entire study population and
both injured and never injured subpopulations where life involvement was present. Participants
would typically put both their own safety and the safety of personnel under their command at
increased risk to facilitate occupant rescue (from all risk sources). This risk acceptance with
limited certainty increased marginally where rescue was of a colleague, particularly when risk
was transferred from the participant to those under the participant’s control. Marginal increase
in risk threshold was observed between personal and personnel exposure where rescue
involved a child compared to an adult. It is hypothesised that this increase may be a
consequence of perceived community expectations and/or due to an innate willingness to
permit great risk to save a child. Further investigation is required to explore this hypothesis.
Risk acceptance with limited certainty declined quickly for the protection of property,
whilst the level of certainty decreased as the lead time to the realisation of potential
consequences increased. For example, the certainty regarding risk acceptance involving
immediate impacts, such as trauma, was generally higher compared to those involving
delayed impacts, such as cancer or lung disease. This suggest participants were more likely to
be concerned with impacts they can witness immediately and is supported by the findings of
previous research (Penney, 2013).
Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of 0.529 (standard
deviation of 0.336) that the entire survey group would agree on the acceptability of any given
situation where the risk was personal in nature. By comparison, a mean probability of 0.449
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(standard deviation of 0.321) was found that the entire survey group would agree on the
acceptability of any given situation where the risk was to personnel under the participant’s
command. This further supports the findings that participants were more likely to accept risk
when they believed the consequences were limited to themselves.
Table 8.3. Risk tolerance to the participant themselves compared to those under their command.
Risk to Participant Themselves
Risk Tolerance
Group
Context & Risk
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Acceptable

Risk
to
Personnel
Under
Command of the Participant
Acceptable
Unacceptable

Unacceptable

the

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

1.00
0.63
0.16
0.95
0.47
0.37
0.58
0.26
0.16
0.84
0.32
0.21
1.00
0.79
0.21
1.00
0.79
0.37
0.84
0.16
0.00

1.00
0.56
0.00
1.00
0.56
0.33
0.56
0.22
0.11
0.89
0.22
0.22
1.00
0.67
0.11
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.78
0.11
0.00

1.00
0.70
0.30
0.90
0.40
0.40
0.60
0.30
0.20
0.90
0.40
0.20
1.00
0.90
0.30
1.00
0.90
0.40
0.90
0.20
0.00

0.00
0.37
0.84
0.05
0.53
0.63
0.42
0.74
0.84
0.16
0.68
0.79
0.00
0.21
0.79
0.00
0.21
0.63
0.16
0.84
1.00

0.00
0.44
1.00
0.00
0.44
0.67
0.44
0.78
0.89
0.11
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.33
0.89
0.00
0.33
0.67
0.22
0.89
1.00

0.00
0.30
0.70
0.10
0.60
0.60
0.40
0.70
0.80
0.10
0.60
0.80
0.00
0.10
0.70
0.00
0.10
0.60
0.10
0.80
1.00

1.00
0.47
0.05
0.79
0.32
0.21
0.63
0.26
0.26
0.74
0.26
0.21
1.00
0.53
0.11
0.95
0.63
0.16
0.68
0.16
0.00

1.00
0.56
0.00
0.89
0.33
0.22
0.78
0.22
0.22
1.00
0.22
0.22
1.00
0.67
0.11
1.00
0.78
0.22
0.67
0.22
0.00

1.00
0.40
0.10
0.70
0.30
0.20
0.50
0.30
0.20
0.60
0.30
0.20
1.00
0.40
0.10
0.90
0.50
0.10
0.70
0.10
0.00

0.00
0.53
0.95
0.21
0.68
0.79
0.37
0.74
0.74
0.26
0.74
0.79
0.00
0.47
0.89
0.05
0.37
0.84
0.32
0.84
1.00

0.00
0.44
1.00
0.11
0.67
0.78
0.22
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.33
0.89
0.00
0.22
0.78
0.33
0.78
1.00

0.00
0.60
0.90
0.30
0.70
0.80
0.50
0.70
0.80
0.40
0.70
0.80
0.00
0.60
0.90
0.10
0.50
0.90
0.30
0.90
1.00

Context and Risk:
1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a low probability of being
severely injured or killed.
2. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a moderate probability
of being severely injured or killed.
3. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a high probability of
being severely injured or killed
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being exposed to
dust that may cause immediate lung damage.
5. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage.
6. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being exposed
to dust that may cause immediate lung damage.
7. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a low probability of
developing cancer.
8. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a moderate probability
of developing cancer.
9. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a high probability of
developing cancer.
10. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being exposed to
dust that may cause long term lung damage.
11. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage.
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12. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being exposed
to dust that may cause long term lung damage.
13. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a low probability of being
severely injured or killed
14. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a moderate probability of
being severely injured or killed.
15. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a high probability of being
severely injured or killed.
16. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a low probability of
being severely injured or killed.
17. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a moderate
probability of being severely injured or killed.
18. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a high probability of
being severely injured or killed.
19. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a low probability of
being severely injured or killed.
20. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a moderate probability
of being severely injured or killed.
21. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a high probability of
being severely injured or killed.
Group:
A. Total study population
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response whilst
working under a different IC
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency response
whilst working under a different IC
8.5

Probability of firefighter injury during emergency response

To determine the probability of firefighter injury during emergency response, a
retrospective analysis of Western Australian fire service safety and incident reports between
January 1st 2001 and January 1st 2015 was conducted (Penney, 2019). A retrospective analysis
of Western Australian fire service safety and incident reports between January 1st 2001 and
January 1st 2015 was conducted. Initial analysis enabled the calculation of conditional
probability given a reportable incident occurs, and likelihood on the basis of activity, risk
source and nature of injury reported. The results are detailed in Tables 8.4-8.6. Each table is
ordered from highest to lowest frequency.
Table 8.4. Analysis by activity.

Activity (A)
Firefighting
RCR
Bushfire fighting
Rescue
Driving
Breathing Apparatus
Suicide Response
Hazmat
Environmental
DBA
Not reported
Storm

Count
327
110
99
36
30
20
15
12
8
5
2
2

P(A|B)
0.491
0.165
0.149
0.054
0.045
0.030
0.023
0.018
0.012
0.008
0.003
0.003

Occurrence per year
21.800
7.333
6.600
2.400
2.000
1.333
1.000
0.800
0.533
0.333
0.133
0.133

Likelihood
Almost certain
Almost certain
Almost certain
Almost certain
Almost certain
Almost certain
Almost certain
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Unlikely
Unlikely
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Table 8.5. Analysis by risk source.

Risk source (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Occurrence per year

Likelihood

Physical Strain

215

0.323

14.333

Almost certain

Exposure - asbestos

120

0.180

8.000

Almost certain

Exposure - psychological

95

0.143

6.333

Almost certain

Impact

49

0.074

3.267

Almost certain

Exposure - smoke

37

0.056

2.467

Almost certain

Exposure - biohazard

24

0.036

1.600

Almost certain

Exposure - hazmat fire

24

0.036

1.600

Almost certain

Equipment failure

21

0.032

1.400

Almost certain

Exposure - chemical

20

0.030

1.333

Almost certain

Thermal

16

0.024

1.067

Likely

Operator error

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Animal

7

0.011

0.467

Moderate

Communications

5

0.008

0.333

Moderate

Environmental

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Impaired Vision

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Other person

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Blast/Explosion

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Entrapment

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Exposure - noise

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Violence

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Electrical

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

Not reported

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

Table 8.6. Analysis by injury.

Inhalation

163

0.245

Occurrence
per year
10.867

Psychological

96

0.144

6.400

Almost certain

Nil

70

0.105

4.667

Almost certain

Back

56

0.084

3.733

Almost certain

Knee

42

0.063

2.800

Almost certain

Eye

32

0.048

2.133

Almost certain

Heat illness

30

0.045

2.000

Almost certain

Shoulder

26

0.039

1.733

Almost certain

Leg

16

0.024

1.067

Almost certain

General

15

0.023

1.000

Likely

Head / spinal

13

0.020

0.867

Likely

Ankle

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Arm

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Finger

9

0.014

0.600

Moderate

Face

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Nature of injury (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Likelihood
Almost certain
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Foot

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Multiple

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Neck

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Hand

7

0.011

0.467

Moderate

Elbow

6

0.009

0.400

Moderate

Ear

5

0.008

0.333

Moderate

Absorption

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Not reported

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Wrist

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Chest

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Groin

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Hip

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Abdominal

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Ingestion

2

0.003

0.133

Rare

Thermal

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

By frequency, firefighting was almost three times more likely to result in a reportable event
compared to any other activity with an occurrence of 21.8 times per year. Road crash rescue
(RCR) response resulted in 7.3 reportable events per year whilst bushfire fighting resulted in 6.6
reportable incidents per year. This result suggests additional attention should be provided in
training personnel and developing suitable risk mitigation procedures the activities most likely to
give rise to a reportable incident, for example, firefighting, RCR and bush firefighting.
In terms of risk source, Physical Strain is almost 1.8 times more likely to result in a reportable
event compared to other risk sources. This is consistent with the physically demanding nature of
firefighting (DFES, 2013) and is comparable to overexertion/strain injury rates in United States
firefighters (FEMA, 2011).
Exposure to various hazards including asbestos, chemicals and biohazards collectively
accounts for more reports than any other risk source (total of 225 incidents with a conditional
probability of 0.338). Such exposures are impossible to eradicate due to the inherent nature of
all hazards emergency response. However, the likelihood of adverse outcomes can be partly
mitigated through procedural and tactical measures. Such an approach is best illustrated using
a bow tie analysis (Robinson et al., 2010) as shown in Figure 8.1. In this manner both pre-exposure
and post exposure controls or barriers can be implemented holistically to reduce the likelihood
and severity of adverse consequences. The bow tie analysis also facilitates the illustration of
relationships between various barriers. Figure 8.1 provides a simple example of this in the
firefighting context. Where a relationship exists between barriers, the influence of the preceding
barrier may be either agonistic or antagonistic on the effectiveness of the following barrier. For
example, inappropriate or insufficient research and data may lead to inappropriate
organisational policy. This, in turn, can result in inappropriate training which will ultimately weaken
risk management at all operational and organisational levels. The combined effect of the
barriers and intrinsic relationships can ultimately affect the severity of realised consequences.
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Figure 8.1. Simplified bow tie analysis contextualized to firefighting operations

Just as firefighting is extremely physically demanding, it is also psychologically demanding
with exposure to psychological trauma identified as the second most common risk source
resulting in reportable events. Other researchers (Carll, 2007; Trappler, 2014) concur that care
must be taken in addressing risks arising from exposures of a psychological nature in firefighting
which are unique to the emergency service profession. Just as education, awareness and
resilience training is important prior to exposure to events of a psychological nature, specific
psychological management programs and counselling are required post exposure.
Analysis by injury yields results that, in limited circumstances, appear to conflict with other
available data sets. Inhalation ‘injuries’ are the most probable of all classified injuries to occur.
However, this may be explained by the fact that all reported incidences of “inhalation” of
smoke or other chemicals were captured in this category, regardless of whether acute injury
occurred. Psychological ‘injuries’ were the second most common reported injury and this is
consistent with the analysis of risk source data. Surprisingly thermal injuries, being those resulting
from heat transfer were the least probable (0.002 conditional probability). This conflicts with
data reported by FEMA (2011, 2012) which identifies a significantly higher thermal injury
occurrence rate. The number of thermal injuries reported in this study may be lower than the
true number of injuries because many incidents may remain unreported. The probability of
“Nil” injuries occurring represents “Near Misses” where no injury was actually sustained and is
the third highest amongst reported injuries sustained. Again, this figure may be lower than the
true number of near misses that occur during incidents because of a lack of report completion
when near misses occur.
Table 8.7 reports the conditional probability of a specific injury occurring given an injury
occurs during the specified activity. Across all activities, the “Nil” injury or ‘near miss’ is
prevalent. This is consistent with previous findings and suggests a large number of incidents
occur with the potential to cause injury, but do not actually cause injury in the specific case
reported. Psychological injuries are also well represented throughout the reports, particularly
where the potential or realisation of human trauma is present (for instance Road Crash Rescue
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and Suicide Response). In the case of reported injuries during Suicide Response it is suggested
it is likely the “Not Reported” values should also be psychological injuries even though they
have not been documented as such in the relevant reports.
Table 8.7. Conditional probability of specific injury during incident operations.
Operation

Injury

Conditional Probability

Breathing apparatus
operations

Nil

0.300

Back

0.150

Knee

0.150

Head / spinal

0.100

Heat illness

0.100

Neck

0.100

Ankle

0.050

Shoulder

0.050

Eye

0.253

Knee

0.141

Nil

0.131

Back

0.081

Inhalation

0.061

Leg

0.061

Bushfire fighting operations

Direct brigade alarm response
Driving operations

Firefighting operations

Ankle

0.051

Shoulder

0.051

Foot

0.030

Heat illness

0.030

Finger

0.020

Neck

0.020

Arm

0.010

Chest

0.010

Elbow

0.010

Face

0.010

Multiple

0.010

Psychological

0.010

Wrist

0.010

Eye

0.800

Knee

0.200

Nil

0.800

Back

0.033

Ear

0.033

Leg

0.033

Psychological

0.033

Shoulder

0.033

Wrist

0.033

Inhalation

0.434

Back

0.092

Heat illness

0.067
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Hazardous material
operations
Road crash rescue operations

Knee

0.064

Nil

0.064

Shoulder

0.046

Head / spinal

0.034

Leg

0.028

Arm

0.024

Multiple

0.018

Foot

0.015

Hand

0.015

Ear

0.012

Psychological

0.012

Ankle

0.009

Elbow

0.009

Eye

0.009

Finger

0.009

Neck

0.009

Abdominal

0.006

Chest

0.006

Hip

0.006

Face

0.003

Groin

0.003

Thermal

0.003

General

0.500

Inhalation

0.417

Heat illness

0.083

Psychological

0.600

Back

0.100

General

0.082

Face

0.045

Absorption

0.018

Inhalation

0.018

Shoulder

0.018

Ankle

0.009

Arm

0.009

Finger

0.009

Groin

0.009

Hand

0.009

Heat illness

0.009

Hip

0.009

Ingestion

0.009

Knee

0.009

Multiple

0.009

Neck

0.009

Nil

0.009
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Rescue (other than RCR)
operations

Suicide response operations

Wrist

0.009

Psychological

0.306

Inhalation

0.194

Back

0.083

Nil

0.083

Absorption

0.056

Shoulder

0.056

Ankle

0.028

Elbow

0.028

Groin

0.028

Hand

0.028

Ingestion

0.028

Knee

0.028

Not reported

0.028

Wrist

0.028

Psychological

0.800

Not reported

0.200

Analysis reveals thermal injuries account for a relatively insignificant conditional probability
of only 0.003 during Firefighting activities only. No thermal burns are reported during Bushfire or
other response. This is in stark contradiction to the probability of thermal injuries reported in
United States statistics (FEMA, 2012). However, it is hypothesised that this may be due to under
reporting of thermal injuries, or due to thermal injuries being referred to as injuries to specific
body parts without reference to the burn trauma, or due to differences in firefighting tactics
between Australia and the United States which may result in different mechanisms and
frequencies of injury.
For example, inhalation injuries appear over-represented in the data which is considered
surprising given the significant respiratory protection available to responding crews(DFES, 2013,
2014 & 2015a). Analysis of descriptions with the reports suggests a significant proportion of
inhalation exposures may be due to partial-face fitting respiratory protection masks that do
not completely prevent ingress of smoke and other products of combustion. This has been
rectified since the study commenced, through the implementation of full face respirators
available for firefighting personnel. The conditional probability of heat illness occurrence also
warrants attention with prevalence amongst all operations and responses that require the
responder to wear structural firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Wearing PPE
requires significant physical effort.
Review of the conditional probabilities detailed above should assist incident controllers
having enhanced evidence based awareness of potential consequences and likelihoods prior
to their occurrence during an emergency incident. Analysis of the conditional probability of
injury given an injury occurs during each of the specific operations will also facilitate the review
and improvement of strategic and tactical planning; personnel relief requirements; the
potential effectiveness of PPE; and even guide the potential development of targeted
prophylactic physical training programs.
Table 8.8 provides useful data to facilitate the development of evidence based risk
mitigation strategies prior to and on the incident ground. Physical Strain recurrently accounts
for high, if not the highest, level of Risk Source giving rise to a reportable incident across almost
all activities. This finding is consistent with the previous results of both this study and FEMA (2011)
and reaffirms the notion that firefighting is extremely physical in nature. By comparison, MooreMerrill et al. (2008) reported that physical strain was the second highest contributing factor to
firefighter injury in the United States (the first being a lack of situational awareness).
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Table 8.8. Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during incident
operations.

Operation

Injury

Conditional Probability

Breathing apparatus operations

Physical Strain

0.550

Impact

0.150

Entrapment

0.100

Equipment failure

0.100

Communications

0.050

Electrical

0.050

Physical Strain

0.515

Exposure - smoke

0.253

Exposure - chemical

0.061

Impact

0.051

Thermal

0.051

Exposure - asbestos

0.030

Bushfire fighting operations

Firefighting operations

Hazardous material operations

Road crash rescue operations

Rescue (other than RCR)
operations

Equipment failure

0.020

Exposure - psychological

0.010

Violence

0.010

Physical Strain

0.358

Exposure - asbestos

0.315

Impact

0.104

Exposure - hazmat fire

0.073

Exposure - smoke

0.037

Thermal

0.034

Equipment failure

0.024

Communications

0.012

Exposure - chemical

0.009

Exposure - psychological

0.009

Blast/Explosion

0.006

Exposure - noise

0.006

Operator error

0.006

Not reported

0.003

Violence

0.003

Exposure - chemical

0.583

Exposure - asbestos

0.333

Physical Strain

0.083

Exposure - psychological

0.600

Physical Strain

0.209

Exposure - biohazard

0.164

Exposure - asbestos

0.018

Impact

0.009

Exposure - psychological

0.306

Physical Strain

0.278

Exposure - asbestos

0.194
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Exposure - biohazard

0.111

Impact

0.056

Equipment failure

0.028

Exposure - chemical

0.028

Psychological Exposure was also well represented in the data, particularly amongst
incident response involving human life and trauma including Road Crash Rescue and Suicide
Response. This again supports previous findings of the study.
Exposure to various contaminants was also prevalent throughout the majority of fields. This
may be significant as potential effects may be mitigated through appropriate strategic and
tactical response; appropriate PPE and suitable decontamination procedures (DFES, 2015 &
2015a).
Breathing Apparatus operations are amongst the most hazardous of all firefighting
activities. These operations involve the use of self-contained breathing apparatus in
atmospheres not conducive to life due to the presence of smoke, heat, oxygen deficiency
and/or excessive temperature [28]. During Breathing Apparatus operations, teams of two
firefighters will work in close proximity to, or inside, burning structures. Typically they rely on a
single line of firefighting hose for fire protection. The margin for error is therefore understandably
narrow and the severity of potential consequences comparatively high (as reported in Table
7.9). Breathing apparatus operations are extremely physical in nature and this is represented
by a conditional probability of 0.55 that the responsible risk source for the reportable event will
be Physical Strain. Analysis also revealed a conditional probability of Impacts being the
responsible risk source for the reportable incident of 0.15. It is suggested Impacts (as compared
with Explosion / Blasts) are more likely to occur within a burning structure. Subsequently, this
figure may be reduced through the defining of organisational risk acceptance thresholds. In
turn, this would facilitate a reduction in the potential for incident controllers committing crews
to internal firefighting in the absence of life involvement because of a perceived internal or
external obligation to do so.
Table 8.9 provides the comparisons between actual reported consequence severity and
potential consequence severity for each Activity. Analysis reveals the conditional probability
of moderate to catastrophic potential consequence severity is higher than actual reported
consequence severity across all Activity groups. In part this may be explained by the lack of
subsequent reports or follow up detail for consequences that may have a long period of
latency (for instance psychological exposures, or exposures to contaminants), or for injuries
that are initially reported but worsen over time. Results of this analysis also support previous
findings of the prevalence of “Nil” reported injuries in that there is a high conditional probability
of ‘near misses’ within the incidents reported.

Table 8.9. Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during operations
Operation

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Breathing apparatus
operations

Insignificant

0.300

0.000

Bushfire fighting operations

Minor

0.700

0.150

Moderate

0.000

0.400

Major

0.000

0.250

Catastrophic

0.000

0.200

Insignificant

0.818

0.000

Minor

0.131

0.505

Moderate

0.040

0.101

Major

0.010

0.212
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Driving operations

Firefighting operations

Hazardous materials
operations

Road crash rescue operations

Rescue (other than RCR)
operations

Suicide response operations

Catastrophic

0.000

0.182

Insignificant

0.967

0.133

Minor

0.033

0.100

Moderate

0.000

0.100

Major

0.000

0.167

Catastrophic

-

-

Insignificant

0.933

0.031

Minor

0.034

0.147

Moderate

0.021

0.199

Major

0.012

0.098

Catastrophic

0.000

0.526

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.000

Moderate

0.000

0.000

Major

0.000

0.083

Catastrophic

0.000

0.917

Insignificant

0.973

0.000

Minor

0.018

0.073

Moderate

0.009

0.218

Major

0.000

0.027

Catastrophic

0.000

0.682

Insignificant

0.972

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.111

Moderate

0.028

0.306

Major

0.000

0.056

Catastrophic

0.000

0.528

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.133

Moderate

0.000

0.000

Major

0.000

0.000

Catastrophic

0.000

0.867

Further analysis reveals that, based on actual consequence severity, there was a
conditional probability of zero (0.000) for a consequence of catastrophic severity occurring
across the entire Activity range. This result is not consistent with numerous international studies
(FEMA, 2011 & 2012; Moore-Merrell et al., 2008) and whilst acknowledging the differences in
incidents responded to in different jurisdictions, this result potentially suggests Western
Australian firefighting strategies are safer than those utilised by international counterparts. By
comparison, a mean potential consequence of catastrophic severity revealed a conditional
probability across all Activities of 0.408 (standard deviation of 0.328). These results represent a
significant potential for increased severe injury, permanent disability and even death amongst
the study group, and should be considered in the establishment of the internal context for risk
management during dynamic emergency operations.
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8.6

Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s

In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services, this chapter provides
important qualitative and quantitative data that can be used to improve risk management
during dynamic emergency operations. When considered together with literature reviewed,
the results of the first study explicitly reject any notion of the validity of “dynamic risk
management” being a stand-alone process for managing risk during emergency situations.
For best practice to be realised, the architectural structure or process of risk management as
defined in ISO31000 cannot change. The context in which risk management is completed may
vary in dynamic emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms; however,
it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency situations that only further requires the risk
management process to be completed in its entirety each and every time risk is assessed and
subsequently managed.
The data presented in this chapter identified recurrent thermoregulatory and critical
incident related risk trends across all activity groups. These trends are significant because they
are associated with greater potential for serious consequences of hospitalisation or long term
disability compared to less severe, but more frequently occurring, physical strain related
injuries. In terms of affecting risk management during frontline operations, these results suggest
Incident Controllers need to take enhanced steps to mitigate thermoregulatory related and
physical strain related risks. Proactive management may include enhanced mobilisation and
rotation of personnel at incidents to reduce physical loading, whilst the risks may be reactively
managed through implementation of active recovery procedures and medical monitoring of
crews at incidents by qualified medical practitioners to ensure it is safe for them to continue
working. Both during and post the emergency phase of incidents, the Incident Controller
should ensure crew mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to psychological
events.
During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or catastrophic
adverse outcomes is present. The potential consequence is consistently greater than the
actual consequence realised in the data analysed. This may be explained by the mitigating
effects of post event barriers (PPE, physical conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the
personnel involved escaped more serious injury due to a combination of events that led to
them being close to the impact, as opposed to being in the direct line of impact. In light of
this finding it is important that incident controllers and operational personnel remain vigilant to
the potentially ‘normalising’ effect of recurrent exposure to potentially catastrophic, albeit low
frequency, situations.
8.7

Implications for urban planners

Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable communities. Through
careful and appropriate urban design that considers potential wildfire behaviour,
defendability of communities, evacuation requirements and firefighter tenability using
evidence based fire engineering analysis, urban planners can enhance the safety of
communities in areas prone to wildfire and the firefighters that protect them.
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9. Conclusions
9.1

Introduction

This section details the key outcomes from each Chapter.
9.2 Key outcomes for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s

1. Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and severity of
wildfires. During periods of elevated fire weather conditions, mega-wildfires in
through continuous vegetation structures (particularly in forest and woodlands),
no amount of resources or water (see Chapters 4-6) will be able to suppress the
head fire. Firefighting strategies in these situations should therefore focus on areas
of opportunity where vegetation structure, particularly surface, near surface and
elevated fuels are limited and the vegetation geometry does not support a
continuous wildfire front. The removal of fuel immediately adjacent to assets and
communities through ‘dry’ firefighting strategies such as backburning (see
Chapter 4) may need to be considered early in firefighting campaigns.
1. Chapter 2 covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and behaviour. As
the suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged against these inputs it is essential
that all firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and IMT’s alike not only understand the
presented models, but are effective in accurately applying them. Incorrect
predictions may result in inappropriate strategies being devised, leaving frontline
personnel exposed to overwhelming wildfire conditions with potentially fatal
consequences (see Chapters 5 and 7). Whilst fire behaviour specialists are
required to accurately and competently predict wildfire behaviour, all personnel
from firefighters to the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby increasing
the margin for safety for both firefighters and the community.
1. When considering the defendability of urban areas where the geometry of
vegetation fuel beds prevents landscape scale wildfire behaviour:
i.
The case studies presented in Chapter 3 indicate potential significant overestimation of radiant heat flux using the approach outlined in AS3959 in
cases involving non-combustible obstructions and point-source ignition
fires for a minimum of 20m separation from the fire front. This is significant as
it is in this distance that wildfire flame radiation is considered to have its
greatest impact (Cohen & Butler, 1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such
situations are common in urban environments. The results demonstrate the
importance of appropriately considering fuel geometry, wildfire behaviour,
and the effect of shielding structures when calculating radiant heat
impacts on buildings and emergency responders within urban
environments where vegetation fuel bed geometry prevents wildfires
reaching landscape proportions.
ii.
Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could, in turn, result
in firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes
as a result of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that indicates
suppression efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and
impacts on communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression
thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour parameters throughout
9-1

A HANDBOOK OF WILDFIRE ENGINEERING | REPORT NO. 590.2020

jurisdictions internationally. Where inappropriate predictions fail to consider
vegetation geometry that does not support the assumptions of landscape
wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable areas may be left unguarded
due inappropriate evaluation of suppression strategies.
1. Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in late 2019 and
early 2020 throughout Australia are dynamic and complex disasters that require
significant interstate and international resourcing over prolonged durations. When
such events occur they will inevitably impact life and property as well as
overwhelming firefighting efforts. Chapter 4 discussed the strategies available to
firefighters, their limitations, and where the evidence suggests they may be
successful. Detailed and accurate planning is required to be completed by IMT’s
and fire behaviour specialists to ensure firefighting operations are suitable and to
minimise the potential for firefighter injury. When applied correctly and in the right
context, the findings of new research including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist
IMT’s to achieve this.
2. As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega wildfires, detailed
predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in itself is insufficient. Care must be
taken to bridge the theory – practice gap and ensure planning is operationally
relevant. The research presented in this chapter demonstrates that even in mild
conditions, the head fire will often be unstoppable where it occurs in continuous
vegetation fuel bed geometry. This is further supported by the findings presented
in Chapters 5 and 6.The use of existing wildfire scars and prescribed burns for
wildfire suppression can only be considered opportunistic and with marginal
chance of success unless the burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and
significant in area. As climate change continues to result in worsening fire
conditions, frontline firefighters, IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists need to apply
increased scrutiny to fuel bed structure and geometry, focusing suppression efforts
where fuels are discontinuous and broken.
1. It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do not
systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, I and LF)
combined with the associated potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters
attempting suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario. Current
fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not specifically address the
tenability of environmental conditions in the proximity of the flaming zone where
firefighters are often working to suppress the fire. Once tenability thresholds are
considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack on the head of large wildfires
is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all but the mildest of conditions.
2. Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous defensive rural
urban interface firefighting is. Firefighters exposed to head fire fronts will potentially
be subjected to levels of radiant heat that are capable of causing severe
incapacitating burns in as little as five seconds in elevated fire weather conditions
and higher fuel loads. Incident Controllers and fire crew leaders must therefore
carefully consider whether properties and the occupants that shelter insider them
are defendable or whether the credible risk to their own crews is too high. As
discussed in Chapter 7, firefighters have a personal risk tolerance higher than that
of their commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more likely
than their ranking officers to commit themselves to defending occupants from
insuppressible wildfire fronts. This is potentially due to firefighters’ own personal
expectations that they should put themselves in personal danger to protect and
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rescue civilians, whist officers also consider the responsibility of keeping their crews
safe and potential greater reaching consequences on the firefighter’s family
should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire suppression operations
(Penney, 2019).
3. As opposed to being part of an RUI strategy, sheltering inside or behind firefighting
appliances during the passage of a wildfire front should be considered an
absolute last resort only. Instead, firefighters should seek refuge in suitable
structures well before the expected impact of the wildfire front and emerge to
salvage property where they are able to do so. Committing to a RUI defense by
positioning firefighters in between a landscape scale forest wildfire front and
private property or critical infrastructure with the expectation that suppression
efforts will be either safe or successful is at best, reckless. Even the intervention of
aerial firefighting suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this approach safe
or effective. Given the extreme danger associated with RUI firefighting, it should
be considered only as a contingency plan except in extreme circumstances
where large populations of vulnerable communities including school, nursing
homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior to the arrival of the wildfire
front.
1. Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to landscape scale
forest and woodlands fires drops significantly as the active flame depth of the
head fire increases. By understanding this concept, as well as how vegetation
structure influences fire behaviour and fire front geometry, IMT’s and firefighters
can more realistically assess the potential for suppression success. At the same
time, if fire behaviour specialists understand these relationships, they are better
prepared to describe the fire behaviour in terms that are meaningful for the IMT
and frontline firefighters. The use of guiding analysis such as that presented in this
and other chapters may assist IMT’s determine that suppression strategies are
unlikely to succeed and resources would be better spent in evacuations or
allowing crews more time to prepare to defend vulnerable assets.

1. The findings of this chapter should be a stark reminder to firefighters of the
limitations of vehicle mounted sprinkler protection systems. Whilst vehicle
protection systems including sprinklers may be successful in increasing the
survivability of mild burnovers against which they’ve been tested, existing
specifications are unlikely to afford sufficient protection against the wildfires
modelled in Chapter 5. An unrealistic expectation of vehicle protection system
performance may contribute to firefighters having a false sense of safety and
security, and thereby being more likely to commit to suppression strategies in
untenable circumstances.
2. The solution to these issues may, in part, rest with:
i.
Updated wildfire suppression training for firefighters clearly identifying the
limitations of vehicle protection systems and effects of vehicle orientation
during burnover events;
ii.
Greater acknowledgement by IMT’s of the physical limits of wildfire
suppression and an earlier consideration of defensive firefighting strategies
with opportunistic ‘surgical’ offensive tactics;
iii.
Increased fire services investment in wildfire appliance design with a focus
on passive design protection elements that mirror AS3959, particularly
surrounding glazing and cabin construction.
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1. In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services, this chapter
provides important qualitative and quantitative data that can be used to improve
risk management during dynamic emergency operations. When considered
together with literature reviewed, the results of the first study explicitly reject any
notion of the validity of “dynamic risk management” being a stand-alone process
for managing risk during emergency situations. For best practice to be realised,
the architectural structure or process of risk management as defined in ISO31000
cannot change. The context in which risk management is completed may vary in
dynamic emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms;
however, it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency situations that only
further requires the risk management process to be completed in its entirety each
and every time risk is assessed and subsequently managed.
2. The data presented in this chapter identified recurrent thermoregulatory and
critical incident related risk trends across all activity groups. These trends are
significant because they are associated with greater potential for serious
consequences of hospitalisation or long term disability compared to less severe,
but more frequently occurring, physical strain related injuries. In terms of affecting
risk management during frontline operations, these results suggest Incident
Controllers need to take enhanced steps to mitigate thermoregulatory related
and physical strain related risks. Proactive management may include enhanced
mobilisation and rotation of personnel at incidents to reduce physical loading,
whilst the risks may be reactively managed through implementation of active
recovery procedures and medical monitoring of crews at incidents by qualified
medical practitioners to ensure it is safe for them to continue working. Both during
and post the emergency phase of incidents, the Incident Controller should ensure
crew mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to psychological
events.
3. During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or
catastrophic adverse outcomes is present.
The potential consequence is
consistently greater than the actual consequence realised in the data analysed.
This may be explained by the mitigating effects of post event barriers (PPE, physical
conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the personnel involved escaped more
serious injury due to a combination of events that led to them being close to the
impact, as opposed to being in the direct line of impact. In light of this finding it is
important that incident controllers and operational personnel remain vigilant to
the potentially ‘normalising’ effect of recurrent exposure to potentially
catastrophic, albeit low frequency, situations.

9.3 Implications for fire behaviour specialists and urban planners

1. To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the accuracy of
modelled wildfire outputs the following is recommended:
iii.
Classification of vegetation based solely on qualitative descriptors should
not over-ride the wildfire behaviour model applied to the scenario without
due consideration of the wildfire behaviour expected to occur through
the vegetation. Using the case study previously provided as an example,
whilst the vegetation could reasonably be classified as Class A Forest or
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iv.

Class B Woodlands, applying the Noble et al wildfire behaviour model to
either of these options without modifying the deemed fuel loads would
significantly result in over-estimation of wildfire outputs. In urban areas
where vegetation geometry restricts wildfire growth, a more appropriate
and accurate approach is to assess the fuel load utilizing Vesta Fuel
Hazard Scores and apply the correct vegetation availability factor.
Further guidance on this can be found in Chapters 2 and 3; and
Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning perspectives)
involved in modelling wildfire and calculating potential impacts require a
sound understanding of the respective models and their limitations.
Caution should be applied when attempting to ‘simplify’ complex
equations, models or engineering concepts in standards, guidance
material or documents for use by lay persons or in land use planning
decisions. The profession of wildfire engineering is in its infancy and job
titles do not necessarily equate to the knowledge and skills required to
complete the required technical analysis or make informed and accurate
decisions. This can be in part be remedied by professionalization /
accreditation of the sector and greater recognition of the role of fire
safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds in it.

1. Perhaps the greatest implications of Chapter 2 for urban planners applies to
assessments of potential wildfire behaviour in urban areas where the landscape
scale wildfire behaviour assumed in AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines
is not possible. Where vegetation fuel bed geometry (refer back to Chapter 1)
prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to section 2.3 of this
chapter), as reported in recent studies (Penney & Richardson, 2019), failure to
adequately adjust inputs may result in the significant over-calculation of potential
wildfire behaviour. This can be in part be remedied by deference in such instances
to suitably qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds that can
provide quantified analysis and an appropriate level of fire safety engineering rigor
to design solutions.
1. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public open
space, road reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn, land that is
actually suitable for development may be identified as being subject to
overestimated wildfire impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether.
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small unmanaged vacant
residential lot is modelled as supporting a landscape scale wildfire, in turn
restricting or prohibiting development on adjacent and near-by lots.
2. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant construction
standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders development through
either misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels of wildfire
impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of
wildfire resistant engineering and construction required.
3. In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the vegetation
availability factor previously discussed, the methodologies proposed also retain
the assumption of a flame emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a landscape
scale wildfire with an active uniform flame front depth greater than 2 m, and even
potentially greater than 10 m (Poon, 2003; Sullivan, 2009). In cases where the active
flame front will not reach this depth, it may also be suitable to reduce the emissivity.
It is important to note that whilst the vegetation factor and modified view factor
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model are applicable to all fuel types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub, grassland,
etc.), the point source acceleration model presented in Chapter 3 is suitable for
treed forest and woodland structures only, as fire growth in other fuel structures
may be significantly faster.
4. The models presented in Chapter 3 are not intended to address the potential
radiant heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being involved in fire. In part,
this is inherently considered within AS3959 through the requirement that associated
structures on the same parcel of land and within 6m of the dwelling subject to
enhanced construction standards, must also be constructed to that same
standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the land development should be
constructed to the required standard of wildfire resistance, in theory significantly
reducing the potential for mass conflagration spreading between multiple houses.
Due to the differences in wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation models
as well as the difference in building and structure performance once impacted by
wildfire, it is suggested that a high level of technical expertise is required to
complete this process.
1. By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression strategies, urban
planners can significantly influence the defendability and resilience of
communities to wildfire impacts through appropriate design of development at
the RUI. The research and increased analysis presented in this chapter enables
wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered at the design stage of
RUI development. Evidence based design that incorporates minimum measures
for evacuations and eliminates the unrealistic expectation that firefighters will be
able to defend every property will lead to more appropriate passive 6 wildfire
resilient design
2. The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire Engineering
Reports, similar to the standard fire engineering processes within the urban fire
engineering profession will only further increase the standard of safety in bushfire
prone areas. These are detailed and complex technical documents however that
required a high degree of technical knowledge and proficiency from both the
engineer and the agencies involved.
1. Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia typically set deemed
to satisfy set the ‘acceptable’ 7 threshold for development at 10kW-2 (NSWRFS,
2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for vulnerable, critical or hazardous land use 8 and
between 19kWm-2 to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for standard
development such as subdivision. As detailed in this chapter, 10kWm-2 is
considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural PPC and breathing
apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60 seconds. At the same level, for a
healthy person without protective equipment, incapacitating burns are predicted
in approximately 60 seconds, with severe pain and first degree burns expected to
occur after substantially less exposure. By adopting these thresholds, communities
are effectively being designed to be undefendable by firefighters. At 29kWm-2,
firefighters in structural PPC and breathing apparatus are likely to face
6 Passive systems do not require action or maintenance. For instance, ensuring road
design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without additional control measures is a
passive measure that can be supported by appropriate and timely community evacuation
messages. Firefighters being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.
7 Planning approval will typically be provided.
8 Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.
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incapacitating burns in less than 30 seconds. This realisation is also significant for
firefighters and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of threatened
communities who must consider whether they are expected to, or are indeed
themselves expecting to do the impossible and un-survivable.
2. The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several approaches
that require consideration on a case by case basis:
i.
If development is required to be actively defendable by firefighters during
the passage of a wildfire front, the maximum radiant heat impact at any
point within the development needs to be within the window of safe and
effective wildfire suppression. In turn, this arguably either requires extensive
and permanent vegetation modification and fuel reduction around the
development, or appropriate landscaping that forms part of a passive
wildfire engineered design;
ii.
If development does not require active firefighter defense then the actual
level of wildfire radiant heat impact can, in theory, be addressed by the
application of enhanced wildfire resilient engineering construction such as
that detailed in AS3959. In turn, this may also allow the fire truck related
road access standards to such as those described in existing guidelines
(NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA, 2012; ) to be revisited;
iii.
Development of an evidence based performance based wildfire urban
planning code, similar to that of the Building Code of Australia and that
adopted by Tasmania (2017). This would need to go beyond the existing
and largely subjective planning guidelines and carry throughout the
planning and building legislation and process, as is the case in Victoria
(VSG, 2019);
iv.
Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering industry.
Whilst the existing Bushfire Planning and Design (BPAD) accreditation
scheme is the first step in this process, the technical knowledge and
expertise required of wildfire engineers arguably requires greater
accreditation and regulation.
1. The data and results presented in this chapter reinforce the implications for Urban
Planners discussed in Chapter 5.
1. The data and results presented in this chapter reinforce the implications for Urban
Planners discussed in Chapter 5.

Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable communities. Through
careful and appropriate urban design that considers potential wildfire behaviour,
defendability of communities, evacuation requirements and firefighter tenability using
evidence based fire engineering analysis, urban planners can enhance the safety of
communities in areas prone to wildfire and the firefighters that protect them.
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